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A b s t r a c t
The thesis argues for the centrality of normative theory in the study 
o f international relations because of its unique capacity to address 
values com prehensively, in contrast to the dom inant trad itions o f 
po litical realism  which m arginalises their theoretical significance. 
Two them es develop, each reflecting opposing pairs: fact/value,
is/ought, descrip tion /prescrip tion , feasib ility /desirab ility . The firs t 
them e concerns the ep istem olog ical fram ew ork p rov ided  by a 
norm ative account o f such values as the security and stability  o f 
knowledge and the orderly apprehension o f the world. In contrast 
to realism , norm ative theory m aintains the d is tinc tion  betw een 
sensory experience and the assignm ent o f m eaning, indicating the 
contingent nature o f epistemological foundations. The second theme 
concerns the political conditions o f knowledge which determ ine the 
role o f different theories, indicating the need for an adaptation o f 
the trad itional norm ative scholarship by overcom ing the separation 
o f ethics from politics which has so far limited its role. As values are 
central phenom ena in politics, and politics is essentially norm ative 
in form (as is knowledge o f it), consideration o f value questions 
cannot be lim ited  to peripheral com m entary. The two them es 
em erge  th ro u g h  an a ly ses  o f  the th e o re tic a l l i te ra tu re  in  
in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s ; o f  the p h ilo so p h ica l fo u n d a tio n s  o f
norm ative theory; o f its relationship to ideas and ideologies; o f the 
encapsu la tion  o f  values and in terests  in w orld view s; o f  the
com m unicative dynamic of norms in ethics and epistem ology; and 
finally o f the applied cases o f deterrence, and foreign policy. The
centrality  o f  norm ative theory is indicated, and its  re la tion  to
political theory and the study of international relations is examined.
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A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s
The Department o f International Relations at the London School o f 
Economics provided the ideal environm ent in which to explore and
debate the many facets of the discipline which this thesis addresses. 
Academic colleagues and students encountered along the way have 
all infuenced th is thesis, although th e ir aggregate effect could 
hardly be disassembled. I owe a special debt to my supervisor, 
M ichael Banks, for his patience and encouragem ent. D iscussions
with Michael Banks, Chris Brown, Robin Brown, M ichael Donelan, 
Mervyn Frost, Owen Hartley, Mark Hoffman, Robert Jackson, Hayo 
Krombach, Cornelia Navari, Rob W alker, Daniel W arner and Philip 
W indsor have left their mark. Robin Brown, M ervyn Frost, Owen 
H artley, Mark Hoffm an, Friedrich K ratochw il, Terry N ardin, and 
John Vincent were kind enough to give me written comments on my 
woik. I am grateful to them for challenging me to make the most o f 
my argument. Along with many others, I benefited from John 
Vincent's remarkable wit and insight until his untimely death on 2
November 1990, and my small part in a widely felt sense o f loss was 
sharpened by subsequent receipt o f his unfinished com ments on a 
draft o f  this thesis. The Departm ent o f Politics at Queen M ary 
College, The Department of Politics at The University o f Natal, and 
The Institute for International Studies at The U niversity o f Leeds 
contributed to the intellectual and social environment in which this 
thesis was w ritten. I was fortunate to have the support (and 
toleration) o f many friends. Ali, Alison, Allison, Anne, Ariane, Bob, 
Brad, Carla, Carol, Caroline, Cornelia, David, Dirk, Edw in, Eric,
Fernando, Fida, Franzi, Gill, Gisela, Gautam, Hayo, Hugh, Ian, Ingrid, 
Isabelle, James, Jo2o, John, Katarina, Kathleen, Kim, K ristina, Kurt, 
Leon, Lori, Malory, Marina, Mark, Max, Michelle, Mike, Nick, Peter, 
Philip, Rania, Razeen, Rebecca, Robin, Ronen, Shari, Simon, Spyros, 
Stephen, Steve, Tony and Yesim all shared in my life and7 work 
during the preparation o f this thesis, and are more im portant to me 
than I can easily say. My family has nurtured me and endured my 
shortcomings, and I dedicate this thesis to them. In acknowledging 
the assistance of these people I also absolve them of responsibility 
for this thesis, which is my own folly. H.C.D., Leeds, October 1992
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P r e f  a c e
The origins o f this thesis lie in a discom fort w ith  the policies o f 
states, which in pursuing some vaguely defined  national purpose 
abroad, seem to contradict the values held to underpin their own 
societies. This contradiction could be accounted for by lim iting
moral concern to members o f a given society, but this is hardly 
plausible in a world where national societies are interdependent. 
C ontradiction and hypocrisy are not them selves surprising, since 
contradictions are everyw here and hypocrisy is at common vice, but 
they lend confusion to the understanding o f national purposes and 
international relations. W hatever values justify  a  particular form o f 
social life, they cannot easily be sustained in a Qimited social sphere 
without finding purchase in the unlim ited global sphere. Sim ilarly, 
the values reflected  in the conditioned anarcfliy o f  in ternational
relations m ust have some relation to the lives and aspirations o f the 
w orld's peoples. The lives o f individuals and societies everywhere 
must be dim inished when the fragile artifices o f  social organisation
are underm ined by incoherence in the ir fundam ental po in ts o f 
reference. Consequently, the norm ative d im ensions o f international
relations seem worthy o f attention. However, traditional theories o f 
in ternational rela tions are lim ited in this resp ec t, being largely 
preoccupied with concrete  m aterial c ircum stances w hich im pinge 
upon these  re la tions, and little  concerned w ith  the norm ative 
param eters which endow purpose and meaning. W hat is referred to 
as normative theory is often a marginalised adjunct o f theories about 
power and w ealth, to w hich awkward ethical is>sues are relegated. 
Both human concern and theoretical challenge d irec t this thesis to 
the role o f norm ative theory in the study o f international relations.
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I n t r o d u c t i o n
The Present Argument
This thesis critically assesses the role o f norm ative theory in the
study o f in ternational re la tions, and as an in itia l prem ise, it
characterises this role as a central one: the attendance to essential
questions o f values. How and why it plays a central role, and what
this role amounts to, are the questions this thesis seeks to answer.
Values are considered in juxtaposition to interests or facts, although
their intimate relationship is an important issue, and the importance
is tw ofold: d istinguish ing  values brings th is la tte r variab le into
focus, but has also perm itted its m arginalisation in the study o f
international relations. The argument develops am idst conflicting
attitudes to norms, since what is largely a philosophical sociology of
in te r n a t io n a l  r e la t io n s ,  e x p o s in g  u n d e r ly in g  th e o re t ic a l
assum ptions and claim s, is at some points an applied sociology o f
international relations indicating agreed norms in practice (such as
inform the idea o f 'international society ') which inevitably im poses
some lim itations on the philosophical sociology bacause o f the
relation between theory and practice. Therefore, the use of* the term
'norm ative ' here does not mean simply 'p rescrip tive ', but is used
more generally to mean 'o f or having to do with norms'. N either
should use o f the term 'normative theory' be taken to suggest either
that there is 'non-norm ative theory' or that international relations
can be separated from norms - it is precisely the argum ent o f this
thesis that neither is possible and that theories o f  in ternational
7
re la tio n s  m ust be se lf-co n c io u sly  aw are o f  th a t con d itio n . 
Consequently, critically  assessing the role o f norm ative theory in 
the study o f international relations, this thesis is itself an exercise in 
norm ative theory .
Because o f the broad implications and the various facets o f a 
normative approach, various modes of analysis are employed as seem 
appropriate to the issue at hand, without straying from commitment 
to a norm ative perspective. 1 In identifying the role o f normative 
theory, this work is also a critical assessment o f traditional views of 
that role, and those dom inant theoretical approaches w hich have 
limited the role. This critique reflects a concern with the apparent 
d iv e rg e n c e , d u rin g  the  co u rse  o f th is  c e n tu ry , o f  tw o 
com plem entary elem ents in political theory, with the consequence 
that political theory generally (though here we are concerned with 
international theory in particular) has in some sense lost touch with
its traditional concerns, and perhaps with its own political character 
as well as that of its subject:
... it is necessary to appreciate that there are two 
aspects to political theory, traditionally conceived. It 
involves the analysis of what is politically feasible on
the one hand, and of what is desireable on the other.2
■y
The divergence o f these two aspects is exacerbated in the 
study o f in ternational relations by the assum ption tha t po litics
1 '...an inquiry may move at need from mode to mode, with no sense of changing 
imposing school commitments in so doing.’ Abraham Edel, Analyzing Concepts in 
Social Science: Science. Ideology, and Value. Vol. 1 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction 
Books, 1979), p. 138.
2 Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its
Critics (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp 1-2.
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occurs w ithin the context o f the sta te  and national socie ty , 
prom pting M artin W ight to ask 'Why is there no in te rna tional 
th e o ry ? '3
In theories o f in ternational re la tions, the dom inant ones 
having considerable influence on the conduct o f world affairs, this 
has had the un fo rtunate  e ffec t o f  ra th e r m a rg in a lis in g  the 
exploration o f the desireable ends of the state or o f the international 
system  as a whole (in any fundam ental way, at any ra te ), and 
m arginalising the problems o f difference and identity in respect to 
the values which inform  desired ends - 'g iven  the w idespread 
presum ption that science deals with facts only, philosophers were 
loath to present themselves as defenders of any particular values’.^ 
S im ilarly, a distinction can be made between descriptive em pirical 
accounts o f the norms o f international relations which give rise to 
claim s or actions, and prescriptive abstract critiques o f the values 
which underlie these norms, understood as signposts o f m eaning. 
H owever, such distinctions are challenged when seen in the context 
o f  a dialogue between the two aspects. The division o f labour in 
political theorising may now be nearing its end, although the debate 
about method is not closed, o f course, and attem pts at closure or 
assumptions about the unique validity of a given method are futile.
The present norm ative approach makes room for both inform al 
modes o f phenom enological and ordinary language analysis, while 
tend ing  tow ard p ragm atism 3 , or instrum entalism ^, in as much as
3 This being the title of Wight's essay in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight 
(Eds), Diplomatic Investigations: Essavs in the Theory of International Politics 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), first published in International 
Relations (Vol. 2, No. 1, April 1960).
4 Kukathas and Pettit, op. cit., p. 4.
5 See subsequent references to Peirce, James, and Rorty.
6 See subsequent references to Dewey.
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these la tter result in 'a forward-looking attitude in which analytic 
emphasis falls on the promise that an idea carries'.?
N orm ative theory is critical in another sense, shared w ith 
critical theory and post-m odernist thought: it im plies the necessity 
o f continuous critique and questioning o f foundations, such that
w hatever philosophical or theoretical foundations underw rite  the 
study o f international relations they must be viewed as ultim ately 
contextual or contingent, and not in any full sense absolute. It is 
argued that this is nevertheless a sound enough basis for both ethics 
and epistemology as applied in this field, and as 'practically ' useful 
as any em pirically based system o f knowledge, while sharing none 
o f the constra in ing  features o f pure em piricism , or sc ien tific
positivism . It thus retains some o f the em ancipatory o r utopian 
asp irations o f  ph ilosophical and theoretical trad ition . B enhabib 
m akes the rela tion  between norm ative and critica l theory  m ore 
cogent by placing the latter between practical philosophy and social 
s c ie n c e :
W hat d is tin g u ish e s  c r it ic a l so c ia l th eo ry  from
positiv isic sociology then is its em phatic n o r m a t i v e  
d im e n s io n ...[w h ic h ]  p re se rv e s  th e  in te n tio n s  o f
p ractical philosophy to  rationally  articu la te  a m ore
adequate form o f  human existence and to * en lighten  
them in its attainm ent.8
B enhabib  em ploys H aberm as's theory  o f  com m unica tive
? Edel, op. c i t p. 14. For a useful discussion of conceptual analysis, see his 
philosophical overview of modes of analysis, pp. 1-41.
8 Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of
Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 5.
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action to argue that social action is not to be regarded in terms of
sub ject-ob ject re la tions:
Comm unicative for social action is the subject-subject 
re la tion , which we can understand as a form  o f 
linguistically  m ediated com m unication.^
T his is a lso  the perspective  o f norm ative theory  as
charac terised  here , in w hich the m eaning o f the o b jec t is
determ ined by inter-subjectively agreed norm s, and for w hich the
role of language - as the medium of agreement - is clearly central. 
Thus H orkheim er's view of the social constitu tion o f nature is 
p referred  over the 'm odern, m echanistic  concep tion  o f  nature
which Durkheim takes for granted'. 10
This is also a position which permits a universal rationalism, 
although this is not a necessary condition o f norm ative theorising.
L inklater suggests that in Hedley Bull's la ter w ritings, rationalism
cam e nearer to 'considering the rights and duties w hich m ight 
underpin a d ifferent form o f universal political organisation ' and
that as a consequence, rationalism 'may be regarded as a bridge 
between realism and the critical theory o f international relations', 
in as much as states are committed (in practice) to consensus and 
o rder, w hich requ ires  tha t 'ce rta in  norm s are regarded  as 
u n iv e rs a lly  b in d in g '.!  1 This last is an em pirical sociological 
observation about the international system, typical o f  the English 
School theorists o f international society, and will be criticised here
9 ibid., p. xi.
*0 See ibid., p. 3.
11 Andrew Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and 
International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1990), p. 20-1.
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for reifying (that is, positing the static reality of) the norms o f the 
states-system . W hile normative theory accounts for existing norms, 
it also enables a critique of given norms and their sources.
The em phasis on values allows for two them es w ithin the 
overall argument, related to the two aspects of political theory noted 
above - feasibility and desireability - and reflected in the recurrent 
opposing pairs o f fact/value, is/ought, descrip tion /prescrip tion .
The firs t them e concerns the ep istem olog ical fram ew ork 
provided by a normative account of knowledge, where values such as 
the  secu rity  and s ta b ility  o f know ledge and the  o rd e rly  
apprehension o f  the world can be explained and com prehended 
(w ith o u t g iv ing  way to co nservativ ism , and a llow ing  am ple 
opportun ity  fo r critique). It is necessary to d istingu ish  th is  
epistem ological dim ension because while the m oral dim ension of 
n o rm a t iv e  s t ru c tu re s  is co m m o n ly  a c k n o w le d g e d , th e  
epistem ological aspect is not so readily incorporated into political 
th inking. W hile m aintaining a heightened consciousness o f  the 
uncertain and contingent nature o f epistem ological foundations, a 
no rm ative  approach to ep istem olog ical values can neverthe less  
provide a system atic account of knowledge which is sensitive to 
changing or competing values (for example, paradigm s), as well as 
the distinction between sensory experience and the assignm ent o f 
m e a n in g . *2  *
T he second them e concerns the po litica l cond itions  o f 
know ledge, which determ ine the role of different theories. This 
po litical dim ension indicates the need for an adaptation o f  the
*2 See, Jerzy Wrdblewski, 'Cognition of Norms and Cognition Through Norms', 
in di Bernardo (ed), Normative Structures of the Social World (Amsterdam: Editions 
Rodopi, 1988), especially p. 244.
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trad itional role o f norm ative scholarship  as m oral com m entary, 
which arises from the critique of traditional approaches which lim it 
the role of norm ative theory. Normative theory, as defined here,
denies the separation o f ethics from politics arising from the natural 
rights tradition and realist conceptions o f the state which have led to 
a separate and easily marginalised study o f morals.! 3
T he th e s is  p re se n te d  h e re  is th a t  v a lu es  a r e  c e n tr a l
p h e n o m e n a  in  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ;  t h a t  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s ,  a n d  k n o w le d g e  o f th e m , a r e  e s s e n t i a l l y  
n o rm a t iv e  in  fo rm ; th a t  c o n s id e ra t io n  o f v a lu e  q u e s tio n s
c a n n o t n o t b e  lim ited  to  m o ra lis in g  o r  o th e rw ise  p e r if e r a l  
q u a l i f ic a t io n s  o f  t r a d i t i o n a l  e x p la n a t io n s  o f  in t e r n a t i o n a l  
r e la t io n s ;  a n d  th a t  n o rm a tiv e  th e o ry  p la c e s  v a lu e s  a t  th e  
h e a r t  o f  in te r n a t io n a l  th e o ry .
The two thematic trends (noted above) often meet one another 
in the overall argum ent, and are elaborated separately  below  to 
provide the reader with some guidance as to their relationship and
d is t in c tiv e n e s s .
Values in Knowledge
A norm ative account o f knowledge, as discussed here, denies the 
tra d i t io n a l  se p a ra tio n  o f  is -o u g h t, fa c t-v a lu e , d e sc r ip t io n -  
prescription, and argues that they are inseparable characteristics o f 
the world as it is apprehended by humans. Because knowledge is 
acquired , validated and shared through the co llective process o f
!3 See the argument in Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia, p. 6.
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assigning meaning, to what only then may be considered objects o f
know ledge, all such contributions to know ledge are sub ject to 
co llec tive  hum an valuations which inevitably em ploy norm s as 
their point o f reference in the medium o f communication.
Taking into account the lim its to human com prehension o f 
human affairs (beyond which any greater certainty would require a 
K ierkegaardian leap of faith) a norm ative approach provides the 
closest proxim ity to 'abso lu te ' know ledge or truth as is e ither
necessary, desireable, or possible, leaving the m atter o f faith  to
transcendent beliefs or confidence in human nature. Thus it can, in
a sense, approxim ate the goals o f secular/rational scientism , but 
w ithout resort to absolutist foundations.
In providing a fram ew ork o f po litical understanding that 
remains flexible in its foundations, while recognising the need for 
structured knowledge (viewed as a normative structure in this case), 
a norm ative approach offers a po ten tial un iversal background 
theory for the study o f international r e l a t i o n s .  14 On this account, 
p a rtia l know ledge and particu la r investigations can be linked  
meaningfully to a greater whole without the necessity o f 'com plete' 
knowledge (in the absolute sense), since the framework is one o f 
form or relationship rather than content, and hence adaptable.
Values in In ternational Relations
The difficulty  o f identifying values has given rise to value non-
14 Note again Beitz's remark that normative ideas are most powerful when 
operating 'in the background'. Charles R. Beitz, 'Recent International Thought', 
International Journal (Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1988), p. 203.
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cognitivist theories which dismiss the subject m atter out o f  hand.
W hile traditional theories of international relations often refer to 
moral concerns, it is generally to dismiss the m atter o f values more
gently, but with equal effect. One reason for this dismissive attitude 
is the assum ption tha t values are s tric tly  p rescrip tive  (in  an 
uninteresting way), have no descriptive function, no substance, and
hence no significance in the analysis o f politics.
Here, it is argued that prescription and description ('ought'
and 'is ') are intimately related, and that values are im plicit in both 
functions (as discussed above in reference to system atic knowledge).
Thus, the political significance of values - as distinct from desired
objects, or objective interests - is their role as m ediators in both 
p rescrip tive  and descrip tive  accounts o f po litic s. V alues are 
necessary points o f reference both in prescribing w hat would be 
good to do or what ought to be done, and in describing what already 
is, in term s o f those existing political values w hich determ ine
interests or objects of desire. On this account, values are the
substance o f political system s and structures, and the appropriate 
objects o f study.
Benhabib says (noting Hegel's argument, as against legalistic 
Kantian ethics) that the institutions and practices o f collective life -
e th ica l life  - are 'to be viewed as part o f  a functionally
in te rd ep en d en t to ta lity  o f  social re la tio n s  and p ra c tic e s '.!  5
S im ilarly , and desp ite  the absence o f  a 'g lo b a l s ta te ', any 
com prehension  o f  in terests  or tangib le assets in in terna tional
15 Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia, op. cit. , p. 309. It is worth 
noting here that the later Hegel maintained a distinction between the state, as an 
expression of the Spirit, and civil society. See the discussions in TorbjOra L. Knutsen, 
A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 1992) and Philip Windsor, The State and War' in Cornelia Navari (ed), The 
Condition of States (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991).
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relations depends on a comprehension of the values at play, for it is 
these latter which give political meaning to the pursuit o f interests
and the formulation of purposes. As opposed to the traditional moral 
standpoint, playing into the discrepancy between is and ought and 
projecting universalised subjective values into an unfriendly world 
o f  facts, the properly co llective ethical standpoint contains the 
individual moral standpoint but also allows that
w ith in  an in te rs u b je c tiv e ly  sh a red  c o n te x t o f  
institutional action, one's action and purposes becom e 
recognisable by others in accordance with socia lly
shared rules and meaning patterns.* 6
Structure o f  the Argument
The argument begins in the context o f an ongoing debate about the 
status o f international relations as an academic discipline, o r field o f
study (and a sim ilar debate concerning the status o f norm ative
theorising). Ensuing problems of defining the subject m atter, and
parad igm atic  d ifferences, mean that the appropria te  m ethod o f 
understanding is not settled (as well as it is in the natural sciences,
for example). That the study and practice of international relations
continues nevertheless thus implies a significant body o f contested 
co ncep ts  and prob lem atic  assum ptions. N orm ative theory  is 
the re fo re  em ployed as a m eans o f revealing  and add ressing  
epistem ological questions in this field. C hapter One exam ines
16 lb id .% p. 79.
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m ethodological issues arising from this application o f values, and 
the relationship o f values to facts through the medium of theoretical 
accounts o f reality. In particular the consequences o f adopting a 
herm eneutic ra ther than positiv is t approach are considered , and 
also the 'is-ought' problem, 'understood to be the manifold o f general 
and fundamental problems about the nature of practical thinking in
general, whether it is moral or not'.* 7
The first task is to discern the means by which an agreed 
understanding o f  the subject m atter has been obtained, in the midst 
o f epistem ological uncertainty. It is shown that this has been
achieved prim arily by the dom inance of one paradigm : Realism . 
This provides, therefore, the starting point for a critical assessm ent 
o f the discipline and the role o f normative theory in it. It is argued 
that realism, as a dominant paradigm, ignores values and leaves open 
the issue o f political purposes, relying instead on the categories o f
'national interest' and 'power' o f states, but w ithout providing any 
foundation for their existence let alone their interests. Chapter Two 
provides an analysis of the literature and the dom inant p lace o f 
realism there, w hile Chapter Three introduces the role o f normative 
theory in contrast. Normative theory is presented as a means o f
revealing value structures that underlie and inform interests, and a 
means o f accounting for political purposes in terms o f social values 
rather than in term s o f such sterile categories as states *and their 
in te re s ts .
H aving already made the connection betw een values and 
facts, the next task is to consider how these value-laden facts are
17 Hector-Neri Castafleda, 'Ought, Reasons, Motivation, and the Unity of the 
Social Sciences: The Meta-theory of the Ought-Is Problem', in Giuliano di Bernardo 
(ed) op. cit.t p. 7.
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related to political ideas through conciousness and the need for 
action. Hence the normative characteristics of ideas and ideologies 
are examined. Ideas are presented as a fundamental influence on 
po litica l events; on the h isto rical progression  o f in ternational 
politics. Ideologies are seen as the means of conveying ideas about
political purposes, and ideology in general is characterised as the 
form o f political engagement. These, then, are fitted to the pattern
of normative structures which link values (and ideas about them) to 
the facts o f political practice. Chapter Four examines the place of 
ideas from a range of philosophical perspectives, and the connection 
between ideas and ideology in political life.
Because ideas and ideology give meaning to political purposes, 
the values that underlie these political purposes are connected to 
knowledge o f both purposes and the political environm ent in which
they are defined and pursued. Thus it is im portant to locate the
relationship between systems o f values and system s o f knowledge:
betw een eth ics and epistem ology. Chapter F ive undertakes an 
investigation o f this relationship, suggesting that political ideas give
rise to norm ative concepts through the use of moral language in 
descrip tions o f in ternational po litics, thus revealing  the relative 
sim ilarity o f form between ethics and epistemology.
The argum ent continues by exam ining the key relationship
betw een values and interests. The above m entioned inorm ative
concepts, reflecting values, provide the foundation o f beliefs and
expectations in political practice, which are then held to  be
interests. In order to determine the role o f normative theory in the
study and p ractice o f international relations, it is necessary to
identify the processes by which values inform and influence the
practical pursuit o f interests through foreign policy. It is argued in
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C hapter Six that the array o f values and consequent in terests  
displayed by a state (or other potential actor) are encapsulated in a 
world view which guides and limits the formation o f foreign policy. 
Furthermore, it is argued that such a settled world view is necessary 
to the stable apprehension o f reality, and provides the only basis for 
p o litic a l cho ice and action . The consequen t d ilem m a fo r 
in ternational po litics is the resolution o f d iffering world view s 
which may be the source of either cognitive dissonance or outright 
conflict, or both.
In order to examine the effects of a world view on political
choice and on the outcome o f policy decisions, the argument then
focuses on a substantive policy area - nuclear strategy > and on
foreign policy formation and analysis in Chapter Seven. Because of
the central importance of nuclear policy in world affairs, it provides
a suitable case for the general argument: the possibility o f collective
self-destruction suggests at least one universal political value and
focusses atten tion  on the potential o f hum an agency. M ore
specifically , this area o f policy provides a clear exam ple o f the
norm ative content and structure of political choice, and indicates
the predom inant im portance of norm ative judgem ents even in a
policy-form ation process which is so burdened with em pirical and
technical considerations. The normative character o f policy choice
is emphasised by an examination o f the particular debate -^about the
ethics o f deterrence, but this examination reveals problems with the
rationale and justification  o f nuclear policies which would be o f
general concern even were the ethical im plications thought to be
uninteresting. Value-informed beliefs underlie 'in terests ' for which
a strategy o f defence, or its realisation, is devised. This chapter
inevitably  returns to the question o f po litical purpose and its
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foundations, in as much as a proper understanding o f strategic 
issues requires an appreciation o f the political goals to w hich 
strategies are directed.
D raw ing on insights from the specific case o f  nuclear 
deterrence, the argum ent turns to an assessm ent o f norm ative 
influences in policy form ation and analysis generally. Here the
problem s o f identifying political goals and the appropriate means to 
achieve them are shown to have profound norm ative im plications, 
w hich cannot be escaped in even the m ost m undane policy- 
processes. Bringing the central themes o f the argument to bear on
the practical and (given the predominance of state actors) essential 
activity o f foreign policy decision-making shows the extent to which
norms and values pervade political structures. It also indicates that
the trad itional em phasis on state-centric realist forms o f political 
behaviour and on the m anipulation o f em pirical data (both in 
po licy-m aking  and policy analysis) does not perm it norm ative 
questions to be dism issed, but only ignored. The trend in  the 
litera tu re  tow ards a greater in terest in norm ative approaches is 
discussed, as are the implications for policy formation which follow 
from a growing awareness o f normative issues as a significant and 
substantial aspect o f political life.
The argument is drawn to a close with a concluding discussion
o f actual and possible roles for norm ative theory w lych have
already been introduced in the course of uncovering the extent o f
norm ative structures and influences. The notion o f a norm ative
background theory , as a basis for particu la r investigations or
theoretical constructs, is exam ined once again in the ligh t o f
discussions above. Similarly, the central question o f whether values
or in terests should be the principal focus o f political inquiry is
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addressed once more. The argument that normative theory cannot 
address practical or 'real' political problems, and that these can only 
be understood  in term s o f  o b jec tive  m ateria l in te res ts  and 
em pirically observed facts, is dism issed with the conclusion that 
normative theory can, should, and does play a fundamental role in 
the study o f international relations.
The following section is a further introductory exploration of 
the nature o f normative theory.
Norm ative Theory
W hile the term 'normative' is frequently used in the literature, and 
generally understood to suggest e ither a moral elem ent or some 
other prescriptive character, it is usually left undefined. Equally, 
'norm ative theory ' is a phrase often used but seldom  defined. 
Because o f such omissions, and because these terms will be widely 
employed in the following arguments, it is approriate to set out their 
various m eanings here. A fu ller exploration o f defin itions is 
presented in the following chapter.
Because of the nature o f his project, Mervyn Frost provides a 
useful definition in his book. Towards a N orm ative T heory  o f 
In terna tional R e l a t i o n s .*** in setting out the critical question on the 
second page - 'W hat ought to be done in international relations?' he 
a lread y  id e n tif ie s  the tra d itio n a l d is tin g u ish in g  fea tu re  o f  
norm ative statem ents: the use o f 'ought' as d istinct from  'is '.
Subsequently, he refers to
18 Mervyn Frost, Towards a .Normative Theory of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2.
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...the set of ideas and rules constituting the civil and 
political relationships between them [states]...
and observes that
...the evaluation o f these rules - which activity I have 
ca lled  norm ative theory - is c learly  o f card inal 
im p o rtan ce . * 9
Frost also points to the convergence o f international relations 
theory with critical social science (cf. Brian Fay)20 as surpassing 
in te rp re ta tio n  and descrip tiv ism  in question ing  p rac tices  and 
developing new ones.21 This suggests that normative theory, being 
tied up in this convergence, is a particularly adaptable theoretical 
approach which is sensitive to political change, and thus suitable for 
addressing it.
A n o th e r u sefu l d e f in itio n  appears  in  C h ris  B row n 's  
International Relations Theory: New Normative A pproaches:
By norm ative international relations theory is m eant
ibid., p. 64.
20 See Brian Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice (London: Allen and
Unwin, 1975), pp. 90-1, concerning the characterisation of interpretive and critical 
social science, as being essentially conservative and potentially innovative 
respectively. Following Fay's distinction, one might consider the two aspects of 
normative theory as having similar characteristics: as descriptive theory it may be 
necessarily conservative in describing the status quo order (though nevertheless 
sufficiently insightful to allow for immanent change), while as prescriptive theory it 
may allow for alternative interpretations of the reality it addresses, since choices 
must be made.
2* Ibid., pp. 26-7. See also Andrew Linklater, Bevond Realism and Marxism. 
op. cit. The relation between normative theory and critical theory will be addressed 
further below.
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that body of work which addresses the moral dimension 
o f international relations and the w ider questions of 
m ean in g  and in te rp re ta tio n  g e n e ra te d  by the  
d isc ip lin e .^  2
Brown argues that while it is possible to have theory which is not
involved with norm s, 'a very great deal o f what is traded in 
in ternational re la tions as non-norm ative theory  is steeped  in
normative assumptions', and says that it is possible (if controversial) 
to defend the view that a ll theory is normative.2 3
W hat has perhaps most com m only characterised norm ative 
theory, while at the same time constraining it in some respects, is a 
close association with morality and ethics. This sort o f view is taken 
by Charles Beitz, though the focus on moral and ethical issues
clearly does not diminished the breadth o f implications:
In international politics as in other areas o f social
inquiry , norm ative ideas have the ir m ost pow erful
e ffec ts  when they operate , so to speak, in the
background: they m otivate em pirica l in v estig a tio n ,
shape research agendas, and affect the choice o f
methods in a variety of subtle ways.2 4
7
What arises from such uses of the term 'norm ative' indicates 
that there is something called a 'norm' from which the adjective is 
derived. For the moment we may define a norm as a standard (a
22 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 3.
23 Ibid., and note 4.
24 Charles R. Beitz, 'Recent International Thought’, op. cit., p. 203.
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fuller definition o f norms is provided in Chapter One), and among
the most common standards in social and political life are moral
norms. The relation between morality and ethics is, indeed, defined
in terms of norms: Morality is otherwise known as norm ative e th ics ,
ind icating  that ethical judgem ents are made in reference to a 
p a rticu la r norm (or set o f norm s), which m ight be a ltered
subsequen tly  o r m ight only apply to p a rticu la r persons o r
c irc u m s ta n c e s .
Thus there is an ambiguity in the term 'normative': it may be 
descriptive either o f that which makes reference to a given norm, or 
o f norms themselves in general. Some theorists demand a distinction 
between the norm ative (by which is meant 'the prescriptive') and
the d esc rip tiv e ; between a deontic m odality  and the actual
circum stance o f that modality. Here, the norm ative is viewed as
inclusive o f both the prescrip tive and the descrip tive, on the 
grounds that these roles of a norm ative international theory are
co ex isten t and com plem entary , no tw ith stand ing  the  d iffe ren ce  
between the two roles. This double meaning gives normative theory 
a broad range, in that it may be employed in addressing particular 
practices which refer to a norm, or in addressing the way in which 
norm s ex ist, evolve, are prom ulgated, and perhaps even tually  
su p e rc e d e d .
W hat is essential to the present undertaking, however, is the
necessity  o f revealing the values at play both in in ternational 
re la tions (the 'ob jec t' o f  study) and in the  ep istem o log ica l 
foundations o f  our understanding of it. N orm ative theory is 
presented here as being uniquely concerned w ith values as a 
significant aspect o f both the practice and study o f international
relations, and consequently a fruitful theoretical approach.
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C h a p t e r  One
M eth o d o lo g y : V a lu es , T h e o ry , F a c ts .
This chapter on m ethodology investigates the role o f norms in 
in ternational rela tions theory in the context o f  ep istem ological 
traditions, and characterises the special relationship between values 
and facts that arises from the interpretive function of theory.
In th is respect norm ative approaches to the study o f
international relations reflect concern with issues larger than the 
description and prediction of events in the analysis o f substantive 
issue and policy areas. This is not to belittle the conventional or
traditional activ ities o f international relations scholars, but rather 
to assess critically the assumptions and philosophical foundations of 
these undertakings. The rationale for such a critical assessm ent is 
simply that the soundness and character of these assum ptions bears 
directly on the efficacy and propriety o f the practical activities 
which they support.
To da te  the m ethodolog ical s ig n ifican ce  o f  no rm ative
in ternational theory  has been little  d iscussed , in sp ite  o f  a 
considerable body o f work which can be described as being o f  a
norm ative character. W hile some o f the literature is specifically 
indicated as norm ative theory, the history of norm ative thought in 
the study o f international relations (such as there is o f  it) is 
somewhat chequered, and comprised of eclectic and com peting ideas
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which seldom receive system atic a tten tion .1 Before examining the
literature, however, we must attend to a prior task: the definition and
explication o f norms, and those normative concepts which will be 
applied in various ways throughout the work.
D efinition of Terms
Norms are, ordinarily  speaking, standards or m easures (from the 
Latin N o r m a , a carpenter’s square or rule). More generally, a norm 
is 'a standard or pattern or type considered representative o f  a 
g ro u p ’. 2 In the social or political context norms are (descriptively) 
standards o f behaviour - o f social and political action - and 
(prescriptively) reasons which dictate such action.
It is central to this thesis that the com mon practice in
philosophy is to make a distinction between the prescriptive and the 
descriptive, thus tempting an assumption that the norm ative belongs
only to the prescriptive. Avrum Stroll, for one, argues that this is a 
m istake - norm s are prim arily  descriptive. Only when it is
determ ined (descriptively) what is normal in a given context, may
deviation  or conform ity be viewed as e ither a p erjo ra tive  or
com m endatory basis for prescription.
y
Norms are, in their basic use, descriptions or reports of 
the average or median outcome o f certain activities or 
achievem ents by a person or group o f  persons. The
1 The exception to the rule being the very recent book by Chris Brown, 
International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1992).
2 Oxford English D ictionary .
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adjective ’normal’ and the adverb 'normally' bear the 
logical weight in this connection. They are used to 
characterise typical or customary behaviour...3
Thus the traditional distinction between the normative and 
the descriptive that is so widely assumed in international relations 
and social science generally arises from the mutually exclusive 
distinction between prescription and description - thus generating 
the faulty premise that norms are prescriptions (only). The present 
argument denies this definition of 'normative', and employs the term 
as one encom passing  both descrip tion and p rescrip t ion , thus  
endow ing it with considerably  g rea ter  s ign if icance  than  is 
generally allowed in the theory of international relations.
As Stroll notes, in the tradition the term 'normative' is a 
creation, 'designed to capture the extended prescriptive use... and 
plays only that restricted role’,4 and therefore we should not look to
this definition for an indication of its function. The prescriptive-
descriptive distinction is reflected in closely related distinctions o f  
ought-is and value-fact which also pervade traditional approaches 
and theories, indicating the extensive implications of the normative 
approach as described here.
Hume's well-known observation, held to make out the case for 
the is-ought distinction, is that discussion of 'ought' tends to become 
discussion o f  'is' without acknowledgement of the change in mode; 
however, this could equally be taken as evidence of  the intimate 
relation between the two and of the dual character of norms.
3 Avrum Stroll, ’Norms' Dialectica (Vol. 41, 1987; Proceedings of the VUIth 
International Colloquium in Bienna/Biel May 1-4, 1986), from the summary, p. 7. See 
also Kuno Lorenz, ’Is and Ought Revisited’ Dialectica (Vol. 41, 1987), p. 134.
4 Avrum Stroll, op. cit., p. 17.
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Having insisted on the dual character o f  norms, it does not 
follow that the descriptive-prescriptive distinction is meaningless:
...the conventional way of  summarizing Hume's insight 
as the gap between 'is' and 'ought' is misleading; ...the 
reason behind this confusing manner o f  expression
probably lies in a too simplistic equation o f  the 
occurrence of a verb in the is-form with descriptivity. 
If  that is the case we need a better convention for
differentiating descriptions from prescriptions, ra ther  
than giving up the whole distinction altogether.^
Similarly, Stroll writes that the distinction may stand for present
purposes, since it is accepted that prescriptions don't describe
anything (are only based on description), but the 'further ascription 
of norms to the prescriptive side of that distinction' is contested/* 
Thus we must not make the error of assuming that 'normative' means 
only or evenly chiefly 'prescriptive'. The point is made by Kuno 
Lorenz in summarising the main thesis of Nelson Goodman's Wavs of 
W o r ld m a k in g  as stating that
the division between the given and the constructed, 
between that which is found and that which is made, 
between the fact and the artefact, is outdated and has,
5 Duen Marti-Huang, The "Is" and "Ought" Convention’, Dialectica (Vol. 41, 
1987), p. 152.
6 Avrum Stroll, op. cil., p. 22.
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actually, been challenged since the times of the pre- 
Socratics though it was seldom understood in that way.?
The epistem ological significance o f  norms in science is 
complemented by a similar significance in the particular social 
context o f  ethics, where norms are moral standards. Morals are 
sometimes called substantive or n o r m a t i v e  ethics (in contrast to 
theoretical ethics) - 'moral' being derived from the Latin m o s t 
meaning custom. The normative reference indicates that a priori 
concep ts  are in play, es tab lish ing  a s tandard  from w hich 
measurements may be taken; by which judgements may be made. 
(Note, however that the concepts may be 'a p r io r i* only in the 
restricted sense o f  being relative to a given context, rather than 
absolute.) In application to international relations, normative 
analysis can be used to evaluate the ethical implications of possible 
norms o f  behaviour, and also to evaluate the efficacy and status of 
substantive custom ary behaviour.
Therefore, taking the ethical content and connotation into 
account, normative theory may be (and has been) characterised as 
em ploy ing  'a p rio ri 'concepts and propositions to formulate an 
essentially  (but, it is argued here, not exclusively) prescriptive 
theoretical framework. However, we may still view normative 
theory as being primarily descriptive, with its prescriptive import 
being derivative. If the norms in question are proven or assumed, 
the theory may address their consequences, and the prescriptive 
function will be incidental to this purpose. Thus Lauener writes:
? Kuno Lorenz, op. cit. See Nelson Goodman, Wavs of Worldmaking 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1978), for a constructive nominalist view.
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Pragmatic considerations induce us to establish, in 
given situations, what I call c o n t e x t s  by adopting 
particular rules. We thus produce a pragmatically
re la tiv ized  apriori provid ing  us with a c lea rcu t 
distinction between the analytic and the synthetic, 
between language and theory, etc.8
Normative international theory is consequently  concerned 
with prescribing the parameters of political organisation and action 
or with describing those parameters (political norms) which are 
already established and acted upon - not ignoring the inference 
from the descriptive to the prescriptive. Frost describes normative 
theory as the e v a l u a t i o n  (which implies both descrip tion and 
prescription) o f  ideas and rules which constitute civil and political 
r e la t io n s h ip s .9
The predominant difficulty in this sort of theorising is 
establishing that political norms exist, this being an assumption o f  
normative explanations. The general point that a structure o f  some
kind is fundamental to communication, coordination, cooperation, 
and even comprehension is not difficult to make. Neither is it 
unreasonable to posit that social and political s tructures are
comprised largely of rules, which may be arbitrary in comparison to 
physical laws, but are of similar definitional significance. Unger 
makes a distinction between prescriptive rules (imperatives) and 
constitutive rules (as in games) and value ('the social face of desire'
8 Henri Lauener, 'Philosophie als normative T&tigkeit (offener 
Transzendentalismus versus Naturalismus)', Dialectica (Vol. 41, 1987), from the 
summary in English, p. 23.
9 Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986). Note Frost’s Theory of Constitutive 
Individuality'.
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dependen t on ind iv idual w i l l ) .1** It is thus rather difficult to 
describe all norms as rules, and not least because 'norm' is a complex 
and evasive concept. For example, Stroll argues that 'norm', 
'standard', 'convention', 'rule' and 'criterion' are all different, but 
closely related - he states that norms are linguistic  locutions, 
standards are prescriptive measures, while criteria are types of test. 
He also mentions patterns and models as being descriptive and 
prescriptive concepts respectively, and implies a virtually unlimited 
range of concepts all being distant cousins while retaining some 
specific meaning in each case: no doubt this situation is the result of 
norms being contextually defined.
In the process of examining the concept of norms, we will see
that its complexity is indicative of its pervasiveness in the social and
political realm, and that the ubiquity of norms (difficult as they may 
be to identify with empirical precision) is in itself justification for 
considering their methodological and theoretical implications.
In the conceptual field of the term 'norm' (see Appendix to 
Chapter One) the most notable characteristic is best described by the
notions o f  continuity or regularity (a characteristic o f  all systems). 
From this characteristic of the related concepts, we may define a 
norm as being some form of constant. A further characteristic is the 
reference to social activity which is shared by many of the concepts. 
From this we may be inclined to describe norms as a social concept, 
yet there are also references which are not exclusively social and 
could equally well apply to the physical realm.
Consider the type of norm called a directive, or 'technical 
norm', which indicates the means to an end - conforming to the
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975), p. 67ff.
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norm is a logical necessity for the achievement of the end in 
question (for example, operating instructions). If  we further
consider the characteristic brought out in the definition of  rules,
that is, the dual role of definition and regulation (description and 
prescription), we can view the concept o f  a norm as one which
concerns the ascription of meaning. This understanding of norms
accounts for the notion of a constant, and allows for applications
which are not necessarily social - although meaning itself arises in 
a social context.
O ther characteristics , such as the notions o f  guidance, 
judgement, and common practice are indicative of fluctuation and 
change, from which we may conclude that norms are o f  greater
significance in the social or political realm where the vagaries o f  
human behav iour present a substantial d iff icu lty  in ascrib ing
meaning. The subject matter of the natural sciences being rather 
more predictable, the demand for reference to a norm may be 
reduced, or infrequent. It is nevertheless significant that norms 
serve the function of regulating the value of facts. The regulation 
of the value of facts, in conjunction with the closely related function 
o f  ascribing meaning, indicates that norms are central to our 
apprehension of reality. If we add that a norm is a linguistic 
locution, after Stroll (as above), this view is further supported by the 
consideration that such ascriptions and apprehensions ^m ust be
expressed in language.
Taking these various characteristics, we may define norms as
constants which define and regulate the value o f  phenom ena in the 
apprehension o f  reality such that meaning can be ascribed. For our 
purposes, this is a useful definition of norms, being general enough
fo r  us to in v es t ig a te  the ir  m e thodo log ica l and th eo re tica l
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significance. As social structures are contingent, a given structure 
being sufficient but not necessary to communal life, it is clear that 
norms are vital to their maintenance. This is true whether norms 
are the dependent or independent variable - that is, the product or 
producer of a social structure (as products, norms are 'constants' in
relation to a given context, and contexts change) - and perhaps
especially true when the social structure is relatively weak (as in 
international soc ie ty ) .1 1
Norms can be seen as the means by which a organised
apprehension o f  a social structure is secured. That norms determine 
the value of social phenomena is shown by the reference to norms 
in judging such phenomena as desirable or undesirable in the
context of the broader social structure. In the physical realm, a 
similar demand for organised apprehension can be met by norms, 
even though we may wish to ascribe some objectivity to physical 
phenomena which is independent of the accepted norms which
define them. Thus there is an epistemological function for norms, 
whether distinctly ontological or simply methodological: ontological 
where there is consensus on what exists, and methodological where 
there is consensus on how to determine what exists or how to 
organise knowledge of what exists.
In addressing the problem of the existence o f  social and 
political norms, as distinct from the abstract concept of norms, it will
11 See for example David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New 
York: John Wiley, 1965), which describes a feedback loop of outputs from and inputs 
to a network of relationships (the system) through the medium of the system's external 
environment. While this refers to a system with a specific means of authoritative 
regulation, and an external environment, it may be applied to the international system 
if this is understood to provide its own environment and some degree of self­
regulation. Equally, this may describe a normative system which generates its own 
'transcendent' universe of values and means of self-regulation - as in, for example, an 
international society. Note Easton's definition of politics: the authoritative allocation 
of values.
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be useful to consider their origin, and some demonstrable examples 
o f  identifiable norms. Earlier it was seen that norms exist, as von 
Wright says, when they are in force. Subsequently, he says
The existence of a norm is a fact. The truth-grounds of 
norm ative statem ents and o f  norm -propositions are 
thus certain facts. In the facts which make such 
statements and propositions true lies the reality of 
n o r m s .1 2
Hence the 'ontological problem of norms' is to determine the nature 
of these facts, and what it means to say that a norm exists. Having 
already concluded that norms exist when they are in force - when 
they are facts - we now want to know the source of these facts 
(norms). This source must be the beneficiary of the norms, and 
perhaps also the instrument of their enforcement, which thereby 
constitutes norms as facts: this source is therefore the political and 
social system (whether state or society) for which the  norms 
operate. Thus one important aspect of the existence and reality of
norms is their validity in respect to the social system as a whole. 
Validity may be understood either in legal terms or in terms of 
efficacy (as in the phrases 'law which is in force' or 'law which is in 
existence' or 'law which is valid', these being synonymous), but in 
both cases the validity of the norm lies in the ability o f  the social
system to uphold it - whether it is brought into existence by means
o f efficacious force or by a legal act. The same applies for norms
which are less rigorously defined and enforced (e.g. customs).
*2 Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977), p. 106.
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Validity is, in this sense, determined by a political, legal, or moral 
authority  for which, im portan tly , leg itim acy is genera lly  a
prerequisite. Thus the validity of a norm stands in relation to the 
higher order norms of socio-political organisation which are the 
bases of all human institutions. The origins of norms are therefore 
similar to those of political organisation.
The origin o f  political norms may be seen, from a
contractarian point of view, as roughly parallel to the evolution of
social conventions. David Hume describes the need for social 
conventions in reference first to the stability of external goods,1 3 
and subsequently to the origin of jus tice .14 A social convention is 
not strictly contractual (T h is  convention is not of the nature o f  a 
p ro m i s e ’16), but is the implicit agreement arrived at when rational 
agents of limited generosity fully recognise their mutual interests, 
and regulate their conduct such that their in terests are best 
s e r v e d . 16 Where conduct is regulated in a coordinated fashion 
according to generally agreed principles, we can say that a norm 
exists. The established norm assumes an identity independent o f  its 
origins, in the manner that states become distinct entities, even 
though both are, as Hume would say, artifices. Similar contractarian 
views are found in the work of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, and in
the neo-contractarian work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. While 
these are theorists of political organisation, the firs t step in 
establishing a political system is to establish the 'rules of the game', 
and in doing so one establishes fundamental norms.
^  David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature. Book III, Part II, Section n, p.489.
14 Ibid., p.491.
15 Ibid., p.490.
16 Hugh C. Dyer, Justice in World Order: A Conceptual Analysis (unpublished 
MA thesis, Dalhousie University, 1984), pp. 182ff.
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This explanation of the origin of norms is both abstract and 
historical, but nevertheless adequate to account for the existence of 
norms in present societies. 'A norm is the resultant of complex 
patterns o f  a large number of people over a protracted period of 
t i m e ' , 17 yet once properly established is independent of individual 
people, particular circumstances, and its own origins. The norm 
becomes an objective phenomenon, and questions about the origins 
of norms then exclude the purely historical and focus on the reasons 
for given norms existing for given societies - that is, on the 
meaning of norms in the social context. Here, the inquiry into 
norms is not so much intended to enhance knowledge of norms 
themselves (with respect to their origin), but o f  the society for 
which the norms operate.
We must also take into account theories which deny that
existing norms are the product of a genuinely collective experience 
or of shared ideas, but rather are the consequence of socio-economic 
(and socio-historical) structures generally favourable to a dominant 
class. A similar argument can be made on the basis of gendered
social structures. Equally, some societies have excluded groups on
the basis of race or religion. Here there is room for debate about the 
relation between ideas, societies, and socio-historical conditions, 
although debates about causal direction tend to exhibit a 'chicken- 
egg’ circularity. One pertinent example is Mannheim’s
'sociology of knowledge' which would demonstrate the 
p ar t isan ,  con tex tua l and ex is ten t ia l ly  de te rm in ed  
nature of all cognition, thought and theories
Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1977), p. 8.
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and his
attempts to produce a social theory that transcended the 
limitations of particular world views1 ®
which Horkheimer criticised as idealism, and the result o f  an 
inadequate theory of society which relates ideas to social groups but 
is insensitive to the particular socio-historical conditions in which a 
society is grounded.
Critiques drawing on specific aspects of social inequality or 
d isc r im ina tion  are en tire ly  valid , but are not im m edia te ly  
troublesome to the present line of argument, since the necessity and 
habit of reference to a normative system may still be explained by 
an evolutionary approach, w hether or not a particu la r  system 
results, in whole or in part, from foreign or indigenous domination 
or particular historical conditions - it simply becomes a descriptive 
exercise in applied sociology. Similarly, the abstract origin of 
Hobbes' Leviathan has a normative aspect, although this solution to 
the state o f  nature problem does not readily acknowledge the 
normative agreement implied by voluntary subjegation to authority 
(largely because the tangible origins were not likely voluntary).
It should also be said that an evolutionary approach does not 
necessitate Darwinism or historical determinism, or a teleological 
requirement o f  progress or 'improvement' at every evolutionary  
stage, rather than simple difference. An evolutionary account o f  
norms merely indicates the social context o f  their origin, rather
^  Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory. Marxism and Modernity (Oxford: Polity 
Press, 1989), p. 24.
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than some transcendent truth towards which our thoughts and 
actions are directed. Thus it is important to recognise that while 
norms, once established, are objective elements of the social milieu 
(objective in their social influence) they are not objective in their 
origins; society itself is indeed an 'artifice', and its contingent 
foundations may well result, for example, in the perpetuation of 
apparently arbitrary discrimination in the distribution o f  social 
benefits. There is ample room, on this account, for fundamental 
critiques o f  society and its political institutions, and for critical 
philosophy addressing itself to the influence of dominant norms in 
thought and discourse. It remains the case that such critical activity 
depends on having identified norms which perpetuate assumptions.
One response to the ubiquity of norms, and the extent of their 
influence once established, may be seen in the 'postmodern turn' in 
philosophy with its somewhat n ihilis tic , rela tiv istic , contextual 
approach (as yet ill-defined in the literature19). This body of work 
comprises critiques of modem philosophy (by Derrida, and Rorty, 
for exam ple),20 and has been called 'an outgrowth of a society in 
which image, culture, consumption and spectacle become organizing 
principles o f  life'.21 Modernists (such as Habermas) have, in turn, 
broadly criticised postmodernism - that with roots in Nietzsche and 
Heidegger - as irrationalist and perhaps even tending to fascism. 
The Critical Theory school concentrates its critique on Lyotard’s T h e  
Postmodern Condition: A Report on K n o w led g e ,  and mounts 'defenses
But see the characterisation of this approach in Chris Brown, In te rn a t io n a l  
Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
20 See Jacques Derrida, On Grammatologv (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976) and Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
21 Kellner, op. cit., p. 166.
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of universality and normativity against the postmodern attack '.2 2 
This debate may be viewed as one about the demise of the modem 
epoch - of Western Enlightenment - and of its conventional form of 
reason. The two commonly known categories o f  reasoning, 
inductivist and deductivist, were complemented by Charles S. Pierce's 
introduction of a b d u c t i v e  reasoning: where induction finds a whole 
from parts (but perhaps having 'a whole' in mind), and deduction 
finds parts from their whole (favoured 'because it appears to be so 
c o n c lu s iv e '23), abduction relates wholes to wholes - it is necessarily 
a creative form of conjecture since the contents of these wholes 'are 
indeterminately different’ when the option o f  deconstructing the 
parts for examination is denied by a direct relation of whole-to- 
whole. It is this element of conjecture, and inevitably paradox, that 
underlies the debate about knowledge and politics. Certainly, it is a 
debate about the influence of certain norms, and their role in 
establishing meaning. It is a particularly significant debate in the 
context o f  current international relations, since the critique of 
Western values coincides with their apparent success in the early 
years of the post-Cold War world.
We are left with the further problem of identifying norms.
This may be essentially a statistical problem, for example, which 
requires identifying the number (percentage) o f  members o f  a 
society who recognise and conform to a norm. Of course, although 
norms have a superorganic quality, there are likely to be dissenters 
in any society and indeed active critique. See, in spite o f  its
22 Ibid.y p. 171. See also Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984)
23 Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), pp. 
98-100. See also, J. Buchler (ed), Philosophical Writings of Pierce (New York: Dover 
Publications, 1955), p. 150-156.
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shortcomings, the arguments within any 'open society'.^4 This does 
not disprove the existence of a norm, but any arbitrary statistical
standard leaves the question of a statistical rationale open. This in
turn leads us back to the fundamental conceptual and methodological 
problems discussed above. Without pursuing an account o f  what is
sufficient to establish the status of a norm (beyond the analysis
already undertaken), we may point to some examples of accepted and
active norms.
In the interpersonal realm norms are familiar and apparent.
For example, there is a norm about responding to a greeting. At the 
level of national societies there are norms pertaining to social and 
political activities, usually in the form of law - which in the case of 
common law is, interestingly, based in part on precedent. At the 
in terna tional level, norms are less im m ediately  apparen t to 
individuals, but function nevertheless. The most obvious examples 
are norms concerning the sovereignty of states over their people 
and territory, and the practice of diplomatic exchange. Less obvious 
but equally significant are norms concerning the proper use o f
force, the duty to aid foreign states and their citizens, and the 
maintenance of orderly international trade and finance, to name a
few. That these norms are less familiar to individuals, for whom 
most normative activities are virtually ins tinctive (the use o f
language and facial expressions, driving on one or the other side of
the road, respect for property, etc.), does not dim inish the ir
normative status. On the contrary it places them more clearly in the 
category of norms precisely because they have not been absorbed 
into the habitual behaviour of individuals, and remain more or less
Karl Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies (London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1945; 2nd Ed., revised, 1952).
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abstract and artificial constants (evidenced only by conformity) 
which are conciously used to define and regulate international 
b e h a v io u r .
At this point in the discussion a clarification of the ethical 
content of norms is required, since it is often scepticism about the 
cognitive status of morality that provides grounds for dismissing 
norm ative a p p r o a c h e s . 25 On this view morality (being synonymous 
with a normative system), is indeterminate due to the absence of any 
objective moral truth. Even where some moral agreement is 
acknowledged for national societies, the constraints of this morality 
are not recognised in international society. So far morality has been 
only incidental to the present discussion, and our definition of 
norms does not make a specific or detailed reference to the subject. 
However, it should be noted that among the related concepts used in 
the derivation of the definition is the concept of customs - located in 
our scheme between rules and prescriptions. Customs that are 
regarded  as ex ce ed in g ly  im p o r tan t ,  o b l ig a to ry ,  and even  
indispensable to social welfare, are sometimes called mores (moral 
c u s t o m s ) . M o r a l i t y  and other normative systems share the 
evolutionary, contractarian origins described above. While there is 
room for debate about moral relativism,27 the apprehension of social 
reality dictated by a moral system cannot be escaped, intact, unless 
morality is viewed (incorrectly) as referring only to ad hoc  
revelations o f  moral truth.
25 See Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations. 
op. cit.t p. 46.
26 Robert M. Williams, The concept of Norms' (International Encyclopedia o»f 
Social Science).
27 See Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics' 
(Millennium: Journal of International Studies. Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1989), pp. 149- 
161.
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In short, morality evolves in a social context, and has the
normative function of defining morally significant aspects o f  that 
social context. One may escape a given morality by entering a
different social context, but must then adopt the corresponding 
morality in order to achieve a coherent perception of social reality. 
This is not to say that morality is the exclusive grounds for socio­
political choice - though it obviously is for moral choice - or that
there are not other normative systems at work, but it is nevertheless 
clear that morality is a necessary if not sufficient condition of social
life. To adopt nihilism, or some undefined objective truth (such as a
transcendent belief) which does not require a normative foundation 
in social structures, is to abandon all referents and enter an 
intellectual and political vacuum in which thought and action are
meaningless; an invitation to existential and social crisis. To view a
morality critically, in the context of coexisting moralities, is a rather
different undertaking perhaps best captured by the term ’anti- 
foundationalism'. This latter position, in effect approximating moral
relativism, emphasises rather than dismisses the need for a better 
understanding of the normative aspects of social and political life, if 
we are to avoid nihilism while coming to terms with relativism
(whether moral, cultural or epistemological). The problem o f 
re la tiv ism , and the an t i- founda tiona lis t  perspec tive ,  w ill be
addressed at greater length subsequently.
V alues
The question of value-free social science is not new, and seems to
have been settled in favour of there being no such thing. It is
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nevertheless possible to practice social science coherently  by 
declaring value-laden assumptions at the outset, such that an 
internally consistent argument can lead to sound conclusions and, it 
is hoped, new insights. It should be recognised, however, that such 
practices do not address values directly, as an object of study, but
merely acknowledge the influence of values while attempting to 
avoid their broader implications.2 8
The re la tionsh ip  between values and norm s has been 
suggested earlier, in the analysis of related concepts. Norms provide 
the standards and criteria for the measurement and apprehension o f  
values. Norms establish the value of other phenomena; o f  social
facts. For a given society, some norms are synonymous with social 
values: those aspects o f  social life which are regarded as most
important. In such cases the term 'value' indicates the high point on 
a scale of possible social values (an ideal, such as 'democracy' for
example), this point on the scale also being the standard used to 
measure relative values on the scale. From the perspective of
interpretive social science, any understanding o f  social phenomena 
depends on the recognition of the social values at play; that is, o f  the 
normative system. Other perspectives, however, will discount the
significance o f  social values, on grounds that there are o ther 
objectively understandable means of explaining social phenomena,
(such as interests, power, modes of production, institutional history,
and so on) and that values belong to the private, not the public
2  ^ For a useful discussion of the role of social and cultural norms in both 
empirical science and (more particularly) social science, see Talcott Parsons, 'An 
Approach to the Sociology of Knowedge', Transaction of the Fourth World Congress of 
Sociology (Vol. 4, September 1959), reprinted as Chapter 5 in his collection of essays, 
Sociological Theory and Modem Society (New York: The Free Press and London: 
Collier-Macmillan, 1967).
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r e a l m . 29 This view rests on the problematic is-ought distinction
discussed earlier. For example, Marti-Huang debates John Searle's
propensity to regard the truths o f  descriptive sentences 
as being  o b je c tiv e ly  d ec id ab le ,  w h ereas  v a lu e  
statements are matters of personal preferences...
on the grounds that:
I f  evaluative conclusions are really a m atter o f  
personal preference, why should we bother to try to
deduce them from factual premises?^0
W hether or not values are exclusively  s ignificant in social 
explanations, when they underpin social norms they must be central 
to understanding, from any perspective.
Through their relation to norms, values are determinant of 
meaning in a given society. If there are explanations from beyond 
the context of that society, they will not account for the particular 
motivations of actors within that context. This can only be 
accomplished by an appreciation of the norm ative param eters  
which define and regulate the scope of the actors' thought and 
action, and govern their apprehension of reality. It may be possible 
to comprehend the relative status and direction of a society as a
29 For an extensive discussion of the term 'value' (and its uses) which is 
sympathetic to the present thesis, barring somewhat different distinctions made here 
between the terms 'value' and 'interest' because of their use in international relations 
scholarship, see Ralph Barton Perry, Realms of Value: A Critique of Human 
Civilization (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954).
20 Duen Marti-Huang, op. cit., p. 152. See Searle's position in John R. Searle, 
'How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"’, Philosophical Review (Vol. 73, 1964).
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whole, in some larger context of which that society is constituent, 
but it is not possible to penetrate a society coherently without an 
implicit analysis of its value system. It is a consequence of adopting 
a pluralistic world view that
Once the matter concerning the choice of a linguistic
system and an ontology is settled the question of
truth...can only be raised internally while theories as a
whole are compared on purely pragmatic grounds.3 1
Any theory of international relations msut stand up to pragmatic 
comparison in terms of its ability to cope with various settled value 
choices, or contingent social norms, which must be taken as given
features of the self-understanding of individual societies. Of course,
any theory of international relations will itself have a standpoint in 
relations to possible value choices, whether or not it is a theory of
values. Explanations which do not specifically refer to values are 
thus nevertheless conditioned by values and norms as a consequence 
of their epistemological priority.
O f course, employing normative analysis does not guarantee 
agreement about the significance o f  observed phenomena, for to
further complicate matters every analyst brings to the task a set of 
personal value assumptions, which are themselves id iosyncratic  
reflections of the analyst’s society or culture or part thereof. At best 
these  personal values are acknow ledged  and experim en ta lly  
controlled. At worst they are hidden assumptions which invade the
analysis, making a rather poor joke of the term ’science*.
Henri Lauener, op. cit.
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If it can be successfully argued that values are, for all 
practical purposes, constant across all social divisions, then most of 
our problems are solved. It seems unlikely, however, that this is the 
case. On the evolutionary, contractarian, pluralist view, there is
little evidence to suggest a consistent pattern of socio-economic or
political development across the globe (or even particular societies) 
which would provide a uniform context for the establishment o f  a 
universal value system. If, as structuralism has it, norms are largely 
d e te rm in e d  by so c io -ec o n o m ic  s tru c tu re s ,  then  the  sam e 
inconsistency o f  development mentioned above denies universal 
values, although vertical, as well as horizontal differences are 
emphasised. From the perspective of realism, where interests and 
power are emphasised, the same inconsistencies in material and 
political circumstances clearly dictate disparate interests, and even 
if  interests could be isolated from values, neither would be uniform.
This conclusion about the heterogeneity of values does not
prejudice the possibility of a value system which is shared by
societies, arising in the context of their mutual interactions, rather 
than the ir  pa r ticu la r  internal c ircum stances. N either  is it 
impossible that certain values or value systems transcend social 
boundaries, even where other values and value systems remain 
intact and distinct. Indeed it may be wise to seek out and foster those 
values which appear to be, for example, transnational in character. 
The question o f  an intersocietal or international value system, 
which refers to thought and action in those areas, is neither novel 
nor difficult. There are many instances of activity which is defined 
and regulated by an agreed code of  behaviour, w hether  an
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institutionalised body of law, or treaties, or regulations, or simply a 
shared understanding of normative parameters .3 2
Of course it may, as Kratochwil suggests,
seem necessary to separate the question of the strength 
or effectiveness of rules and norms from the issue of 
their existence and function.3 3
Obviously, at the extremes of isolation or violent in teraction, 
in ternationally  shared value systems are e ither ir re levan t or 
abrogated, as are treaties and laws in such circumstances. This limit 
to the influence of norms, is also evident in intrasocietal situations, 
yet only confirm s by exception the existence and centrality of 
values in any functional social or political system.
Methodological Implications of Values
The central methodological problem of a normative approach is the 
location of values. As suggested above, this is on the surface a simple 
empirical problem which could be solved by statistical analysis o f  
adherence to recognised norms. As we will see in Chapter Two, 
ideology may be understood as the ’language o f  adherence', so an 
example o f  such an empirical analysis might be a survey o f  
ideological identification among members of a society. Yet the prior
32 See, for example, Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, When 
Trust Breaks Down: Alliance Norms and World Politics (Columbia, SC: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1990), and Dorothy V. Jones, Code of Peace: Ethics and Security 
in the World of Warlord States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).
33 Friedrich Kratochwil, ’Norms and Values: Rethinking the Domestic 
Analogy’, Ethics and International Affairs (Vol. 1, 1987), p. 136.
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requirement is an ability to identify a norm or value as such; as 
distinct from some other kind of social habit, or an 'empirical' 
condition of social existence.
To begin with, the term 'norm' remains broad enough to 
present problems of identification. One author suggests that there 
are three basic types or characterisations o f  norms: norms as
linguistic expressions, as complex situations, and as regularities o f  
some phenom ena. 34 The first type is relative to a given language, 
requiring consideration o f  grammatic structures, while the second 
adds to the linguistic expression a complex practical context o f  use, 
and requires consideration o f  other normative structures (such as 
politics, culture, society, etc.). The third is less troublesome for the 
present argument, and could be said to reflect the common meaning 
of regularity. It is the first two types of norm that raise problems of 
cognition, since they are only to be identified within a context that 
is itself normative in character. It is this latter consideration that 
points to the role of norms themselves as determinant o f  meaning 
( ’cogn ition  th rough  n o r m s '^ ) ,  even as they are being socially
d e te rm in e d .
It is the notion of facts standing separate from values that is 
the initial stumbling-block; but as the discussion above suggests, 
values are 'in' facts already and cannot be separated from them. This 
is particularly clear in the case o f  institutional facts, which are 
s im ply  re f le c t io n s  o f  the in s t i tu t io n a l  s t ru c tu re  and the  
relationships which constitute it. Where the institution amounts to
34 Jerzy Wrdblewski, 'Cognition of Norms and Cognition Through Norms’, in 
Giuliano di Bernardo (ed), Normative Structures of the Social World (Amsterdam: 
Editions Rodopi, 1988), p. 223. See also in this useful edition Hector-Neri Castafieda, 
'Ought, Reasons, Motivation, and the Unity of the Social Sciences: The Meta-theory of 
the Ought-Is Problem'.
35 Wrdblewski, op. cit., p. 241.
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an entire society, these relationships are obviously complex and are
in general taken for granted as a given social reality. Yet it is 
precisely in those hidden networks of social relations, and the 
institutional facts they generate, that values are located.
A norm becomes a fact when enforced by an acknowledged 
authority (see the argument above concerning the onto logical 
problem o f  norms). In the pursuit of systematic knowledge 
(science), the acknowledged authority is the dominant theory (or 
paradigm) of the pertinent discipline: it is the value-structure of 
this theory which determines the validity of facts or theoretical 
p ro p o s i t io n s .
Thus, it is not methodologically fruitful to set out on a 
norm ative analysis o r  explanation by searching for values in 
isolation, and shunning investigation of social 'realities' or  'facts' 
which are held to be somehow unrelated to or independent of values. 
The appropriate method of a normative approach is to examine 
precisely those aspects of social and political life which seem to be 
determined entirely by factual circumstances rather than social
norms, or exclusively by a calculus of interest rather than by 
political values, and through this exam ination to reveal the ir  
normative character and value content.
Conversely, as the present argument emphasises, it is fruitless
to engage in purely empirical analyses of political life, and to
attempt an isolation of facts from values > especially in international
relations, where institutional facts are not as clearly settled and
hence more obviously reliant on a normative frame o f  reference.
The consequence o f  this epistemological condition - in science
generally, in the social sciences certainly, and particularly in the
field o f  international relations - is that any methodology must be
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sensitive to the normative character of both subject and method 
(implicating theory), such that the traditional distinction between 
'is' and 'ought' gives way to an understanding of their intimate
r e la t io n s h ip .
Some, like Kegley and Raymond, respond to this issue by
advocating a combination of methods or 'multiple p a th s ' : ^
Epistemologically, we feel that our understanding of 
world politics can best be advanced by an approach that 
combines the positivists reliance on empirical evidence 
with the postmodernist's  emphasis on the meanings
that statesmen attach to the concepts that organise
their vision of global reality and the legal narratives 
that shape their thinking.3 7
Alternatively, the problem of locating the foundations of empirical 
evidence, further complicated by the state-centric assumptions of 
realism, suggests that a more direct approach to the epistemological
problem is required to uncover the full significance of such terms as 
'meaning', 'vision', and 'narrative', since these may entirely undo
any empirical foundations.
Friedrich Kratochwil, in his book Rules. Norms, and Decisions. 
suggests that human action is
unders tandab le  against the background o f  norm s 
em bodied  in conven tions  and ru les  which give 
meaning to an action. Thus, not only must an actor
36 Kegley and Raymond, op. cil., p. 99.
^7 / bid., p. 4.
refer to rules and norms when he/she wants to make a 
choice, but the observer, as well, must understand the
normative structure underlying the action in order to
interpret and appraise choices.3 8
T h is  v iew  u nderl ie s  the d iscuss ion  w hich  fo l lo w s ,  
emphasising the need to question prevailing assumptions, including 
those about the reliability of empirical evidence and the more 
general conception of world politics embodied in realism. The 
innovative critical character of normative theory is presented as an 
appropriate means of addressing both epistemological issues and the 
underlying substance of international relations. It is also an 
approach which goes some way to asserting the autonomy o f  the 
human sciences, as Greimas s a y s , 39 by constituting world politics as 
a realm of human activity rather than a remote, alien and alienating 
p h e n o m e n o n .
As a final example of the methodological implications o f  
adopting a normative approach, Quentin Skinner's discussion o f  the 
role o f  ritual and ceremony in politics raises a 'question o f  deep
concern to political theorists' which he notes has been addressed in
different ways by such diverse authors as Nikos Poulantzas (e.g., in 
Political Power and Social C lasses). Charles Taylor (writing on
38 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions of 
practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 11.
39 'in the same way that the natural sciences have done, the human sciences 
can also assert their autonomy, which comes not from the 'nature' of the objects of 
investigation - words or things, nature or culture - but from the method of approach 
that constitutes them all into human objects, into signifying objects’. Algirdas Julien 
Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiology (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), 
p. 19.
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democracy) and John Dunn (e.g , in Western Political Theory in The 
Face of the Future):
The question is whether our inherited traditions of 
political analysis may now be serving to inhibit rather 
than clarify our understanding not merely o f  alien 
cultures but also of ourselves.4 ®
The following chapters examine the theoretical literature in 
in te rn a t io n a l  re la t ions ,  revea ling  the inhe ren t va lues  and 
assumptions of traditional theory, and assessing those value-centred 
approaches which comprise the extant body of normative theory and 
hold the seeds of new approaches to international relations.
40 See Quentin Skinner's review of Clifford Geertz, The World as a Stage. 
Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1981), in The New York Review. 16 April 1981, pp. 35-7.
53
A ppendix  to C h a p t e r  One :
C o n c e p tu a l  A nalys is  o f  'N o r m '
The following conceptual analysis uses a representative group of  
term s or related concepts (definitions) from which significant 
characteristics are extracted and reorganised, or reconstructed. The
outcome is a formulation of the concept of a norm (as given in the
main text o f  Chapter One). The formulation is necessarily general, 
although more specific definitions may apply for certain norms.
Fig. 1 Types and Partial Svnonvms of Norms
G uides
P a t t e r n s
RULES
Idea ls  Customs
DIRECTIVES P r in c ip le s  PRESCRIPTIONS
Criteria Regulations
Standards Laws
The arrangement of the various concepts in Fig. 1 is suggested by
von Wright's classification of norms into three main types (Rules,
Prescriptions, Directives) with related concepts, and three 'lesser'
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ca tegories  (Custom s, P rincip les ,  Ideals) which exhib it shared 
characteristics (and are shown between the relevant groups).1
The preceding scheme is not rigid, but merely elucidates the 
main features of the central thematic concept of a 'norm'. The 
various interrelated concepts in Fig. 1 belong to the same field o f  
meaning, and are discussed briefly below.
R U L E S  are established guides for action, usually applicable to 
specific circumstances or activities. They often share the dual role 
characteristic of norms in being the definition of an activity, as well 
as the regulator of action in the context of the activity.
P a t t e r n s  are observed regularities, are characteristic of any 
system, and are basically descriptive. The continuity of patterns 
provides grounds for description and prediction, and might be 
considered defin itional in the way that the pattern  o f  play 
(determined by rules) constitutes a game.2
G u ides  to social conduct are called social norms, when they are 
generally recognised and complied with by members of a society.^
Thus the guide must relate to an ideal or customary or ’correct' form 
of conduct.
P R E S C R I P T I O N S  dictate thought or activity by command, 
permission or prohibition. Prescription, in the social context, is an 
activity of a norm-giver (an authoritative source), which indicates 
the authoritative status norms assume in guiding social conduct.
R e g u la t io n s  are a form of prescription having the purpose of 
regularising a certain activity (e.g. traffic regulations). They have
1 See Georg Henrik von Wright, Norm and Action (London: Routledge & Kegan 
Paul, 1977), p. 106.
2 Avrum Stroll, 'Norms’ (Dialectica. Vol. 41, 1987; Proceedings of the VIHth 
International Colloquium in Bienna/Biel May 1-4, 1986).
* Ibid., p.12.
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a coordinating role in the sense that rules or directives do, but are 
expressions of an authoritative will concerning the activity.
L a w s  are the institutional embodiment of political norms. 
Where law deviates from widely held social norms, it is generally 
subject to change, but note that sanctions often accompany the 
promulgation of law in order that a sovereign will (e.g. o f  the state) 
is effective.
D I R E C T I V E S  or ’technical norm s’ d ictate the means 
appropriate to achieving a particular end. Thus they presuppose the 
necessary conditions o f  achieving an end (e.g. 'instructions for use' 
appended to some product or equipm ent),  and are generally  
descriptive. A prescriptive element arises when the end is subject to 
e v a lu a t io n .
C rite r ia  are employed in the process of judgement, as modes of 
control. They are related to other norms in being controls, yet are 
somewhat more subjective since they refer to the judgem ental 
process, while other norms may control the meaning o f  the facts 
ju d g e d .4
S ta n d a rd s  are used to measure, and lay off a scale of, values; 
are prescriptive measures. The usual objective character of norms is 
not necessarily exhibited in standards, but any norm may take the 
role of a standard, and in either case relative values are judged by 
standards which take some objective form as the ir  adequate 
ju d g e m e n t .5
The following concepts share characteristics of more than 
one of the main types of norms:
4 John Dewey, in J.M.Baldwin (ed.), Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology 
(New York: Peter Smith, 1940), p. 182ff.
5 Dewey, Ibid,.', Stroll, op. cit.
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C u s to m s  arise in the context of social activity over time, in 
which customs are established patterns of common practice, and are 
thus sim ilar to rules. Like prescriptions, customs exert social 
pressure to conform, which supports and maintains the practice.**
P r i n c i p l e s  are both prescriptive and technical guides to 
thought and action, reflecting some authority (perhaps related to 
law or custom or belief) and giving direction (for example, about 
how to achieve The Good Life).
I d e a l s  are concerned with 'being' ra ther than ’doing ', 
through their relation to notions of goodness or virtue. Virtues are 
the characteristics of whatever is considered good in some class of 
things (in the present context, political systems, laws, social 
relations, etc.), and are conceptually related to the ideal ('the good').
The b rie f  discussions above provide a starting point for 
constructing a definition of norms. Each concept has been defined
in terms of its relation to the other concepts, or partial synonyms of 
the general concept of a norm, and an extract o f  the defining
characteristics will yield a reasonable definition of norms: See the
main text of Chapter One.
** Edna Ullmann-Margalit, The Emergence of Norms (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1977), p.8.
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C h a p t e r  Two
R e a d in g  T h e  L i te r a tu r e  (I) : R e a lis t  A ssu m p tio n s
The central aim o f this chapter is to show that built into realist 
assum ptions about w orld po litic s  are a host o f  no rm ative  
considerations, and while realists have had to contend with them, 
these considerations are not reflected in the tenets o f realist theory.
The overall argument of this and the following chapter is that 
trad itional theories o f in ternational rela tions (specifica lly  realist 
theory) have not only excluded values from the list o f central 
considerations in the study of international relations, but have also 
constrained the developm ent o f normative theorising generally (not 
ju s t about 'm orality ') in this area by containing it w ith in  the 
trad itional in ter-state , pow er-political paradigm . Thus, w hile the 
im portance o f values is often recognised, regret is sim ultaneously 
expressed that value considerations cannot play a part in 'serious' 
international political theory. It should be said that nothing about 
norms is inaccessible to realism, but by em phasising the distinction 
between 'is' and 'ought' and concentrating on the cognitive force of 
'is ', realism tends to ignore the influence of 'ought' in the realms of 
knowledge and politics - an aspect of reality.
This critique o f realism highlights problem atic assum ptions
which are more clearly evident in realist theory, but because o f the
influence o f realism  and the porosity o f the c lassifica tions o f
in terna tional re la tions theory , these assum ptions also crop  up
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elsewhere as a consequence of tradition, this latter being understood 
in terms of disciplinary norms.
In the area of normative theory, examined more closely in the 
follow ing chapter, broad and ancient origins in ethics and political 
ph ilosophy , as well as early  w ritings d irec tly  concerned  w ith 
in ternational relations (from the classics of po litical thought to 
early proposals for European federation and world government) will 
be considered. Subsequently , various categories o f norm ative 
thought (such as just war theory, and formulations o f human rights) 
w ill be discussed to show  both the underly ing  ch arac ter o f 
norm ative approaches, and the trad itional role they have often 
conform ed to. V arious cases of overlap betw een realism  and 
norm ative concerns will be examined (norm ative com mentary being 
quite common in realist w orks), as these are perhaps the m ost 
in te re s tin g  exam ples o f the co n s tra in ts  im posed  by re a lis t 
assum ptions. Fundamental differences, such as that between Max 
W eber and John Dewey, concerning the theory/practice, fact/value 
and means/end distinctions, will be presented as representative of 
the problem atic in In ternational R elations theory . From  th is 
d iscussion  will be drawn conclusions about potential ro les for 
norm ative theory in the study of international relations at large, the 
re la tio n sh ip  betw een norm ative  theory  and trad itio n a l rea lis t 
theory, and the place of the present work as an attempt to clarify 
these issues.
In this and the following chapter, distinctions will be made
betw een the dom inant theoretical trad itions, o r schools in the
In ternational R elations litera tu re  - predom inantly  'rea lis t' - and
norm ative theory, as defined in this work. W hile the various
approaches do not represent com pletely exclusive categories, and
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are not easily defined (although realist assumptions in general are 
widely recognised), there are distinctive characteristics in each case 
which are significant for the overall argument o f the thesis.
In one respect the distinctions between approaches bear on 
the traditional role of normative thought, in relation to dom inant 
realist perspectives, and in a second respect they bear on theoretical 
param eters in the study o f international relations which have been 
determined by realist assumptions. The discussion is not intended to 
provide a rigorous history of thought, nor even a typology, but 
rather to indicate the extent to which the distinctions amount to
conceptions o f the international political condition and o f the 
nature o f politics in general, and consequently delim it theoretical 
and practical activity. In this sense, a conception, characterisation, 
or even apprehension o f the object o f study - the international 
system in this case - is not the prerequisite for theorising about it,
but rather a consequence of theory.
In particular, the realist school will be examined to show how
- as a dom inant and traditional approach - it has system atically
excluded value considerations from the analysis o f in ternational
relations, and constrained the development o f theory in the field by
estab lish ing  param eters and prom ulgating assum ptions about the
subject which severely lim it explanatory ability . W hat follow s
should not be taken as an entirely dismissive critique, as there is
clearly merit in much realist thought (not least clarity itself)* but
neither are the shortcomings of realist theory to be underestimated,
since the popularity o f this approach among policy-m akers means
that a theoretical liability right away becomes a practical one as
well. This latter observation points to a particular aspect o f  the more
general question about the relation between theory and practice,
60
held here to be an intimate and interactive relation.
Beyond a critique of realism and other traditional approaches, 
the following discussion (in the next chapter) will show by contrast 
the innovative and productive character o f norm ative approaches, 
and by com parison among these la tter will reveal characteristics 
which have made norm ative approaches vulnerable (to charges o f 
idealism  or utopianism , for exam ple), and yet fundam ental to  the 
study o f social phenomena, including - perhaps especially so - the 
study o f  in ternational re la tions. S ubsequently , the argum ents 
employed in the present work will be justified  and placed in the 
context o f the broader concerns of international relations theory.
Even where Realism has allowed particular norm ative issues a 
lim ited role, they have been forced into the conventional state- 
centric categories. For example: justice is considered in respect of 
inter-state war and peace, or the more mundane obligations o f states 
to one another, and is always conditioned by considerations o f the 
realities o f pow er (or it is relegated to the dom estic po litical 
environm ent); human rights are at best considered in respect o f  the 
duties between state governments, or at worst are seen as strictly a 
m atter o f internal political relations - domestic politics - insulated 
from external criticism by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The 
same may be said of those issues for which there is ample concrete 
p hysica l ev idence o f  the global im p lica tio n s : en v iro n m en ta l
degradation , nuclear and o ther ind iscrim inate w eapons o f  m ass 
destruction, population growth, economic developm ent, and so on.
The real significance of normative theory is thus hidden by
the 's tru c tu ra l' constra in ts  im posed by trad itio n a l theo ry , and
normative approaches have felt obliged to respond to the demands o f
these traditions in the language of the dominant paradigm. In some
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respects normative theory finds points o f reference in versions of 
liberalism , and may be seen as an outgrowth of liberal critiques. 
However, the great potential o f norm ative theory is viewed more 
favourab ly  against the backdrop o f contem porary  c ritiq u es  o f 
traditional international relations theory which have grown out of 
c ritica l theory  and postm odern ism .1 It is in this rather different 
theoretical environm ent that the worth o f norm ative approaches 
can be more clearly  seen, in part because these critiques o f 
ep is tem o lo g ica l and o n to lo g ica l assum ptions  have fo rced  a 
reassessm ent o f political and social theory generally, and thus o f the 
foundations o f in ternational relations scholarship  in p articu la r - 
here considered to be an aspect of the larger project.
This kind of critical inquiry has sim ultaneously revealed the 
fre q u e n tly  bu ried  re la tio n sh ip s  betw een  the  p r in c ip le s  o f 
epistem ology and ethics, and between political o rgan isation  and 
human aspirations. It is here that fundamental normative questions 
arise. It should be said, however, that normative theory need only 
partake o f postmodernism (sharing some o f its concerns) as a way of
1 For example, R.BJ. Walker argues from this perspective in saying that 
'theories of international relations are always destined to be the poor relation* of 
traditional political thought as a consequence of Wight's rendition of the subject, and 
that other traditional formulations similarly constrain theory in this field. See R.BJ. 
Walker, The Prince and the "Pauper": Tradition, Modernity, and Practice in the 
Theory of International Relations' in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), 
Intemational/Intertextual Relations: Post-modern Readings in World Politics 
(Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 30-32. The postmodernist literature in 
International Relations is represented by Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Geneologv of 
Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), and for politics generally by 
Michael J. Shapiro, Language and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1984) 
and Reading the Post-modern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). The broader postmodernist 
context is provided by works such as Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena 
(Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), Michel Foucault, The Archeology 
of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), 
which literature is in turn placed in the context of alternative theoretical approaches 
by David Held (ed), Political Theory Todav.fCambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 18-19.
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sharpening the focus on normative issues that arise in the context of 
late modernity. That is, descriptive normative theory applies to the 
contem porary o r h istorical world, even if  p rescrip tive norm ative 
theory can apply to possible future worlds.
Realist thought in its traditional forms, and the reworking o f 
this body o f thought in the form of neo-realism (or what Waltz calls 
structural realism ), will be reviewed in light o f the contem porary 
c ritiques m entioned above.2 The provenance o f realist thought in 
In ternational R elations will be d iscussed with reference to  the 
influence o f realist thinkers from ’outside the field' or predating it, 
in c lu d in g  T h u cy d id es , M ach iav e lli, R ou sseau , and th e  la te  
nineteenth-century German thought o f M einecke, Treitschke, and o f 
Max W eber in the twentieth century. The developm ent o f the 
trad itio n  will be considered through d iscussion  o f  w ell-know n 
international relations authors such as E.H. Carr (The Twenty Years' 
C r i s i s ) . Reinhold N iebuhr (C hristian ity  and Pow er P o litics  and 
C hristian  R ealism  and P o litica l P ro b lem s). H ans M orgen thau  
(Politics Among N ations. Scientific Man vs. Power Politics and T ru th  
and P o w e r ) . Martin Wight (Power P o litics and System s o f S ta tes). 
G eorge Kennan (Realities of American Foreign Policy), and Hedley 
Bull (The A narchical S oc ie ty ). As representative o f  neo-realist 
thought, the work o f Kenneth W altz (T heory  o f  In te rn a tio n a l 
P o l i t i c s )  will receive some attention. Reference will bet made to 
com m entators (secondary sources) as much as to the o rig inal 
canonical texts, since it is the influence o f realist thought on the 
discipline which is at issue here. In every case it will be noted that 
a ttem p ts to deny  or d im inish  the im portance o f  no rm ative
2 See, for example, the debate in Robert O. Keohane, ed.. Neorealism and Its 
Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).
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considerations are ultim ately unsuccessful.
R ea lism
In a survey o f neo-realist thought, Robert Keohane states that
...it is important to understand realism and neorealism  
b e c a u se  o f  th e ir  w id e sp re a d  a c c e p ta n c e  in  
contemporary scholarship and in policy c irc les.3
and subsequently that
The danger that one will becom e the p risoner o f 
unstated assumptions is rendered particularly  acute by 
the value-laden  na tu re  o f  in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s  
th e o ry .4
These two statem ents provide a neat synopsis o f  the problem atic
addressed in this chapter: a dominant realist approach to the study of 
international relations may well have im prisoned thinking in this
field . The consequences o f theoretical dom inance are the more
urgent when a single body of theory infuses general practice, and
the m ore profound when it is recognised that theoretical activity  
itse lf is subject to the influence of value structures.
There are particular aspects of realist thought which not only 
define that theoretical approach, but to some exten t define the
3 Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, op. cit., p. 4.
4 Ib id .
theoretical endeavour itself, such that the agenda o f m etatheoretical 
issues is set by the predominance of realism as the benchm ark o f 
in ternational relations theory.
The first of these aspects of realism is an inclination to pursue 
a science o f international politics which is somehow analogous to 
the natural sciences, and hence more likely to acquire some o f the
prestige accorded to 'Science' in a culture which is intrigued and 
im pressed  by techno log ical p rogress. T h is phenom enon  is 
evidenced both in M orgenihau's traditional realism and in W altz's
neo-realism  (and is criticised by the traditionalists o f the 'English 
School', o f which more later).
W altz, for example, presents a systemic theory em phasising 
p o litic a l s tru c tu re  in three d im ensions: o rd e rin g  p rin c ip le s ,
functions o f units, and capabilities of units.5 By assuming anarchy 
in the states system, and functional similarity among states, the first 
two dimensions of structure are controlled and the third - 'power' - 
becom es the significant variable.6 This is a tidy and effective theory 
o f  international politics ('elegant', in scientific parlance), until one 
questions (a) the degree of anarchy in a system  which exhibits 
many forms o f cooperation and coordination (w hether voluntary, or 
hegemonically imposed), (b) the similarity o f functions among states 
which have widely varying political experiences and ideologies, and
(c) the profound difficulty  o f estim ating capabilities given that
these are defined in terms of complex relationships, not to mention
(d) the lim itation o f considering states to be the only significant
5 Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading. MA: Addison- 
Wesley, 1979), p. 73.
6 For a useful discussion of this issue see A. Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States 
Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics', International Organisation (Vol 
46, No. 2, 1992).
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units in a world rife with transnational forces o f all kinds. Which is 
to say, the theory sidesteps a range of normative issues. In this case, 
one m ight argue, the goal of scientific respectability overrides the 
goal o f understanding the subject matter: The desire to provide an 
explanation seems to have brought with it a forgetfulness about the 
reason why an explanation was thought desirable in the first place. 
This is odd, given Waltz's sensitivity to the purposes o f theorising, 
but no doubt he would say it is due to his limited theoretical aims.7
M o rg en th au 's  m ore h is to rica lly  o rien ted  tra d itio n a l o r 
classical form of realism similarly evades this kind o f criticism , 
since he is him self a critic o f the scientistic behaviouralism  o f the 
sixties and a defender of qualitative analysis. However, Morgenthau 
is equally inclined to seek out simplifying categories, such as power, 
and constructs theory around the established realis t assum ptions 
about interstate relations. His focus on state power is as empirically 
grounded and conceptually static as the scientism he deplores.**
A second aspect of m etatheoretical agenda-setting is perhaps 
le ss  pern ic ious  than its im m ediate affron te ry  suggests: The
im plication that realists are the only theorists addressing, or indeed 
capable o f addressing, reality. The very term 'realism ' amounts to a 
co-option o f reality by those adopting this appellation, and yet the 
very heart of theoretical debate is the definition o f reality through 
the act o f providing an account of it. *
7 See the discussion of laws and theories in the first chapter of Waltz's Theory 
of International Politics, op. cil.% and his response to the critiques of Ashley and Cox 
in Keohane, Neorealism and its Critics, op. cit.
** See for example the various essays in Truth and Power: Essavs of a Decade. 
1960-70 (London: Pall Mall Press, 1970). Morgenthau is discussed further below.
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Origins and Development of the Realist Tradition
The origins o f the key assumptions of contemporary realist thought 
can be located in thinkers o f earlier centuries. F or exam ple,
Rousseau's observation that wars occur because there is nothing to 
prevent them , is reflected in W altz's view o f war resulting from 
anarchy as a perm issive cause with national in terests providing 
reasoned m otivation .9 Of course, the same critique could be applied 
to both views as well: to use Waltz as the test case for the moment, the 
relationship between characteristics of the state (his 'second image') 
and the anarchic international environm ent (his 'th ird  im age') is
not well developed, allowing both the impact of dom estic public
opinion on foreign policy and the socia lising  aspects o f the
international realm to be overlooked - in fact there is much to 
prevent wars, if  only the costs o f fighting them. (A norm ative 
critiq u e  w ould point to ra ther m ore co n struc tive  re la tions
exceptions to the 'rule' of warlike behaviour - which are readily 
apparen t in the modern in ternational system , and w ould ra ise  
questions about the notion o f causation employed by W altz in this 
case .) W hat this exam ple illustrates is the degree to w hich
con tem porary  rea lis t th eo ries  rest on p ro b lem atica lly  sim ple 
assum ptions borrow ed from th inkers o f prev ious periods, and 
modified only superficially to fit modern requirem ents of* scientific 
respectab ility , but not (it should be said) the requirem ents o f 
m o d e rn ity .
Sim ilarly, the definition of the realist position in contrast or
9 Waltz, Man. the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), 
pp.231-2; 238. In this work Waltz represents the 'classical' school, in contrast to his
later structural or neo-realist work, Theory of International Politics.
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opposition  to idealism  rests on the im probability  o r practical
difficulty o f proposals for world peace or federation (e.g, by Crucd, 
de Sully, Saint-Pierre, Kant, and others) and legalist interpretations 
o f  appropriate state behaviour (e.g., Bodin, G rotius, V attel) from
p rev io u s c e n tu r ie s .10 The most famous attack on idealism  in the 
younger litera tu re  o f in ternational rela tions is by E .H . C arr, 
responding with inherited pessimism to the failures o f the inter-war 
p e r io d .11 None o f these negative definitions of realism allow escape 
from the Hobbesian attitude to previous events in in ternational 
relations, nor can they offer a positive contribution to the future.
Among the c learest proponents o f realism  is  Hans J.
M o rg en th au  who (b o rro w in g  h e a v ily , tho u g h  w ith  l i t t le
acknow ledgem ent, from Max W eber12) provides a convenient list of 
'six principles of political realism' in Politics Among N ations:1 3
(1) Politics, like society in general, is governed by 
objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
(2) The main signpost of political realism is the concept 
o f interest defined in terms of power.
(3) This key concept is an objective category which is
See the historical survey in TorbjOm L Knutsen, A History of International 
Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), and the analysis 
in Daniele Archibugi, 'Models of International Organization in Perpetual Peace 
Projects', Review of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 4, October 1992).
11 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. (London: Macmillan, 1939).
12 For views on Weber’s influence see Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought 
from Weber to Kissinger (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 
1986), and Daniel Warner, An Ethic of Responsibility in International Relations 
(London: Lynne Reiner, 1992).
Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1948; 5th Ed., revised. 1978), pp. 4-15.
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universally  valid , but not endow ed w ith  a fixed  
m e a n in g .
(4) There is an ineluctable tension between the m oral 
command and the requirem ents o f successful po litical 
a c tio n .
(5) The moral aspirations of a particular nation are not 
iden tified  w ith the m oral laws tha t govern  the  
u n iv e rs e .
(6) The autonomy o f the political sphere is the 
profoundly distinctive intellectual and moral attitude o f 
re a lism .
To locate these principles in the context o f the  present 
critique, the follow ing are, in Thom asian sty le , the im m ediate
objections or replies:
(1) 'N atural laws' no longer provide an ob jec tive  
standpoint, and assum ptions about hum an nature are 
c o n te n tio u s .
(2) Defining interests in term s o f an undifferentiated  
concept of power provides a vague signpost o f  dubious 
u ti l i ty .
(3) The universal objectivity o f such a concept is only
possible because its meaning is indeterm inate.
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(4) The tension between morality and politics is created 
by theoretically excluding morality from a definition of 
p o litic s .
(5) If there w e r e  moral laws governing the universe, it 
would be strange if particular nations did not partake 
o f them.
(6) This restrictive attitude to, or definition of, politics 
lim its and im poverishes realism , detaching  it from  
broader normative consideration of the social realm.
The problems associated with these principles may already be 
evident, and they will be discussed at various points in the present 
work. For the moment it will be more useful to examine a critical 
assessm ent of realism in general, which naturally draws in broader 
themes than those identified by a single realist author. M ichael 
Smith identifies 'four key com ponents to the realist approach '14 , 
according to which realists assume:
(1) tha t hum an nature is ch a rac te rised  by 'an  
ineradicable tendency to evil ... among all ?men and 
w om en’. Views range from N iebuhr's concept o f  
o rig inal sin, to E.H. Carr's 'search fo r pow er and 
secu rity ' as a fundam ental hum an m o tiva tion , to  
M orgenthau's 'elem ent o f universality [which] may be
14 Michael Joseph Smith, Realist Thought from Weber to Kissinger, op. cit.%
219ff.
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called human nature'.
(2) that the 'only really im portant collective actor is 
the state’ ("the state-centric assum ption”). Thus, the 
realist view o f change is that it can only be achieved by 
m anipulation o f  the habits and assum ptions o f  an 
existing political reality.
(3) that 'power and its pursuit by individuals and states 
[is] ubiquitous and inescapable ... In an anarchic 
m ilieu, states are engaged in an unending quest for
power'. Thus, the important subjects o f theory are the 
components, methods and instruments of power.
(4) 'that the real issues of international politics can be 
understood by the rational analysis o f com peting  
interests defined in terms of power'. Thus, a rational 
aspect o f the national interest underlies the two ideal
types of foreign policy objective - 'to m aintain o r to 
increase pow er’.
Among Smith's criticism s of these realist assumptions is the
broad and undifferentiated concept o f power, which is treated as
both end and means but (as discussed elsewhere) realism provides no
account of how goals are established. A further criticism is that the
em phasis on the anarchic  ch arac te r o f in te rn a tio n a l so c ie ty
underp lays the re la tionsh ip  betw een dom estic and in terna tional
politics: domestic politics are seen as merely one variable affecting
the external efficacy  o f  sta tes , no tw ithstand ing  ano ther rea lis t
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them e - the durability  o f the unitary  nation -sta te . F ina lly , 
significant changes in the character and agenda o f in ternational 
politics are not recognised by realism 's reference to 'tim eless laws' 
o r 'perennial forces'. This, as Smith says, 'is not to  deny the 
continued salience of old [factors]; but it does question a theory 
which denies that anything im portant has changed '.15 in  his gentle 
criticism o f George Kennan, Smith states
... he did not go much beyond presenting an idealized 
balance-of-pow er system . And because he never 
seemed to recognize the extent to which such a system 
required at least a minimal code o f in ternationally  
shared values, Kennan never considered w hether, or 
how, the necessary consensus around those values 
could be built.1**
This last observation relates to the present critique o f  the 
scientific aspirations of realism which have limited its sensitivity to 
the essential issues o f human collective activity , o f politics: not 
simply what is done, but why; and this question im plicates values 
above all. Aside from absolute dictatorships, no state can define its 
interests without reference to the fundamental values held by its 
dom estic society. Britain, for example, relies heavily oir a broad 
social consensus in support o f its particular form o f governm ent 
which, despite the absence o f a written constitution and specific 
dem ocratic guarantees, rem ains one o f the w orld 's m ost stable 
d em o crac ie s .
15 Ibid., p. 225-6.
16 Ibid., p. 235-6.
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E qually , no in ternational system  can p rov ide in terested  
reasons for state action unless it is able to reflect the socio-political 
values o f the m em ber-states. The European C om m unities, fo r 
example, would not provide a meaningful framework for state action 
unless the idea of Europe somehow reflected the values o f 'European 
citizens' - indeed, this is the substance of debate concerning the 
deepen ing  o f European in teg ration  - w hatever the p a rticu la r 
interests or relative power of the member states.
Interests, whether or not defined in terms of power, must be 
secondary  to foundational v a lu e-stru c tu res , suggesting  th a t a 
norm ative understanding must take priority  over any em pirical 
observations about interest-driven behaviour. W hile attem pting to 
provide a general theory o f international politics, the realists have 
lost sight o f their goal ('reality1; a kind of truth claim) in the search 
for rigor, simplicity, and the means of political 'control'.
G eorge Kennan provides a particularly  in teresting  case in 
point because of his expressions of 'idealist' concern, combined with 
a conventional realist view o f international politics. The author of 
the post-w ar policy o f 'containm ent' (o f Soviet c o m m u n i s m ) 1 ? ,  he 
has warned against em ploying m orality in the determ ination  or 
analysis o f state behaviour, and yet he has always written with a 
great sensitivity to moral issues.18 Perhaps because he is among the 
most forthcoming of realists in this latter respect, Kennan * illustrates 
the constrain ts which a realist approach puts on a norm ative
1? Kennan's views, and name, came to prominence with the famous *Long 
Telegram’ (from Moscow) of February 1946 and the (briefly) anonymous *X' article in
Foreign Affairs of 1947, both written while he was in the American foreign service.
He was U.S. Ambassador to Moscow in 1952, until declared persona non grata for his 
frank description of living conditions there.
111 George Kennan, 'Morality and Foreign Policy', Foreign Affairs. (Vol. 64, No. 
2, Winter 1985-86). See the further discussion of Kennan’s work in Chapter Five,
under 'Normative Aspects of Foreign Policy', which supports the point made here.
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understanding o f international politics; constrain ts w hich thereby 
lim it not just realism but the development of norm ative theory as 
well. O f his vascillation between 'realism* and 'idealism ' Barton 
Gellman says,
Behind this confusion o f roles is a false dichotom y
between facts and values, between reality and m orality, 
as if  it were necessary to choose one or the other. It is a 
d ichotom y to which K ennan som etim es seem s to
s u b s c r ib e .. .1 9
Gellman is a respectful critic, and is genuine in searching for some
pattern in K ennan's argument, but finding this d ifficu lt ('P robably 
on no other subject are his views so confusing... puzzles me no end 
in his discussions o f morality and world affairs’2®) can only note 
that Kennan did not aspire to write system atic philosophy (though 
he is an h istorian). Perhaps the connection between the  'tw o
K ennans', between m orality and pow er-politics, is that to 'K ennan's 
way o f  thinking, pow er always creates a "moral d ilem m a"'.21 No 
doubt this is true, but surely such dilemmas - such value choices -
are just what a study o f politics should address.
Gellman identifies six different them es in Kennan's w riting 
on morality and foreign affairs; 1) morality is only possible in the
absence o f pow er struggles; 2) politics involves both underly ing  
ideals and superimposed power relations, but the latter demand prior
attention; 3) security is a precondition for a policy based on ideal
19 Barton Gellman, Contending _with Kennan: Toward a Philosophy of American 
Power (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 60.
2® Ibid., pp. 69 and 78.
21 Ibid., p. 62.
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principles; 4) security and principle (national interest and m orality) 
are conflicting values; 5) agnosticism (the moral questions are too 
difficult); 6) relativity (only competent to judge one's own national 
in terest and behaviour).2 2
These various them es are not easily  sum m arised ,2 3 but 
G ellm an nevertheless offers a broad and balanced critique o f 
Kennan's position on morality - so far as it can be located - and notes 
tha t K ennan's objections to m orality are prudential ra ther than 
principled. This may be the result o f an unsystem atic w riter, as 
G ellman im plies, but it should be noted that there is no lack o f 
system atic argument in respect to power. It is that m orality sits 
uncom fortably with realist assumptions, rather than that m orality is
troublesom e in itself, that leads realist theory to exclude m oral 
considerations - system atically.
Kennan often exhibits great common sense and insight, as
indicated by a diary entry from 1949:
...dispense with those means which can stave o ff defeat 
only at the cost o f undermining victory.24
Yet, in spite o f the enormous implications o f such a view, Kennan 
the realist was obliged to see this noble goal as one to be achieved by 
a 'sufficient margin' of military power. That there might *be means 
other than power, or that the end itself might be understood in terms
other than victory and defeat, does not enter easily into the realist's
22 Ibid., pp. 64-9.
23 Kennan provides a loose summary of his position in his Realities of 
American Foreign Policy (New York: W.W. Norton, 1966), p. 49 (first published by 
Princeton University Press, 1954).
24 George Frost Kennan, Memoirs. 1925-1950 rVolume Onel (Boston: Little, 
Brown, 1967), p. 437.
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field of vision. (Normative aspects of strategic thought are discussed 
at greater length in Chapter Seven).
For Kennan, as for other realists, m orality is clearly  an 
uncom fortable, if  important, subject. Moral concerns clearly arise, 
but they bring with them a kind of cognitive dissonance for the 
world-view o f realism, which holds that morals belong at home (in 
domestic society), or even that they are strictly personal. Kennan, 
fo r example, makes a clear distinction between public and private 
morality in an article entitled 'M orality and Foreign P o l i c y ' , 2 5  the 
argument o f which will be discussed at some length in the chapter 
on nuclear deterrence and foreign policy below. This is a limited 
conception of m orality, and reflects the views o f Reinhold Niebuhr 
who, like E.H. Carr, was critical o f utopian idealism in the inter-war 
period as being inappropriate in the face of real dangers. Niebuhr 
wrote that
...the 'liberal culture' o f modem bourgeois civilization 
has sim ply and sentim entally  transm uted the supra- 
historical ideals o f perfection o f the gospel into simple 
historical possibilities. ...that this kind o f perfectionism  
is bad religion...that it is bad politics and that it helps to 
make the democratic nations weak and irresolute...2 6
*
It is not difficult to understand why such challenges to idealism were 
expressed, given the apparent dangers of the historical period in
25 Op. cit. This would seem to be a reply to Gellman, op. cit. (who was 22 when 
writing in 1984), among others: There have... been demands, particularly from the 
younger generation, that I should make clearer my views on the relationship of moral 
considerations to American foreign policy' (p. 205).
26 Reinhold Niebuhr, Christianity and Power Politics (New York: Scribner's, 
1940), from the Preface, pp. ix-xi.
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which they were expressed, but they do not constitute the basis o f a 
theory  o f in ternational po litics or m orality . T hese critic ism s 
concerned practical judgem ent, at a time when practical judgem ent 
was everything. It does not follow that a theory can be built upon 
the need for action in those contingent circumstances, nor that some 
'ideals o f perfection' might not provide appropriate foundations for 
a theory which may subsequently inform (not replace) practica l 
j u d g e m e n t .27 The present argument, of course, is critical o f  any 
absolutes that lie outside human experience o f po litics - outside 
history (supra-historical) - and of any attempt to dictate historical
possibilities, but this does not diminish the need to identify political 
goals (whether or not these are expressed as ideals). N iebuhr is 
symptom atic o f the realist penchant for moral concern (som etim es 
in the form o f conservative religion) com bined with a view  o f 
po litica l theory w hich exp lic itly  excludes a m oral com ponent, 
although this does not necessarily amount to an amoral view  o f
political life. Indeed, the concern with m orality is palpable in
realism , but it does not belong to its account o f in ternational 
relations. As Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff argue:
In addition to their efforts to determine how nations in
fact behaved, realists developed a body o f norm ative 
theory addressed particularly to policy m ak ers^ *
But the norm ative\ethical component of political action is an after­
thought or em bellishm ent, conditioned by the prior concern w ith
27 See the subsequent discussion of Bull and Morgenthau, and notes 77-79.
2* James E. Dougherty and Robert L Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
International Relations (New York: Lippincott, 1971), p. 101.
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p ru d en tia l s ta te  behav iour, and the norm ativeX epistem ological 
structure of political theory which provides the context for action is 
not accounted for. It seems we are to wait for an after-life before 
living out, or living up to, any ideals. Yet this is, o f course,
im possible: every society (even international society) is informed by 
some conception o f the 'good', or some ideal foim. In realism, such 
essential aspirations are reduced to the m anipulation o f pow er,
devoid o f meaningful content. Ideals remain necessary, but being 
excluded  from the po litica l, they naturally  becom e sta tic  and
absolute. Niebuhr is him self critical o f the role Christianity has 
p lay ed  in secu la r p o litic s , and says tha t C atho lic ism  and
Protestantism  have exhausted the possibilities o f error:
In either case peace and order through pow er were
estim ated too highly and the inevitable in justice o f
every stabilization of power was judged too leniently.^^
How it is possible to make such estimations, or even engage with the 
tension between order and justice  in the absence o f a political
theory which acknowledges the significance of such values? It is a
prob lem  rev isited  in the d iscussion  o f H edley B ull, below .
U nderlying the insistence on a distinction between the 'idealism ' o f 
m orality and the 'realism ' o f politics is an insistence on absolute
foundations for both, such that the twain shall never meet. Again,
Niebuhr recognises the problems o f absolutism when he notes:
The proponents o f 'natural law ' therefore invariab ly
29 Niebuhr, The Christian Church in a Secular Age’ in Christianity and Power 
Politics, op. cit., p. 223.
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introduce some historically  contingent norm or social 
structure into what they regard as G od's inflexible
n o rm .3 0
It is not only idealist absolutism of which he is wary. He is critical of 
orthodox realism  in noting the benefits o f  loyalty  to  a value 
transcending  national in terest:
It corrects the ’realism ' of those who are myopically 
realistic by seeing only their own interests and failing
thereby to do justice to their interests when they are
involved with the interests of others.3 1
N iebuhr rightly points out that static absolutes do not provide a 
su itab le foundation for political life > 'Good and evil are not 
determ ined by some fixed structure o f human existence ' - and
im plies relying on some abiding character in collective relations in
his reference to 'love', though for him this is a divine inheritance.3 ^
Thus, because o f a distinction between the continuity  o f divine 
qualities and the contingent reality o f human experience, there is 
no place in this scheme for human norms (as opposed to God's) as a 
fundam ental part o f political association. Human behaviour is 
view ed with pessim ism , as being necessarily  se lf-in terested  and 
u ltim a te ly  se lf-d es tru c tiv e , w ith only  the p ro sp ec t o f  d iv ine
redemption to fall back on: hardly the basis o f a humanistic theory
30 Niebuhr, 'Augustine's Political Realism' in Christian Realism and Political 
Problems (New York: Scribner’s, 1953), pp. 132-3.
31 Ibid., p. 137.
33 Ibid., p. 103. See the different treatment of love in Roberto Mangabeira 
Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free Press and London: Collier 
Macmillan, 1975), inter alia pp. 206-295.
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o f politics. Niebuhr attempts to find a balance, but is unable to
escape the assumptions of the realist position (as elaborated by Smith
ab o v e ):
Realistic pessimism did indeed prompt both Hobbes and 
Luther to an unqualified endorsem ent o f state power;
but that is only because they were not realistic enough.
They saw the dangers of anarchy in the egotism o f the 
citizens but failed to perceive the dangers o f tyranny
in the se lfishness o f the ruler. T herefore they 
obscured the consequent necessity o f placing checks
upon the ruler's self-w ill.3 3
The State of Nature
It is appropriate at this point to consider the related points o f  the 
realist assumption about the state-of-nature (after Hobbes, im plying 
'all against all' as between states) and the distinction between the
legal and the moral (the la tter distinction is discussed further in 
C hapter Five). Benhabib's analysis o f H egel's norm ative critique 
points to the state of nature assumption o f the em piricist natural 
rights theorists (including Hobbes, Locke, G rotius, and Pufendorf - 
all o f whom influence traditional realist theories o f in ternational
rela tions) as being a presupposed assum ption, 'arrived  at v ia  a
thought experiment'. He argues that
33 Ibid., p. 127. Here Niebuhr exhibits, even in a critical mode, the four 
components of the realist approach: (1) a pessimistic attitude to human nature, (2) the 
state-centric assumption, (3) the centrality of state power, (4) the rational aspect of 
national interest.
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th e se  th e o ris ts  a b s tra c t from  hum an li f e  in  
communities those aspects and elements which seem to 
them to constitute human nature, w hile leaving aside 
those w hich they consider accidental, in v irtue  o f  
o rig in a tin g  in conven tion , trad itio n , custom , and 
covenant... In fact, these thinkers are guided m ore by
their prejudices as to what is and is not part o f  human 
nature than by philosophical principle.34
Furtherm ore, the arbitrary selection of some aspects o f the 
human condition and the exclusion o f others in the state-of-nature 
assumption is related, for Hegel, to the destruction o f the conception 
o f  the ethical life, which thus dissolves into the separate spheres o f 
legality  and m orality , alienating the individual from the society
(denying the ethical whole) by placing the legal medium of the state
in opposition to 'personal' m orality.35 (The later Hegel argued that 
the ethical life o f individuals was expressed through the institutions 
o f the state as V o lk s g e is t  ,36) In the realm o f international relations 
a para lle l problem  is the separation  o f  a un iversal hum an 
community through the interposition of a system o f sovereign states, 
although Hegel sees this as an historically contingent circum stance 
through which the universal mind arises out of reciprocal* relations 
between the 'Finite m inds' o f nation-states.37 The states system is
34 Seyla Benhabib, Critique. Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of 
Critical Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 24.
35 Ibid ., pp. 24-7.
3*> G.W.F. Hegel, The Philosophy of Right (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1980 [1821]), p. 156.
37 Merle, The Sociology of International Relations, trans. Dorothy Parkin 
(Leamington Spa: Berg Publishers, 1987), pp. 49-50.
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reified by realists' assumption of a 'natural' condition, when states 
need only be understood as the means of engaging - given identity
and difference • in a universal dialogue about the ethical life.
Realists, in their pessimism, are unwilling to accept that those 
involved in political life are themselves the source o f  authenticity 
and rectitude in their relations. But the alternative, reliance on
divine guidance or scientific assertion, will provide only the illusion 
o f certain foundations and a static conception o f what is inherently 
dynamic. There is little opportunity in the realist scheme for moral 
issues to be seen as part of a larger political realm, or as an aspect of 
the  norm ative  s truc tu re  that underlies  in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s  
(including power relations). It is assumed by realists that states are 
cen tra l, and relations betw een them bad by defau lt. R oland 
Robertson, as a sociologist refering to culture, says that 'the disputed 
term s in which globalization has occurred and is occurring has been 
greatly neglected', but this does not assume anything in particu lar 
about the circumstances of the discourse in which such term s are 
expressed. It does not assume a state o f nature.
M arcel M erle, in his study o f the sociology o f  international 
relations, points to three versions o f the state-of-nature theory in 
which conflict is logically resolved in (a) a balance o f  pow er 
between sovereign entities, (b) some form o f world governm ent, or 
(c) an historical dialectic, but he says
The theory o f the state  o f nature purports to  be
rea lis tic , but is the rad ical opposition  w hich  it
estab lishes betw een in ternal o rder and in terna tional
chaos still well founded, if  indeed it ever was? It is o f
course true that resort to force is legitim ate between
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states, while it is under state control and monopoly
within states. However, this is a partial and over-
form al view, introducing a difference in kind when
there is only, nowadays at least, a difference in degree
between the two kinds of society.3 8
and later,
The rigorous logic o f the s ta te -o f-na tu re  theory ... 
contains a m ajor disadvantage: it closes the debate 
before all its terms have been analysed.39
M uddled thinking about the supposed separation between the 
'rea litie s  o f pow er' and socio-political values can be seen in
K ennan's discussion of means and ends in foreign policy. Kennan
argues that foreign policy is a means to an end, and that the state as 
a sovereign entity em bodies this end or over-all purpose, 'som e
purpose to which the total o f its political life was supposed to be 
dedicated and by which its existence as a separate political entity was
supposed to be justified ', while at the same time this entity is 'not
conceived as being an end in itse lf .40 Subsequently he says, 'let us
not assume that the p u r p o s e s  o f states, as distinct from the methods,
are fit subjects for measurement in moral term s'.41 Thesq purposes
(for the U.S.A., the protection of certain individual rights) are thus 
self-evident and unquestionable. However, Kennan is unable to hold
38 Ibid.* pp. 51-2.
39 Ibid.* p. 58.
40 Realities of American Foreign Policy, op. cit.* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1954), pp. 5-7.
41 Ibid.* p. 47.
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th is line o f argum ent when his concern with 'rea lities ' actually  
causes him to counsel cosm opolitanism  with regard to the world 
environm ent (political and natural) and the expansion o f  national 
life, and to call for a greater sense of purpose in the development o f 
national life - indeed he acknowledges that he is here 'at odds' with 
the above initial justificatory purposes o f the state.42
D istinguishing R ealist Perspectives
W hile realist authors are by nd means all o f a kind, there is a 
common thread in the attem pted exclusion o f  norm ative elem ents 
which is ultimately unsuccessful since each in turn has to admit the
im portance o f norm ative theory.
Hedley Bull offers a useful example of realism, ju st because his 
work does not fall readily into the realist mold. He is a 'hard case' 
w ith respect to the d istinctions and d iv isions in in ternational 
relations scholarship, that both he and others have suggested. This 
is due in part to the plethora o f cross-cutting categories that have
been proposed, but it is im portant to recognise that w hatever 
typology is used, the significance o f normative theory is evident at 
every juncture even within the realist canon.
In his discussion of the concept of order in world politics, Bull 
speaks o f 'a  com m on ep istem ology ' and 'com m on valu es ' in  
in ternational socie ties.4 3 However, he is quick to point out that such 
common points o f reference are not entirely characteristic  o f the 
m odern  (tw en tie th  cen tu ry ) in te rn a tio n a l so c ie ty , w hich  'is
42 Ibid., pp. 106-110.
42 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 16.
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weighted in favour o f the dominant culture o f the W est'.44 This 
sensitivity to normative considerations is typical o f Bull (and he does 
not intend prescription), but equally (and more im portantly) typical 
is his focus on the goals o f the states system (preservation o f the 
sy stem ; m ain ten an ce  o f so v ere ig n  in d ep en d en ce  o f  s ta te s ; 
p e a c e /p r in c ip le d  co n d u c t o f  w a r )4 5 which he view s as the 
inevitable point o f reference even as he entertains the possibility of 
its obsolescence.4 ^ It is easy to agree that we must begin from where 
we are, but Bull fails to see the consequences o f  defining the 
possib ilities in term s o f existing realist assum ptions. T hat even 
prim ary goals (like order) might be established differently does not 
enter into the realist paradigm, and Bull reiterates the realist state- 
c en tr ic  concep tion  o f  m anaging  hum an a ffa irs  th ro u g h  the 
excercise o f power. Indeed he self-conciously defends the states- 
system, though he claims this is not at the expense o f the human 
com munity, and explicitly asserts the moral priority o f  world order 
(a wider concept) over the states system.47 Thus, like other realists, 
Bull is unable to tackle international relations from a norm ative 
perspective directly, and in falling back on realist assum ptions his 
good in ten tions becom e paving stones on a road o f uncertain  
d e s tin a tio n .
Among the clearer distinctions to be made in realist thought is 
th a t  b e tw e e n  th e  A m e r ic a n /c o n t in e n ta l  's c ie n tif ic *  and
B ritish /A n g lo -S ax o n  'tra d itio n a l ' o r 'c la s s ic a l ' ap p ro ach es to  
in ternational re la tions. There is substan tial d iscussion  o f  the 
'English School', and of the dominance of American social science in
44 Ibid., p. 317.
45 Ibid .. p. 16.
A6 Ibid., p. 295-6.
47 Ibid., p. 318-20.
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th is field ,4 ® though both approaches are im plicated in the general 
critique o f realism offered here. Chris Brown argues that the 
E nglish  School (including W ight, Bull and possibly Carr) 'saw  
them selves as students of diplomatic practice and celebrators o f the 
creative side o f statecraft; the urge to reduce action to formulae was 
m issing, and this gives their "realism" a fluidity and flexibility not 
characteristic  o f the school o f M orgenthau '.49 M artin G riffiths 
argues that the American realists, Hans M orgenthau and Kenneth 
W altz, are not in fact realists at all but are 'more appropriately 
charac terized  as po litica l id e a lis ts ',5 0 since M orgenthau 's work 
suffers from 'nostalgic idealism ' (evaluative reification o f  the past) 
and W altz's from 'com placent idealism ’ (reification o f the present). 
G riffiths, using R.N. Berki to construct a framework for analysis, 
awards the title of true realist to Hedley Bull (with the assistance of 
M artin  W ight,51 and in spite of 'the truncated boundaries o f W ight's 
paradigm s o f international thought'52 ).
A lthough G riffiths applies the appelation d ifferen tly  (and
48 See Roy Jones, The English School of International Relations: A Case for 
Closure', Review of International Studies (Vol. 7, No. 1, 1981), the debate between 
Peter Wilson (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1989) and Sheila Grader (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1988) in that 
journal, and Steve Smith, International Relations: British and American Perspectives 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985). On American dominance, see Stanley Hoffmann, 'An 
American Social Science: International Relations' Daedalus. (Vol. 106, No. 3, 1977), 
Ekkehart Krippendorff, International Relations as a Social Science (Brighton: 
Wheatsheaf, 1982), and chapters by Steve Smith and others in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon 
Mangasarian (eds), The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (London: 
Macmillan, 1989). t
49 Chris Brown, ’Sorry Comfort? The Case Against "International Theory", 
unpublished conference paper presented to the Inaugural Pan-European Conference on 
International Studies of the European Consortium for Political Research, Standing 
Group on International Relations (panel on 'Power and Morality in International 
Relations'), Heidelberg, 16-20 September 1992, p. 5. The arguments of this paper can 
be found in the introduction to Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New 
Normative Approaches (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992).
50 Martin Griffiths, Realism. Idealism and International Politics: A 
Reinterpretation (London Routledge, 1992), passim.
51 Ibid., p. 34.
52 Ibid., p. 167.
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disputes Bull's 'Grotian' disposition) Bull certainly falls into the 
'classical' tradition by virtue of his notable attack on the scientific 
approach in his 'International Theory: The Case for a C lassical 
A p p ro a c h '.55 Stanley Hoffmann says o f Bull,
... he disliked the scientific method because he thought 
its practioners were obsessed by the quest fo r a far 
g rea te r degree o f p rec is io n  than the  f ie ld  o f  
international relations a l l o w s . 5 4
A m erican realism  can be iden tified  w ith th e  sc ien tific  
approach, as Stanley Hoffmann im plicitly does in describ ing two 
other differences between Bull and the realists: 'his d istrust o f the 
realis t m odel o f state behaviour' and his prim ary in te res t in 
in ternational society  (the in ternational po litica l m ilieu ), ra th e r 
than p o w e r . 5  ^ Mark Hoffman, on the other hand, uses the same 
characteristics to place Bull among the realists in a discussion o f 
'C ritical Theory and Realism ' while em ploying R ichard A shley 's 
d is t in c tio n 55 between technical and practical realism:
An exam ple o f practical realism  which m ore clearly
5 3 Hedley Bull, 'International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach’, 
World Politics (Vol. 18, No. 3, 1966), which is reprinted in K. Knorr and J. Rosenau 
(eds), Contending Approaches to International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1969) along with the article by Morton Kaplan, The New Great 
Debate: Traditionalism vs Science in International Relations'.
54 Stanley Hoffmann, 'International Society’ in J.D.B. Miller and R J. Vincent 
(eds). Order and Violence: Hedlev Bull and International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1990), p. 16.
55 Ibid., pp. 14-15.
55 See Richard K. Ashley, Tolitical Realism and Human Interests',
International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 25, No. 2, 1981) and The Poverty of Neorealism’, 
International Organisation (Vol. 38, No. 2, 1984).
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[than M orgenthau] exem plifies th is category is the 
'E ng lish  School' and in p articu la r H edley B u ll's  
A narch ical Socicly.-5 7
Mark Hoffman (in noting L inklater5 **) is aware, though, that 
Bull is usually associated with the category of 'rationalism '. Vincent 
notes Bull's 'occasional, even frequent, alignm ent with the realists' 
while saying that he 'stood four-square in the Grotian or rationalist 
t r a d i t i o n ' . ^  The Grotian view is one in a tripartite scheme o f 
approaches that Bull outlines in The A narchical Society .6 *1 derived 
from M artin W ight's sim ilar scheme61 (the differing terms o f which 
are shown below in parentheses), and reflected in Banks' three 
p a ra d ig m s 62 {differences shown in brackets}:
62 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate' in Dyer and 
Mangasarian (eds), The Study of International Relations, op. cit., p. 71.
58 Andrew Linklater, 'Realism, Marxism and Critical International Theory', 
Review of International Studies (Vol. 12, No. 2, 1986).
59 r j . Vincent, ’Order in International Politics’ in Miller and Vincent (eds), 
Order and Violence, op. cit., p. 41.
6® Op. cit., p. 24. See, however, Griffiths’ ...Reinterpretation, op. cit.
61 See his 'Western Values in International Relations' in H. Butterfield and M. 
Wight (eds). Diplomatic Investigations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1967).
62 Michael Banks, The Inter-Paradigm Debate' in Light and Groom (eds), 
International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Francis Pinter, 1985).
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APPROACH -  VIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
H o b b e s s ia n /r e a l i s t  -  state of war among states
(M a c h ia v e ll ia n )
G r o t ia n / i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s t  -  international society o f states 
( ra tio n a lis t )  {p lu ra lis t}
K a n t i a n / u n i v e r s a l i s t  - potential community o f mankind 
( re v o lu tio n is t)  ( s t r u c tu r a l i s t}
In many respects this typology is only notional, since there are some 
overlapping elements and differences w ithin categories, but it does 
serve as a context for debate between views, even if  it is recognised 
that all o f these categories derive from the assumptions o f W estern 
E n lig h ten m en t ra tio n a lity  and m e t h o d o l o g y . *>3 This three-part 
arrangem ent is not, of course, the only possible scheme. M ichael 
D onelan points out that both Carr and M orgenthau were content 
w ith two categories (roughly speaking, realism and idealism ), and 
provides his own five-part scheme: natural law, realism , fideism , 
rationalism  (which he prefers), and historicism (in two aspects).**4
The significance o f adopting such taxonomies o f international 
political thought should not be underestim ated, how ever,* since in 
providing a context for debate they also proscribe the lim its o f 
discourse. R.B.J. Walker observes that
63 See, for example, the discussion in N.J. Renger, 'Serpents and Doves in 
International Theory', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 2, 
Summer 1988) and James Der Derian's introduction to that Special Issue on 
philosophical foundations of International Relations.
64 Michael Donelan, Elements of International Political Theory (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990).
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far from being merely one of a series of debates that 
have characterised the history o f the d iscip line, the 
d is tinc tion  betw een po litica l realism  and p o litic a l 
idealism has provided the context w ithin which other 
disputes about appropriate methodology or the priority 
o f state-centred accounts o f world politics could occur 
at all.65
Thus it is possible to say that there are certain consequences 
o f adopting a specifically Grotian view, and o f some interest here is 
the d istinction between the naturalists (G rotius and Lauterpacht) 
and the positivists (Vattel and Oppenheim) among the international 
lawyers. The Grotian natural law foundations o f Bull's view may 
explain both his concern with moral issues, and his inability  to 
properly incorporate them into a theory o f international relations. 
While Stanley Hoffmann says that for Bull,
international society has a moral basis; indeed Bull's 
concern for international society and his in terest in 
moral conceptions are inextricably linked.** *>
he also points out that
it must be said that Bull him self never did lay out fully
**5 R.B.J. Walker, ’History and Structure in the Theory of International
Relations’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1989), 
p. 167.
**** Stanley Hoffmann 'International Society', op. cit., p. 19.
90
the foundations of his own moral position...67
If he had addressed those foundations, no doubt it would have 
been apparen t tha t the ab so lu tis t ch a ra c te r o f  n a tu ra lis tic  
assum ptions (even when secularised) give rise to an insistence on
abso lu te  foundations w hich are no m ore appropria te  to  the 
understanding o f a varied and changing society than the static 
foundations of positivism. Bull recognises that order is 'necessarily 
a relative concept', and 'exists only in relation to given goals', but
nevertheless insists that certain goals are universal conditions o f 
social life .68 He supports his analysis by reference to the 'good 
sense' o f the 'simple truisms' o f natural law (as discussed by H.L.A.
Hart in The Concept o f Law), but this line of argument suggests a 
case o f 'the natura listic  fallacy ' (as discussed in G.E. M oore's 
P r in c ip ia  E th ic a l if it amounts to a claim that such universal 
co n d itio n s  are a natu ra l (ob serv ab le /p ro v ab le ) so c ia l 'g o o d '. 
A lte rn a tiv e ly , bu t eq u a lly  p ro b le m a tic a lly , th e se  u n iv e rsa l 
cond itions may be view ed as non-natural 'goods' w hich are 
apprehended by the faculty o f intuition, yet are still an aspect o f 
reality 'out there' to be apprehended regardless o f the socio-political
context o f their apprehension.
B ull's central definition of order as 'a pattern o f human 
activity  that sustains elem entary, prim ary or universal *goals o f 
social life' does not evade the troublesome question o f purpose (what 
should those goals be?). In providing an account o f a kind o f 
'p ractical association’,69 which does not require or pursue a common
67 Ibid ., p. 21.
68 The Anarchical Society, op cit., p. 4.
69 A term used by Oakeshott, and Nardin. See Michael Oakeshott, On Human 
Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) and Terry Nardin, Law. Morality and the
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vision o f the good life,7 ® the explanation of why such an order 
should come about or be pursued is not provided.
This shortcom ing may be understandable in view o f M artin 
W ight's d istinction  betw een c lassical po litica l theory as being  
'theory o f the good life' and international theory as being 'theory o f 
s u rv iv a l ',71 and o f course Bull sees order as instrumental to survival. 
Robert Jackson argues that international theory is also a theory o f 
the good life, is part of the theory of the state, since it addresses the 
conditions under which the good life can be pursued within states:
International theory in both its realist and rationalist 
versions is a theory o f survival only because political 
theory is a theory of the good life... If revolutionism is 
a variant o f international theory, then that theory is 
not limited to the theory o f survival...7 2
This passage addresses W ight’s claim that 'w hat for political 
theory is the extrem e case (as revolution, or civil war) is for 
international theory the regular case', this being the reason for the
Relations of States (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983).
7® See Friedrich V. Kratochwil. Rules. Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions 
of practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 256.
71 Martin Wight, 'Why Is There No International Theory?' in Butterfield and
Wight (eds). Diplomatic Investigations: Essavs in the Theory of International Politics 
(London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1966), p. 33. This essay was first published in 
International Relations (Vol 2, No. 1, April 1960). It is worth noting that both Wight 
and Butterfield, along with Niebuhr, arc characterised as being engaged in the 'search 
for a normative foundation for politics' while Carr, Morgenthau and others are seen as 
primarily interested in 'power and politics' in Kenneth W. Thompson, Masters of 
International Thought: Maior Twentieth-Centurv Theorists and the World Crisis (Baton 
Rouge, LA: Louisiana Slate University Press, 1980). It is a reflection of Thompson's
own views that those he discusses are (with few exceptions) realists.
72 Robert Jackson, 'Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1990).
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'recalcitrance o f international politics to being theorized about'.7 3
Questioning the assumption that states are the perfect form of 
association necessarily undermines an exclusive concern with their 
survival. Hegel's characterisation of the state as the highest form of 
political life is, after all, entirely contingent and his h istorical 
d ia lectic  does not perm it dogm atic attachm ent to any particu lar 
social form ation or 'natural law' (setting  aside any teleo logical 
determ inism  that may be seen in such an account). Some 
consequences o f orthodox conceptions o f the state, for the study of 
in ternational re la tions, are suggested by Fred H alliday  in h is
discussion of an alternative history o f world society, em phasising
so c io lo g ica l trends ra th e r than the expansion  o f in te r-s ta te
in s t i tu t io n s :
The argument is not about whether we are or are not
'state centric', but what we mean by the state.74
Jackson concludes that 'po litica l and m oral theorising  on 
international relations is expanding, arguably because the good life 
is affected more and more by events external to states'. Ferguson and 
M ansbach note that norm ative/legal boundaries do not necessarily  
coincide with political boundaries, and so abandon the dichotom y 
between interstate and domestic politics in favour o f the concept o f 
'authority patterns' or 'polities' in history.7 ^
7 3 Wight, op. cit., p. 33.
74 Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second 
Agenda', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987),
reprinted in Dyer and Mangasarian (eds), op. cit.., p. 43. See also responses to this
article, and Halliday's rejoinder, in Millennium (Vol. 17, No. 1, Spring 1988).
7^ Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, 'Beyond the Elusive Quest: A 
Search for Authority Patterns in History' (a paper given at the joint BISA/ISA 
convention, London, 31 March 1989, p. 3. Sec their The Elusive Quest: Theory and
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Bull's notion of order, as Vincent indicates, is ambivalent with 
respect to  it being an em pirical genera lisa tion  o r a log ical 
requ irem en t: an am bivalence w ith re sp ec t to the is /o u g h t
q u e s t io n .76 This ambivalence undermines the critical potential o f  
Bull’s argument; it is perhaps something inherited:
W ight's attitude to the realist position, then, is an 
ambivalent one; and in Power P o li t ic s  he does not so 
much formulate or expound it as suggest that it is food 
for thought.7 7
It should be said, of course, that a consequence of this ambivalence is 
that it does not close the argument in the way that 'scientific' forms 
o f realism  do, but the reluctance to prescribe or recom m end 
condones the status quo .78 It is odd that realists like Bull and 
M orgenthau, preoccupied with state system s and state behaviour, 
claim n o t  to be defenders o f the status quo (and indeed were often 
critical o f state practice): Bull states that it would be an oversight 'to 
derive from this [defence of the states system] an endorsement of the 
e x is tin g  so c ie ty  o f  s ta te s ',79 and M orgen thau  s ta te s  th a t 
'international relations is not something to be taken for granted but 
som eth ing  to be understood  and to be changed and, m ore
International Politics (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988) and 
The State. Conceptual Chaos, and the Future of International Relations Theory 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1989).
76 R.J. Vincent, ‘Order in International Politics', op. cit., p. 48.
77 From the editors' Introduction to Martin Wight, Power Politics. 2nd Ed., 
edited by Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad (Leicester: Leicester University Press for 
the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1978), p. 19. The editors distinguish 
Wight's approach from those of Carr, Morgenthau, and Kennan.
78 See the conclusion of Bull’s The Anarchical Society, op cit., pp. 318-20.
79 Ibid., p. 319.
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particularly, to be changed beyond the present limits o f its political 
structu re and organization'.*®  However, prescription and critique 
are related (in that critique is both 'negative prescription ' and an 
avenue for change and p rescrip tion) and the crea tive process 
requires both in full measure. Thus while Bull emphasised 'society' 
(w ith its common in terests, values, rules and institu tions) over 
'system ' (the impact of slates on one another), his concern with 
o r d e r  nevertheless leads to a reindorsem ent of the states-system  - 
implicating both study and practice. As Mark Hoffman states:
For the English School, the central starting point is the 
uniqueness of the system o f states in displaying both 
o rder and elem ental society in the absence o f  an 
overarch ing  sovereign.**1
Bull introduces some latitude by saying that the states-system 
is 'only part' (but 'the most important part’) of world politics,**2 and 
Vincent is able to describe a passage on the moral priority o f world 
society over state-society as 'tantalizingly  b r ie f .* 3 The unwritten 
study o f  ju stice  (to com plem ent the study o f order) m ight have 
clarified Bull's position in this respect. Bull must have recognised 
the problem s inheren t in de linea ting  the norm ative  and the
*® Hans J. Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory' in 
his Truth and Power: Essavs of a Decade. 1960-70. op. cit., p. 261. This essay was 
first published in Horace V. Harrison (ed), The Role of Theory in International 
Relations (Litton Educational Publishing, 1964), and in it Morgenthau aligns himself 
with the historical perspective of Martin Wight's 'Why is there no International 
Theory?' {op. cit.), as against abstract rational-scientific theorists.
*1 Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Inter-paradigm Debate', op. cit., p.
71.
*2 Bull, 'International Relations as an Academic Pursuit’, Australian Outlook 
(Vol. 26, No. 3, December 1972), p. 255, and The Anarchical Society, op cit., pp. 319.
*3 R.J. Vincent, 'Order in International Politics', op. cit., p. 43.
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political in his discussion concerning the relationship  betw een 
justice and order, and which of these has priority (in the end he says 
that order is not a com m anding value). The difficulty  here is
precisely the making o f a distinction between order and ju stice  as 
conflicting political goals: justice is the political virtue, and it both 
supports and depends on order o f some kind (orderliness in general, 
but not a particular instance of order).®4 Placing these two at odds is 
not an appropriate starting point for understanding po litic s, as 
noted in the discussion o f Machiavelli below. The question o f how 
politics is to be ordered always remains. In spite o f h is realist
assumptions (e.g., about the primacy o f states) and because o f  his 
concern with in ternational society (somehow 'beyond* the states- 
system, though comprised of it), Bull was aware of the significance 
o f norm ative issues and identified normative enquiry and values as 
prom ising potential developm ents in his article 'New D irections in 
the Theory o f International Relations'.® ^
M orgenthau provides another perspective on the d istinctions 
in realist theory, both as a realist him self (primarily concerned with
the category o f power) and as a critic o f a particular mode o f 
theorising. As a realist, Morgenthau declares the central concept of 
politics to be power; as a critic o f the rationalistic quantitative 
approach he says 'but if  I want to know how much pow er this 
politician or that government has, I must leave the adding machine 
and the  com puter for h is to rica l and n ecessa rily  q u a lita tiv e
judgm ent'.® 6  He argues that
84 See Hugh C. Dyer, Justice in World Order: A Conceptual Analysis 
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Dalhousie University, 1984).
85 International Studies (Vol. 14, No. 2, April-June 1975), pp. 283£f.
®6 Hans J. Morgenthau, 'Common Sense and Theories' in Truth and Power, op. 
cit., p. 245. This essay was First published as 'International Relations: Common Sense
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W hat d istingu ishes the reflections on in terna tional 
relations since M achiavelli from those that preceded 
them is not their concern for p ractica lity  but the 
intellectual mode with which they endeavored to satisfy 
that concern. The Greek and m edieval m ode was 
p re d o m in a n tly  e th ic a l and d e d u c tiv e ; th a t o f  
M achiavelli and those who followed him was em pirical 
and inductive.**7
The d is tin c tio n  M orgenthau makes is the re fo re  one betw een  
h istorical and rational-scientific modes o f theorising, betw een an 
aspect o f political philosophy or philosophy o f history and theories 
w hose aim  is 'th e  ra tio n a l m an ip u la tio n  o f  in te rn a tio n a l 
rela tions...in  the interest of predictable and controlled results'.** 8 
However, this distinction does not address the gap in M orgenthau's 
own thinking between his view that the final and most noble task of 
a theory o f international relations 'is to prepare the ground fo r a 
new  in te rn a tio n a l o rd er rad ically  d iffe ren t from  th a t w hich 
preceded it*,8 9 and his universalisation o f the characteristics of 
existing power politics. In identifying the shortcom ings o f rational- 
sc ien tific  theory ,9® Morgenthau remains a theorist o f the state, and 
his perspective is not as distant from M achiavelli's as his -theoretical
and Theories', Journal of International Affairs (Vol 21, No. 2, 1967).
87 Ibid.. p. 242.
88 Morgenthau, The Intellectual and Political Functions of Theory', op cit.. p.
251.
89 Ibid.. p. 259-60.
9® Morgenthau's critique of behaviouralist scientism is found in Scientific 
Man vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
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distinctions suggest.9 1
M achiavelli and M a c h s ta a t92
M achiavclli provides an obvious point o f reference for realism  in 
his notion of n e c e s s i t d ,93 the means by which f o r t u n a  is overcome 
in meeting the requirements of v irtu .  The origins of the problem of 
state action had, of course, been addressed in the earliest political 
writings - by Thucydides, for example, who said o f men that 'it is a 
necessary law o f their nature that they rule wherever they can'94 - 
but according to Meinecke, M achiavelli was the first to assess the 
m eaning o f ra ison  d ' i t a t  in the context o f a nascent 'm odem ' 
western system o f states.95 Thus Meinecke finds a starting point for 
addressing the essentially  modern phenom enon o f M achiavellism , 
and its influence on political thought. The theories o f M achiavelli 
h im se lf have been subsequently  buried  or subsum ed by the 
condensation o f his ideas (e.g., by Treitschke)9 ^ in the concept o f
91 Howard Williams notes the modem equivalent of Machiavelli's practical 
experience of government (1498-1512) and his advice to princes (his views later 
presented in The Prince. 1514, as a bid to regain favour) in the advice to U.S. 
governments of Morgenthau and Kissinger (the latter as an agent of the state). See 
Howard Williams, ’Machiavelli: Realpolitik' in his introductory text, International 
Relations in Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1992).
9^ The idea of 'Machstaat' (roughly, ’power-state*) is not directly addressed 
here, but the Weberian influence and realist concern with power is. For a discussion 
of 'Machstaat' in the context of international relations theory see Cornelia Navari, 
'Introduction: The State as a Contested Concept in International Relations' in Cornelia 
Navari (ed), The Condition of States (Milton Keynes: Open University Press,1992).
9^ Discourses. I, 1.
94  H istory o f the Peloponnesian W ar, v. 105.
95 Meinecke, Machiavellism: The doctrine of Raison D'etat and its place in
Modern History trans. D.Scott (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1957, 1962), p. 28. 
First published as Die Idee der StaatsrSson in der Neueren Geschichte (Munich: R. 
Ouldenbourg Verlag, 1924).
96 E.H. Carr, having criticised the view 'that a natural harmony of interests
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raison d 'e ta t  (ragione di sta to ), yet it is important to the present 
argument that Meinecke em phasises the
enorm ous significance (and th is significance is not 
only historical, but also philosophical) o f the problem 
o f raison d 'etat [where] one sees particularly  clearly 
the frightful and deeply disturbing d ifficulties, which 
are concealed by the juxtaposition o f what is and what
ought to be, of causality and the Ideal, o f Nature and
Mind in human life.^?
This 'enormous significance' is disguised in realist theories in
two ways. F irst, realism understood as a theory o f state action 
requ ires  no fu rth er ju s tif ic a tio n  o f such action  beyond the
im perative o f engaging with contingent events in order to mould 
them in the interest of the slate. That states act in their interest is
simply an aspect of reality, from this perspective. That values might 
be involved in the determination of interests is not considered. As 
Michael Smith says of the realists.
They have instead argued unconvincingly that values 
do not enter in, that 'good' policy is simply a m atter of 
fo llow ing the national in terest. But the? national 
interest is not an objective datum, an amoral law  o f
exists' as being a cause of confused thinking (The Twenty Years' Crisis: London: 
Macmillan, 1939, pp. 66-7), quotes Treitschke (on pp. 113-4) as saying that the 
terrible thing about Machiavelli's teaching was 'not the immorality of the methods he 
recommends, but the lack of content of the state, which exists only in order to exist', 
(Aufsatze. iv., p. 428).
97 Meinecke, Machiavellism. op. cit., p. 5.
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interstate existence. Rather it is defined according to a 
particular hierarchy of values.9 8
Secondly, realism assumes that historically contingent events or the 
circumstances o f the moment are also an aspect of an objective and 
static empirical reality, from which conclusions about state interests
can be drawn unproblem atically. Once again, we are confronted
w ith M orgenthau 's 'perennial forces'. Furtherm ore, as W alker 
argues, the com plexities of realism 's intellectual history become lost 
when static  structu res are posited (by 's tructu ra l rea lism ', for 
e x a m p l e ^ o n  the grounds o f unproblem atic in terpretations o f 
early  w riters:
In place o f a history of political thought is offered an
ahistorical repetition in which the struggles o f these 
th in k e rs  to  m ake se n se  o f  th e  h is to r ic a l  
transform ations in which they were caught are erased 
in favour of assertions that they all articulate essential
truths about the same unchanging and usually tragic 
reality: the eternal game of relations between states.1®®
From such a perspective, there is little chance that what M einecke 
considers 'deeply disturbing difficulties' will be observed, *let alone
98 Michael J. Smith, Realist Thought.... op. cit., p. 235.
99 See Chris Brown, 'Sorry Comfort? The Case Against "International Theory", 
op. cit. In footnote 1 he argues: 'Some modem variants of realism are more hostile to 
normative theory than others: structural realism, for example, denies the possibility 
of real choice in international relations, and thus effectively eliminates normative 
analysis - see, e.g. K. Waltz Theory of International Politics (Addison-Wesley, Reading 
MA, 1979). However, "process" realists are in closer touch with normative theory..,'
*®® R.B.J. Walker, 'History and Structure in the Theory of International 
Relations' Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1989), 
p. 172.
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addressed .
These assumptions lead realist analysis to focus on contingent 
circum stances and the efficiency of state action in bringing about 
or m anaging change in them. Thus, with respect to M einecke's 
juxtapositional scheme above, the emphasis will be on 'what is', on 
causality , and on Nature, with little  or no concern fo r human 
purposes and their relationship to interests ('what ought to be', the 
Ideal, Mind). In terms o f the M achiavellian conceptual bridging 
structure, by which n e c e s s i ty  {raison d ’i ta t  /national interest) forms 
the span betw een f o r t u n e  ( c h a n c e / c o n t i n g e n c y / ' r e a l i t y ')  
an d  v /rrzi.(national values/ideals/purposes), this is an em phasis on 
the relation between fo r tu n d  and raison d 'i ta t  which does not allow a 
completion o f the arch by consideration o f virtd .  When the assumed 
un in terpreted  reality  o f contingent events perm its unquestioned  
ca lcu la tio n s  o f in te res ts , there is no room fo r (need  of)
investigations o f a state's ultim ate purposes or the values which 
guide its actions - such inquiries are seen as either subversive o f
self-evident interests or as simply unrealistic. Martin G riffiths uses 
Berki's analysis to make sense o f realist categories along sim ilar 
lines: These 'th ree broad referents for "the real"' (im m ediacy,
necessity and tru th )1®1 are each inadequate in themselves, reality as 
im m ediacy (the condition o f international politics, for G riffiths)
being the dialectical product o f reality as necessity (abstraction o f 
co n stra in ts) and reality  as truth (abstrac tion  o f freedom s)(cf. 
B e r k i1®2 ). The difference in this case (that is, for Berki and after 
him, G riffiths) is that necessity is given, and im mediacy is the
1®1 Martin Griffiths, Realism. Idealism and International Politics, op. cit., 
p.25. The three 'referents' are discussed on pp. 18, 20, 22, respectively.
^ 2 R.N. Berki, On Political Realism (London: J.M. Dent, 1981).
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constructed response, whereas in M achiavelli n e c e ss i ty  is the mode 
o f response and f o r  t u n a  is the given - with tru th /freed o m /v ir/d  
remaining in both cases an abstraction of uncertain status. Berki's 
view reveals typical realist assum ptions (which m ight have been 
wholly transferred to Griffiths but for the discovery o f R orty1^ 3) ,  
and is made clear in his discussion of:
The Dialectic of Political Understanding... or the way to 
the achievem ent of com prehending politics fully as 
’practical' reality. This achievement is what I shall be 
calling political philosophy or wisdom. The two levels 
to be passed on the way are, respectively, political 
science or the level o f knowledge, and ideology or 
political belief. On the level of knowledge politics is 
comprehended as objective reality, a world o f facts and 
observable, em pirical relationships. On the level o f 
belief it is approached as a world of values and ideals, 
an area for human action , as sub jective  reality . 
P h i lo s o p h y  s y n th e s iz e s  th e s e  tw o  p a r t i a l  
a p p ro a c h e s .104
Such clear distinctions between fact and value, even allow ing for 
synthesis, are characteristic  o f realist perspectives which in the 
first instance engage with the problems of state practice in terms of 
’know ledge’ of 'objective reality ', leaving 'values’ and 'subjective 
reality ' and paradoxical truths about the conflict o f values and
103 Martin Griffiths, Realism. Idealism and International Politics, op. cit., 
p. 172, note 8. Griffiths refers to Richard Rorty, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), op. cit. in this work.
*04 R.N. Berki, On Political Realism (London: J.M. Dent, 1981), p. 71.
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ideological clashes to the leisurely acquisition of 'wisdom'.
W eher and the Limits of Realism
One characterisation o f a modem policy-maker - Henry K issinger in
this case - suggests that a practioner of a state-centric W eberian 
'ethic o f responsibility’ must necessarily exclude from consideration 
any substantive goals or ultim ate ends, being concerned prim arily
with the avoidance of catastrophe in the maintenance o f the status 
q u o . *05 Problem s attending such assumptions are recognised, if  
reluctantly, by the realists themselves.
For exam ple, Hans M orgenthau uses a famous quote from 
W eber to support his own case for the primacy of interests:
In terests  (m aterial and ideal), not ideas, dom inate 
directly the actions o f men. Yet the 'images o f the 
world' created by these ideas have very often served as 
sw itch es  d e te rm in in g  the tracks on w hich  the  
dynamism of interests kept actions m oving.106
Here, as Turner and Factor argue, W eber treats value choices
as a category o f interests (’ideal interests’) .1®7 The quoted passage
105 Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fehdr, The Postmodern Political Condition 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 66. See also Daniel Warner, An Ethic of 
Responsibility in International Relations (London: Lynne Reiner, 1992).
^ 6  Politics Among Nations, op. cit., p. 9; quoted from Marianne Weber, Max 
Weber (Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1926), pp. 347-8.
J®7 Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, Max Weber and the dispute over 
reason and value: a study in philosophy, ethics, and politics. International Library of 
Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 173.
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(the book's only nod to Weber) also qualifies interests by the use of 
'd irectly ', whereas W eber elsewhere notes the significant effects o f
the in d ire c t  influence of v a l u e s . 1 ^  8
E.H. Carr, in The Twenty Years' C ris is , also recognises the
problems and limitations of realism, and provides a damning critique
o f it, having first made good use of realist assum ptions in his
arguments against utopianism. Indeed, this somewhat cynical use of
a theoretical tool is an indication in itse lf o f the seductive yet
shallow  nature of realist polem ics. In Chapter 6, entitled  'The
Limitations of Realism', Carr notes that:
The im possibility of being a consistent and thorough­
going realist is one o f the most certain and curious
lessons of political science. Consistent realism excludes
four things which appear to be essential ingredients of 
all e ffective  po litical th inking: a fin ite  goal, an
em otional appeal, a right o f moral judgem ent and a
ground for action.109
From this, it may be assumed that at least some among the 
realists paradoxically share the conclusions of the presen t work 
concerning the problems of realist theory. It may be felt that some 
o f these problems have been resolved by neorealist revisions. W altz, 
for exam ple, asserts that a theory of international relations m ust
identify what is distinctive about them - for him, this is the nature of 
the  in te rn a tio n a l system  and the way it m o tiv a tes  s ta te
10® Turner and Factor refer here to Weber's The Protestant Ethic and the 
Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner's, 1958), pp. 35-7.
100 Op. cit., p. 113.
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b e h a v io u r .110 Thus any explanations not at the systemic level (i.e., 
concerning com petition  and socialisation  in the anarchic states 
system) are reductionist confusions, and a 'major impediment to the 
d e v e lo p m en t o f th e o rie s  abou t in te rn a tio n a l p o l i t i c s ' .1 1 1 
Consequently, virtually all political characteristics are excluded in 
the description of the system's natural balance o f power.
The heart of the theoretical problem is that while realists 
sensibly point out the effects of power and the habit o f pursuing 
in te res ts , ne ith er o f  these avenues o f inquiry are especia lly  
im portant to the study of politics: realism simply lays out some 
obvious features of political experience, while setting aside the most 
troublesome and important (and interesting) political questions. The 
pursuit of power is an instrumentality, and in itself says little about 
underly ing  causes or consequences. For the m ost part, the 
fundam ental political questions concern the assignm ent o f value, 
hence the necessity of choice, and ultim ately the em bodim ent of 
value choices in political action. Importantly, all of this must take 
place in the context of relationships: the exercise o f pow er cannot 
take place in a vacuum, and always assumes a political framework. 
There is no reason to exclude practical considerations, of course, and 
as Schw arzenbergcr says, 'a realistic  exposition  o f w hat is  is 
perfectly com patible with constructive views on what can or o u g h t  
to b e '.1 ^  The heart of the practical problem is that realism dictates 
obvious forms o f practice, such as the pursuit o f power and interests,
110 Patrick Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What 
Are We to Think? (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), p. 251.
111 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison- 
Wesley, 1979), p. 78.
11 ^ Georg Schwarzenberger, Power Politics: A Study of World Society. 3rd. Ed. 
(London: Stevens & Sons, 1964), p. 6.
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that are both insensitive to the complexities of its own categories and 
dism issive o f alternative categories o f thought and action. In 
realism, values (the very stuff of politics) are a marginal concern, 
elim inated or contained by problem atic assumptions.
M ervyn Frost provides a useful account o f problem atic 
assum ptions in reference to a 'postiv ist bias' in the study o f 
in te rn a t io n a l  r e l a t i o n s .1 1 3 M aking use o f R ichard R orty 's 
argum ents against the 'm irror o f nature ' assum ption about the 
m i n d 114 (it being an assum ption shared by most in ternational 
relations theorists), Frost presents a case for treating norm ative 
approaches as (at least) the epistem ological equal of positiv ist 
theories. This critique of positivism involves the idea of a realm of 
social discourse, which admits certain forms of knowledge but does 
not endow them with exclusive epistemological validity .115
There are a number o f significant consequences o f such a 
view , am ong which is the dim inished role o f ph ilosophy as 
determ ining a priori criteria o f true knowledge, and the problem of 
relativism  in the absence of such universal criteria. These issues 
have already been introduced in the previous chapter, and will be 
raised again in the following discussion of normative theory as an 
alternative approach in respect of both its focal concerns and its 
unique relevance to the epistem ological debate. In particular, the 
relationship between values and theoretical and practical -rreasoning 
prov ides a focal point for d is tinc tions  betw een realism  and 
norm ative theory, which can be raised here in respect to realism
11 ^  Mervyn Frost, 'Normative Theory and International Relations: Overcoming 
the Positivist Bias* Politikon: South African Journal of Political Science. (Vol. 12, No. 
1, June 1985), pp. 3-15.
114 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1980).
These points are elaborated in the following chapter.
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and later revisited in the following chapter on normative theory.
In a d iscussion o f history and structure in In ternational 
R elations theory, W alker continues his rem arks concern ing  the 
d istinction  betw een po litical realism  and po litical idealism  by 
pointing to its proscription of discourse and debate:
Fram ed within this d istinction, 'm etaphysics’, 'e th ics ' 
and 'ideology' have become the names for roles in an 
old and obviously decrepit manichean theatre. Tamed 
in this way, it is hardly surprising that they have been 
m arginalised in favour of the louder and seem ingly 
more up-to-date claims of social science.116
W alker observes in a footnote that Carr and M orgenthau offer 
formulations o f dilemmas arising in early twentieth century German 
historicism, as mediated by Karl Mannheim and Max Weber. W eber 
is clearly an important figure (as Walker has said), and is both the 
starting point of Michael Smith's study of realism (op. cit.) and the 
subject o f Turner and Factor's book, Max W eber and the Dispute over 
Reason and V alue, which indicates that W eber relied heavily on
(w h ereas  D ew ey a tta c k e d ) the m eans/end  and fa c t/v a lu e  
d is t in c tio n s .1 17
Turner and Factor argue that 'W eber’s ideas were to? form the 
backbone o f M orgenthau's work' (M orgenthau does acknowledge the
1!6 Walker, 'History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations', 
op. cit., p. 167.
117 Turner and Factor, op. cit., p. 166. As an indication of connections in the 
literature, note that Turner and Factor’s work is cited in Walker, ’History and 
Structure...', op. cit. See also John Dewey, 'Theory of Valuation', International 
Encyclopedia of Unified Science. Volume II, Number 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1939) and the discussion of his views in the next chapter.
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influence in an autobiographical article, published in 1977) and
suggest that M orgenthau reconstructed W eber's position in Anglo-
American terms, since theory of German origin would not have been
well-received at the tim e11**;
it is evident that the basic structure o f M orgenthau's 
argument in this book has simply been taken over from 
W eber: M orgenthau  argued tha t a perso n  m ay
potentially  choose various moral positions o r make 
various ultim ate choices, and that reason and rational 
dialogue cannot settle  the questions betw een these 
c h o ic e s .119
Turner and Factor write that M orgenthau opposed the trad ition  
which 'm isunderstands the nature of man, the nature o f the world, 
and the nature of reason i t s e l f 1 . that is to say, rationalism (in 
respect to values); scientism in social science (applying reason to 
values); liberalism  in p o litics  (reasoned debate about values); 
legalism  in foreign policy  (leg a l-ra tio n a l b e h av io u r)121 - and 
supported those who 'conceive the nature of international politics as 
an unending struggle for survival and pow er'.122 They argue that 
M orgenthau's criticism  o f legalism  is not based on the obvious
118 Morgenthau's quite reasonable sensitivity in this respect is in evidence 
later, in a response to a critic: '...an attempt is being made to exploit a residual 
American xenophobia in order to question my credentials'. See Morgenthau, Truth 
and Power’ in Truth and Power, op. cit., p. 23. This essay first appeared in The New 
Republic (November 26, 1966).
119 Turner and Factor, p. 169. The reference is to Morgenthau, Scientific Man 
vs. Power Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).
12® Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs Power Politics (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1946), p. 204.
121 Turner and Factor, op. cit., p. 170.
122 Morgenthau, Scientific Man vs Power Politics, op. cit., p. 42.
108
problem  o f assum ing un iversal acceptance o f A nglo-A m erican  
culture, but on the blindness to the nature of politics as a struggle of 
in te re s ts :
For Morgenthau, 'justice' is an illusion; struggle is rea l.12 3
Hence there is only the struggle of valuative and material interests, 
and no opportunity  for rational reconciliation. In con trast to 
lib e ra lism , M orgenthau  and W eber take the red u c tiv e , and 
antipolitical view (in the same sense as Marx) that the illusion o f 
po litics finds m eaning in a struggle based outside o f po litical 
d iscourse, though of course M orgenthau identifies behav iouralist 
reduction ism  w ith n ine teen th  century  M arxism  and lib e ra lism , 
since it fails to address politics 'in its own terms, that is, in terms of 
p o w e r ’ . 124 The point is that where Marx reduces politics to 
econom ics, M orgenthau reduces it to power, and while M orgenthau 
makes the distinction between quantitative and qualitative m ethods, 
h is insistence on qualitative m ethods does not translate  into a 
sp ec ifica lly  norm ative  approach . T urner and F ac to r o u tlin e  
M orgenthau's positive theory, which sets itself against utopianism  
(also W eber's target):
M orality in foreign policy, as M orgenthau understood 
it, is equivalent to the intellectual in tegrity  o f the 
person who subjects h im se lf to the d isc ip line  o f 
consequen tia list moral d iscourse and the re fo r lim its
123 Turner and Factor, op. cit., p. 171.
124 Morgenthau, 'Common Sense and Theories' in Truth and Power, op. cit.,
244.
himself to attainable ends .1 2 ^
For M orgenthau, the 'moral blindness of scien tific  m an' lies in 
failing  to recognise the tragic character of human life, and the 
unavoidable risk of evil in political action.1 However, Turner and 
Factor argue that Morgenthau developed these ideas into a theory 
w hich inform ed practice - som ething W eber thought im possible. 
Thus Morgenthau advised that the duty of officials is to preserve the 
state, but is unable to provide the grounds for any obligation to do so 
(T h e  intellectual seeks truth;the politician, pow er'127). Indeed the 
relationship between state and civil society is not characterised, and 
perhaps cannot be since the ep istem olog ical foundations fo r 
justify ing  any duties at all, or any practice, are underm ined by 
ignoring the centrality of values in politics. Although M orgenthau 
attacks theory which is uncritical of the status quo and official 
d o c t r in e 12^, the logic of his representation of politics suggests that 
an official is free (in the context of the 'struggle') to choose any 
interest he or she likes, without regard for the value choices of the 
society which officials represent. What is missing in realist theory 
is the acknowledgement that politics, even its own version (pow er 
politics), is shot through with values.
The concept of interest used by W eber (as reflected in the 
passage cited by M orgenthau, above) is not entirely  clear in its 
foundation, being qualified by consideration of values even though 
value choices are held to be irrational. This position is sometimes
125 Ibid., p. 172.
12*> Morgenthau, Scientific Man.... op. cit., pp. 168ff.
127 Morgenthau, Truth and Power' in Truth and Power, op. cit., p. 14.
12  ^ Morgenthau, ’Common Sense and Theories' in Truth and Power, op. cit.,
247-8.
referred to as ’decisionism ', which holds that rational value-free 
decisions can be made (in science and politics) once value choices 
have been made. W ithin a context, the means to an end can be 
determined: interests are given. Turner and Factor say M orgenthau
treated values and interests the way W eber did, by 
considering interests to be dictated by value choices, 
material and ideal. But the institution o f the nation­
state creates an anom alous situation: in in ternational
po litics, according to M orgenthau, in terests  can be 
rather precisely defined .129
This seems to take a great deal for granted about the state, and its 
rela tion  to its own and o ther societies, including in ternational 
society. As W alker implies, this is an artifact o f early tw entieth 
century German historicism, emphasising commitment to the state as 
the ultimate expression of political value - an untenable position in 
the modem world, given that even realists like Bull recognised that 
the states system was only one aspect of the modem world, and both 
he and M orgenthau encouraged considera tion  o f  new po litica l 
structures. Given the imperatives o f survival and national interest 
('defined in terms o f power', though whether this is national power 
or official power is now unclear), the limits o f realist action are 
clear-cut, if inappropriate. Thus,
fo r M orgen thau , an o b je c tiv e , p ra c tic e - in fo rm in g  
theory o f in ternational po litics is possib le  w ithou t
129 Turner and Factor, op. cit., p. 173.
I l l
d ep artin g  from the W eberian  s tr ic tu re s  ag a in st
norm ative t h e o r y . 1 30
M orgenthau rephrased W eber's ideas in the idiom o f Anglo- 
Am erican scientific culture, facilitating the adoption o f W eberian 
language. As Turner and Factor suggest, this was accomplished in 
part by interpreting the term W is s e n s c h a f t  to mean 'science', which 
denies it the full breadth of a meaning that includes 'philosophy'. 
N aturally  enough, argum ents for value-free science seem  qu ite
plausible in an em piricist environm ent, and M orgenthau criticised  
rationalist quantitative methods on just those grounds. However, the 
broader meaning implicates Weber's view that there is no rationality 
to moral and political choice, and indeed that it is not possible to 
question the meaning or value of science or the value and rational 
adequacy of politics or culture - 'an extremely implausible claim '.131
The d ifficu lties o f norm ative theory prom pted realists  of 
every stripe to eschew the norm ative elem ents in in ternational 
politics in favour of apparently rigorous theories o f state power. 
However, maintaining such distinctions as those between values and 
interests, justice and order, ethics and politics, means only that the 
conception of world politics employed in realist theory is inadequate. 
Attempts to modify the realist approach by addition o f structural and 
systemic considerations in neorealism has done little or nothing to 
alter these characteristics.132 Even realist assumptions are rife with
norm ative content, and realist theory is unable to account for it 
w ithout resorting in the end to normative theory.
130 Ibid.
131 Ibid ., p. 183.
132 See John A. Vasquez, The Power of Power Politics (London: Pinter, 1983)
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C h a p t e r  T h r e e
Read i ng  the  L i t e r a t u r e  (I I ) :  Norma t i ve  I nnova t i ons
N orm ative Theory
T heories or statem ents w hich are called 'norm ative ' are, in a
traditional nutshell, concerned with what ought to be as d istinct
from what is. The present argument attempts to avoid any simplistic 
distinction of this sort, arguing that apprehensions o f 'what is' are 
in tim ately  related  to understandings about 'w hat ought to be ', 
w hether these are understandings o f norm s and values in the 
po litica l realm  o r norm s in the ep istem ologies o f system atic
know ledge. Norm ative theory, as defined here, is based on the 
prim acy o f norms and norm ative systems and structures, and thus 
subverts the traditional distinctions o f is/ought and fact/value by
locating all foundations in value choice. Normative theory concerns 
both the structure o f  know ledge and the framework o f  po litical 
r e f e r e n c e .1
In an overview  o f in ternational po litical theory , P atrick  
M organ provides a w ide-ranging d iscussion , w hich includes a 
chapter entitled 'Do We Study Art Scientifically?'.2 In this chapter is
* The philosophical background to normative theory is given in Chapter Four, 
but might be read prior to the treatment of the normative literature in the field of 
international relations given here. The present organisation of material is only to 
ensure that the main strands of the argument are not lost in extensive preliminaries.
2 Patrick M. Morgan, Theories and Approaches to International Politics: What 
Are We to Think?. 4th. Ed. (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1987), pp. 25-47.
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a very brief commentary on T he Matter o f Values', which states that 
there is 'a generally accepted distinction between questions o f fact 
and value, under which science can resolve the former but not the
latter', and goes on to note the traditionalist argument that 'value 
problem s are the key problems in international politics and in all
politics'. Morgan cuts short his discussion on this m atter (at about a 
page in all), because he feels
there is less interest in it now. This is because values 
refer to the u s e s  to which knowledge is to be put, 
whereas scientists and traditionalists quarrel more over 
the m e th o d s  by which to obtain it.^
He concludes th is section by noting the danger o f purposes 
co n tam in a tin g  m ethods, but fee ls  th a t co n sc ie n tio u sn ess  in 
scholarship is a sufficient guard. Just how methods are to  be 
determined, or what values they might reflect, he does not say. This 
is an aspect o f what W alker identifies as a 'quite m isleading 
exchange in the 1960s betw een "scien tific" and "trad itionalis t"
approaches to  in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s ' (re flec ted  in K eohane 's  
concern with epistem ology in a more recent discussion o f 'tw o
a p p r o a c h e s '^ )  which does not recognise that 'crucial differences 
betw een the u tilita rian  ra tionalists  and the h isto rica lly  inc lined  
reflec tiv e  school extend to p rio r and even more con ten tious 
problem s, many o f which have long been assumed to challenge the 
claims o f modem social science'.^
3 Ibid., p. 41.
4 Robert O. Keohane, 'International Institutions: Two Approaches', 
International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 32, No. 4, December 1988).
5 R.B.J. Walker, History and Structure in the Theory of International
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The position outlined above (Morgan's) is indicative of a deep 
malaise in theoretical endeavours. Although the author is sensitive 
to  the range of debate in the international theory literature, and to 
the problem s of theory generally, the 'm atter of values' is relegated 
to a b rief and somewhat dism issive treatm ent. In particular the 
quoted passages reflect two unquestioned assum ptions: the first is 
that questions o f fact and value are distinct, although the same
author elsew here acknow ledges the role o f theory in determ ining 
the significance o f facts (what determines meaning?); the second is 
that values are located in the choice of u ses  to which knowledge is 
put rather than the m e t h o d  o f obtaining it, although the same 
author elsew here acknow ledges the role o f theory in determ ining 
the acquisition of knowledge (what is to be studied?).
A Further example may be taken from a work on the analysis 
o f international relations by Karl Deutsch:
Knowledge is different from values. Values m otivate 
the search for knowledge and make some of its results
more salient to us than others... I have tried to support 
all judgem ents and not to let my preferences deceive 
me. You may decide for yourself to what extent I have
failed or succeeded in this search for realism  and
re a lity .^
Relations', Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1989), 
p. 165.
6 Karl Deutsch, The Analysis of International Relations (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice-Hall, 1978), p. vii. This passage is quoted in Mervyn Frost, 'Normative 
Theory and International Relations: Overcoming the Positivist Bias' Politikon: South 
African Journal of Political Science. (Vol. 12, No. 1, June 1985), p. 3.
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This passage reiterates the fact-valuc distinction, and the separation 
of knowledge from what is taken to be the corrupting influence o f 
value considerations: precisely the problem atic assumptions o f the
previous position, indicating that this view is not an isolated or 
eccen tric  one but ra th e r is w idely shared in the  fie ld  o f  
in te rna tional re la tio n s .
Values are not simply a means of determining what would be 
good to do, if only reality would permit it. Values at the same time 
determine what is im portant enough to be recognised as 'fact', and 
how such facts are to be gathered and organised. Science is not 
immune to value influence, but is rather the product o f the value
attached to systematic knowledge. John Dewey suggests that there is
no radical m ethodological distinction between science and m orals
(in contrast to W eber's view), and that principles and general truth 
are o f the same kind in both morals and science.7
Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff discuss norm ative theory briefly at 
the end of their survey of international relations theory:
A lth o u g h  n o rm a tiv e  a ssu m p tio n s  m ay u n d e r lie
em pirical research, the quest for a value-free science 
o f po litics  has d im inished in terest over the past
generation in norm ative theory. If political scientists
choose to em phasize em pirical-analytical theory, to the
relative neglect o f  norm ative theory, they w ill have
rem oved them selves from a problem  area w hich
historically has been of great interest to them. They
7 John Dewey, 'Challenge to Liberal Thought' in Fortune (Vol. 30, 1944), p.
186, cited in Stephen P. Turner and Regis A. Factor, Max Weber and the dispute over
reason and value: a study in philosophy, ethics, and politics. International Library of 
Sociology (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 166.
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will have chosen to ignore the task of defining the 
meaning of 'the good life', the designing o f political 
s tru c tu re s  and the  e s ta b lish m e n t o f n o rm ativ e  
standards....**
Thus, while there may be some kind o f distinction to be made 
betw een facts and values, it is not in any sense an absolute 
distinction, and least o f all grounds for setting values aside in the 
pursuit o f factual knowledge. Equally, our methods o f  acquiring 
know ledge are inevitably tied up with values which bear on its 
application: in adopting a particular theory, we right away know 
what we w a n t  to know, or what would be g o o d  to know about. 
Dougherty and P faltzgraff continue:
Indeed, despite the tendency over the past generation 
to deem phasize normative theory, it has been a m ajor 
thesis o f this chapter that norm ative and em pirical 
theory and basic and applied research are by no means 
in c o m p a tib le . N o rm ativ e  th eo ry  can su g g e s t 
a lte rn a tiv e  g o a ls  and p re fe ren c es  fo r p o li t ic a l 
in s titu tions and can also provide p ropositions fo r 
testing, and em pirical-theory can furnish guidance as
** James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., Contending Theories of 
In ternational R ela tions (New York: Lippincott, 1971), p. 396. A similar, though 
revised, passage appears in the third edition of this book (New York: Harper Collins, 
1990), p. 565: ’In the current stage of its development, international relations has 
been marked by efforts to establish linkages between normative theory on the one hand 
and empirical-analytical theory on the other... Given the nature of the objects with 
which international relations deals and the enormously important questions 
associated with war and peace, normative theory can be expected to remain central to 
this field.' This passage, like the earlier version, reveals the typical error of 
separating normative theory from empirical analysis, thereby construing it 
exclusively in the prescriptive mode.
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to the kinds of political behavior which are essential
for the attainment of desired goals.9
The euphemism 'deemphasize', in reference to the plight o f  
normative theory, is overshadowed by stronger terms in M ervyn 
Frost's account o f  the 'postivist bias' in the study o f  international 
r e la t io n s .  *0 Making use of Richard Rorty's arguments concerning 
philosophical assumptions about the mind as a 'mirror o f  nature ',1 1 
Frost argues that normative approaches and positivist theories are
epistemological equals - though normative theory has some residual 
advantages over positivism. The 'bias', in brief, is that to have 
knowledge the mind must reflect (mirror) what is outside it (nature), 
and the task of philosophy is to determine the way in which this 
occurs. This view 'underpins the thinking o f  most theorists in 
international relations', says Frost. Chris Brown, also referring to 
Rorty in his discussion of critical and postmodern theory, points out
the implication o f  taking anti-foundationalism seriously:
something profound has happened to Western thought 
once it becomes clear that the foundations upon which
it rests are, ultimately, radically, insecure.1 2
R orty 's  c r i t iq u e  is, e s sen t ia l ly ,  that d e te rm in in g  the 
mechanism of 'reflection' - how knowledge is obtained - does not
9 Ibid., p. 398.
Mervyn Frost, 'Normative Theory and International Relations: Overcoming 
the Positivist Bias’ op. cit., pp. 3-15.
11 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 1980).
12 Chris Brown, International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches 
(London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), p. 198.
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provide independent criteria for judging the truth of knowledge so 
obtained: we don't know a good mirror when we see one. Frost notes 
that this critique is echoed in the work of such modem philosophers 
as the la te r  W ittgenste in ,  Quine, Sellars , D avidson, K uhn, 
Feyerabend, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Habermas. Brown adds to the 
list o f  'pale anti-foundationalists' like Rorty, the more radical figures 
o f  N ietzche, H eidegger and latterly D errida and F o u cau lt .1 3 
Collectively they eschew the notion of a correspondence theory of  
truth (such as a 'mirror of nature') and substitute the notion o f  a 
social discourse which 'allows' certain knowledge claims - but 
without any priveleged access to epistemological validity. As Frost 
points out, this makes it
'possible to conceive of there being k n o w l e d g e  about
normative issues’. 14
Nevertheless, the nature of such knowledge may remain ambiguous: 
it may be e i the r  theore tica l know ledge o f  'a llow ed ' value  
commitments (that is, knowledge of intangible thoughts or ideas), or 
empirical knowledge o f  'acceptable' value-realising behaviour (that 
is, knowledge of acts or tangible artifacts defined in reference to 
certain values). By limiting discussion to the latter - the conditions 
and consequences o f  realising values - an orthodox em piricist 
position may restrict normative theory to its descriptive, as opposed 
to prescriptive role:
13 Ibid., p. 199.
14 Mervyn Frost, 'Normative Theory and International Relations: Overcoming 
the Positivist Bias', op. cit., p. 7.
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V aluations, Dewey argued, are capable of being 
empirically observed, in the historical and cultural- 
anthropological sense. This sort of knowledge does not 
w arrant ’va lue-propositions ',  i.e., purely  norm ative  
s ta t e m e n t s .1 5
However, the introduction of a validating 'realm o f discourse' 
opens up the possibility of assigning a similar cognitive status to 
both descrip tive  and prescrip tive norm ative s tatem ents  (value 
propositions) such that it is as acceptable to make truth claims about 
values themselves as about value-directed facts, though neither 
enjoys epistemological privelege. Furthermore, the discourse itself 
is both a social fact and an abstract conversation among those 
sharing a socio-political space. Of course, the problem o f  relativism 
arises as soon as universal a priori criteria are abandoned, but this 
problem always exists potentially, and is mitigated by the constraints 
of a discourse. The discourse provides a security of meaning without 
the liabilities of absolutism.16
In a sense we create our own reality, even if not - as Marx said 
of creating history - just as we please. This is an aspect of what
Turner and Factor, op. cit., p. 167. The reference is to John Dewey, Theory 
of Valuation* in Neurath, et al, Foundations of The Unitv of Sciences: toward an 
international encyclopedia of unified science. Vol. II (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1970). An earlier edition of the same work by Dewey is cited below as Vol. II, 
No. 4 of the encyclopedia, published in 1939.
15 The notion of a discourse arises in post-modern theory and philosophy, and 
is discussed in Chapter Five. See Michael J. Shapiro, Reading the Post-modern Polity: 
Political Theory as Textual Practice (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1992), James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), International/Intertextual 
Relations: Post-modern Readings in World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 
1989), and works on knowledge by the modem French philosophers Michel Foucault, 
The Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and J.F Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984).
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Heidegger refers to as ’facticity': we live in a world of facts o f  our 
own making either through theory or social practice, but we can't
undo our creations just as we please either, nor deny what we have 
already made of ourselves (facticity is finding oneself already in a 
given world, and being attuned to it). One is reminded of Bull's story 
o f  a person who, when asked for directions, replied 'If I were you, I 
shouldn't start from here '.17 Of course we must always 'start from 
here', but should also be aware o f  the extent to which we define our 
location. This is why political decision-makers often find themselves 
having to choose between what would be the 'right thing', and what 
is dictated by prudence in the face of 'the facts': the solution would 
be to alter the facts to fit the value, but of course the facts have 
already been determined by previous choices made on the grounds
o f  prudence, and the alteration o f  these facts by value considerations
will only occur over time. Nevertheless - and this is central to the
present argument - the first step in this process must be the
recognition o f  epistemological conditions determining the initial 
'location ' from which a journey begins; what exactly will be 
changed by enacting policy depends on the definition of the status
quo, and such defin itions  may be founded on unchallenged  
assumptions about political representation, economic growth or
legal status, arising out of nationalism, racism or sexism. According 
to the view which denies any priveleged access to a priori criteria o f
-i-
knowledge, the epistemological condition is established by the 
relevant domain o f  discourse which credits or discredits particular 
know ledge claims: this is an essentially  norm ative condition,
common to the political realm.
17 Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 295.
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As suggested in the previous chapter, the monopoly on 
’r e a l i ty ’ im plied  by the term ’re a l is m ’ ra ises  ju s t  such 
philosophically troubling issues about assumed reality: that is, the 
assumption that there is a single objective reality 'out there' waiting 
to be apprehended, even if the debate about which theory correctly 
apprehends it can not be settled. A critique of the assumption of an 
un in terpre ted  reality  is provided by the 'l ingu is tic  turn ' in
philosophy, reflected in such varied authors as Manning, Oakeshott,
Winch and Wittgenstein, and also by Richard Rorty's argument
discussed above. This problem has also been addressed by
deconstructionist thinkers (such as Derrida) who see all aspects o f  
reality lying in context, such that a fuller understanding of reality 
can only be achieved through an unravelling o f  settled truths, or a 
peeling-back of the layers of previous 'text' which have successively 
sustained apprehensions of reality. Of course, this does bring with it 
(as Gayatri Spivak has pul it) a melancholy feeling, since textuality 
is limitless and ultimately suggests a kind of nihilism.18 Following 
such a scheme, any given theory of international relations would 
amount to a layer of text, somehow dependent on previous thought or 
theory, and itself similarly conditioning future thought.
Thus we are unable to transcend ourselves, having to start
from where we are, but we may nevertheless escape the parameters
o f  traditional theories about our world once we recognise their
*
uncertain origins in our own thinking, or the thinking of previous
!8 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, in televised discussion with philosopher John 
Searle. See the printed guide and bibliography, 'Voices: The Trouble with Truth' 
(London: Channel 4 Television, April 1988), written by David Herman and produced by 
Broadcasting Support Services, P.O. Box 4000, London W£ 6XJ, and Gayatri Spivak, In 
Other Worlds: Essavs in Cultural Politics (New York and London: Methuen, 1987), and 
her translation of Jacques Derrida's On Grammatologv (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976).
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generations. Hence a theory of value structures (including those o f  
theory itself), indicating the foundations of both theory and practice 
in international relations, will take us as far as any other rational 
system of knowledge; that is, to the point at which only some form of 
faith could provide a greater degree of 'certainty' about the Truth. 
Viewing theory in this way, it may be possible to avoid or alter or 
' r e i m a g i n e '1^ an unwanted reality, which exists simply because o f  
difficulty in seeing how it is (to a degree) self-generated, and how it 
is perpetuated by allowing 'the facts' to constrain a lternative 
understandings through a prudential (utilitarian) rationality which 
is itself bounded by this same self-generated reality. This neither 
diminishes the importance of such a reality (contingently, it must be 
coped with) nor provides a ready formula for change, but simply 
restricts claims about reality to a domain of discourse - a normative 
structure - since there is no access to an uninterpreted reality. As 
Frost points out, there is no sense in the notion o f  a reality 'out 
there’ (Sellars' 'myth of the given') for which one interpretation or 
another provides the most accurate description.20
F or the study o f  in ternational rela tions a particu la rly  
significant dimension of such self-sustaining indigenous 'realities' 
is their claim to universality. The demand for universals may be 
understood as a central problematic of world politics, and it is useful 
to note that universals are a feature of both scientific claims to true 
knowledge (where truth is indivisible) and of social claims about
19 The idea of 'reimagining' crops up in relation to nationalism in Anthony D. 
Smith, The Nation: Invented, Imagined, Reconstructed?', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 20, No. 3, Winter 1991), and in relation to feminist theory 
in Christine Sylvester, 'Homeless in International Relations? "Women's" Place in 
Canonical Texts and in Feminist Reimaginings' in Adam Lemer and Marjorie Martin 
(eds) Reimagining the Nation (London: Open University Press, forthcoming).
2® Mervyn Frost, 'Normative Theory and International Relations: Overcoming 
the Positivist Bias', op. cit., p. 8.
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fundamental values (where morality is absolute). As s tric t 
rationality allows of no relativism, what is real must be real 
everywhere; one notable consequence of this view being that much 
in ternational conflic t arises from efforts  to impose particu lar 
national truths and values, and discourses.
From the championship of religious creeds, to the institution 
o f  the modern nation-state, to the development o f  the global 
economy, to the proliferation of various technologies, the history o f  
international relations has been characterised  by universalis ing 
forces. In many respects these have brought a degree o f  uniformity 
to in ternational political life through shared insti tu tions and
practices. At the same time, the division of political authority, and 
the division of labour (and wealth) in the international political 
econom y, means that there will always be underly ing value 
d i f f e re n c e s  a r is in g  from d i f f e r e n t  n a t io n a l  e x p e r ie n c e s .  
Furtherm ore, international collective choices will inevitably fall 
short o f  garnering universal participation in their formation under 
a system o f  d ifferen t and independent sovereign au thorities , 
overlaid by a variety of cross-cutting allegiances and divisions.
Nevertheless, the consequences of contextual epistemologies 
are not necessarily relativistic; not least because there is no sense in 
positing a reality 'out there' in relation to which views are relative.
Still, there is a degree of objectivity to be found in the need for
*
coherence with ordinary experience - not in the positivist or
empiricist mold, but in the sense that any explanatory scheme must
give a plausible account of 'reality' - and this aspect o f  'facticity'
p rov ides  g rounds for ju d g in g  the m erits  o f  a p a r t ic u la r
in terpreta tion , necessarily  through the medium of a pertinen t
'language' or discourse since these are the only available means o f
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discuss ion .
A potent critique of in terpreta tions o f  ’reality ' and o f  
dominant discourses is provided by gender theory, with its growing 
literature in the field of international relations.21 The impact of 
reinterpretation from a feminist perspective reveals the depth o f  
certain assumptions concerning the human condition , and this 
revelation is in itself an indication of the potential o f  normative 
theory in locating and criticising underlying values. By bringing 
about a shift in focus from the presumed value neutrality of sexual 
difference (sex being a biological category) to the value-laden
category o f  gender (a socio-political construct), gender theory has 
been able to uncover a long-standing bias in the study o f  
international relations. This gender bias has not only been
responsible for excluding the perspectives o f  those called 'women* 
(people lim ited  to socia lly  constructed  roles, and genera lly  
disenfranchised), but also for perpetuating political practices o f  a 
patriarchal nature which by definition do not reflect the full range 
of human experiences and values. Gender theory thus provides a 
com pelling  exam ple o f  norm ative theoris ing which e ffec tive ly
challenges ins ti tu tionalised  assumptions and practices, p rov ides  
r e in te rp re ta t io n s ,  and su g g es ts  a l te rn a t iv e  and p re v io u s ly
unconsidered political possibilities.
In some respects the anarchic conditions of world politics may 
be said to present difficulties for a normative approach, with its
21 See, for example, Jean Bethke Elshtain, Women and War (New York: Basic 
Books, 1987); Cynthia Enloe, Bananas. Beaches, and Bases: Making Feminist Sense of 
International Politics (London: Pandora, 1989); Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory 
and International Relations in a Postmodern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, forthcoming) and her 'Homeless in International Relations? "Women's" Place in 
Canonical Texts and in Feminist Reimaginings' in Lemer and Martin (eds), 
Reimagining the Nation, op. cit.
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emphasis on values in political understanding. From a scientific 
perspective, the relative indeterminacy of values compares poorly 
with the universal validity of empirical observation. From a moral 
perspective, any degree of relativism must encourage scepticism 
about moral judgements and the role o f  values in international 
political analysis. Indeed variations in collective experience may be 
understood, from a M arxist or structuralist perspective, as the 
product o f  varying material circum stances and hence m ateria l 
interests. Yet these apparent dilemmas for normative theory are 
simply the product o f  dominant theoretical assumptions which have 
con tribu ted  to the m arg ina lisa tion  o f  norm ative  though t 
assumptions which are now being called into question.
Liberalism. Subjectivism. Relativism, and Moral Scepticism
The unfavourable com parison with scientific  methods is less 
troubling for normative theory when scientific theory is revealed to 
have a value content, and where the reliability  o f  em pirical 
observation is shown to be questionable (Heisenberg's uncertainty 
principle) or unim portant (Levi-Strauss 's  inductivist i l l u s i o n ) . ^  2 
Furthermore, when the possibility of reference to an uninterpreted
reality is denied, the value of empirical observations can claim no
■*
special merit. The objection that interests are prior to values evades 
the problem of identifying or ascribing interests in the absence o f
22 Kenneth Waltz refers to L£vi-Strauss's 'inductivist illusion' and Pierce's 
view that direct experience affirms nothing, but 'just is\ in Chapter One of Theory of 
International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), as reprinted in Robert O. 
Keohane (ed), Neorealism and Its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), 
p. 30.
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any framework that gives them substance - a framework necessarily 
pervaded by values. Perhaps most telling is the dilemma of moral
scepticism in the face of subjectivism and relativism, but this too is
an aspect of critiques - commonly made of liberal political theory - 
which have their roots in absolutist expectations.
James Fishkin argues that subjectivism m a y  be avoided 'if  
only we choose to think and live in the manner required', which in
turn requires 'a change in moral culture’.23 The insistence on a 
Categorical Imperative in ethics is paralleled by an insistence on an
absolute objectivism in epistemology, the combination o f  which, 
through traditional ethics and traditional international re la tions 
theory  (read rea lism ), im poses such re s tr ic tions  on value
considerations as to rule out any significant theoretical role for
them. That values exist anyway, and are acknowledged by traditional 
theory to have some undefined importance, is a problem which is 
effectively ignored in the quest for rigour.
Such rigorous expectations are not only troublesome for
undermining the basis of moral positions which cannot live up to
them (e.g., the inherent contradiction in liberal theory - to be
liberal and yet in s is t  on liberalism), but also because they call for a
kind of efficiency in theoretical premises which leads to intellectual
and political tyranny. These circumstances also perpetuate a culture
o f  absolutist expectations in which there is always a demand for
*
certa in ty ,  and no encouragem ent o f  the genuinely  po li t ica l
activities and skills which provide the means o f  coping with a
degree of uncertainty, and with inevitable change. As Henry Kariel 
o b se rv e s ,
23 James S. Fishkin, Bevond Subjective Morality: Ethical Reasoning and 
Political Philosophy (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984), p.
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Nietzsche would seem to have been alone in noting the
futility of hectoring those who craved foundations and
flocked to a saviour. Unable to maintain their balance
under pressure, the masses would but resent the kind of 
political process in which they them selves might
become actors.24
There is no doubt that some foundations are required, but they are 
themselves constructed by a political process, and therefore remain
always political issues. The dilemma is characterised in another way
by Heller and Feher:
Theoretical reason does not provide certainty, and yet it 
is certainty which morals must be based on. But 
certa in ty  e lim inates choice. And how can one
eliminate choice without backing away from modernity
to t r a d i t io n a l  n o rm s  g u a ra n te e d  by d iv in e  
r e v e la t io n ? 2 5
If it is accepted that values exist, and are important in some
way, the s ignificance o f  norm ative theory in the study o f
international relations may then be said to rest on the perceived 
number and importance of shared values and assumptions^ - as
opposed to 'objective interests' or the product of empirical science. 
Taking the discussion only this far, however, may still leave
24 Henry S. Kariel, The Desperate Politics of Postmodernism (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1989), p. 148.
25 Agnes Heller and Ferenc Fch6r, The Postmodern Political Condition 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 48.
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normative theory with the burdens of indeterminacy and relativism. 
When the significance of normative theory is seen to rest also on the 
volume and character of the intercourse which establishes values 
and assum ptions, and norm ative p r o c e s s e s  are the object o f  
attention, the problems of indeterminacy and relativism o f values 
seems less burdensome, since these values are somewhat transient in 
their particulars even if the presence of values is a persistent aspect 
o f  the international socio-political processes in question.
Dewey's discussion of 'Valuation and the Conditions o f  Social 
Theory' suggests that the fact/value distinction is perpetuated, and 
the existence of values denied, when theory ignores the cultural and 
institutional contexts in which interests arise:
When current theories are examined which, qu ite  
properly, relate valuation with desires and interests, 
nothing is more striking than their neglect - so 
extensive as to be systematic - of the role of cultural 
conditions and institutions in the shaping of desires 
and ends and thereby valuations.2 ^
It is this failure to observe the social conditions under which 
interests arise and function - conditions that constitute lack or need 
- that permits the distinction between ends and means, between 
valuation and evaluation, says Dewey.27 Theoretically, this gives 
rise to two extremes: one taking desires as 'original' and isolating 
them from any existential context, thereby making values arbitrary
26 John Dewey, Theory of Valuation', International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science. Volume II, Number 4 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1939), p. 64.
27 Ibid., p. 33.
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(relativism); the other viewing values as 'ends-in-themselves', as 
ultimate standards o f  valuation (a priori absolutism). This last,
in its endeavor to escape from the frying pan o f  
d iso rde red  va lua tions ,  ju m p s  into the f i re  o f  
ab so lu t ism .28
Dewey argues that desires give content to 'ends-in-view', which are
valued as potential solutions of some conflict or need, and evaluated
in terms of the means of solution (i.e., whether they will succeed). 
Being also causal conditions of results, desires must be appraised as 
potential means. The 'should be1 of desires which are critically 
judged in relation to the actual social conditions of their attainment 
stands apart from the 'is* of impulsive desire; it is the former which 
give content to ends-in-view, thus informing value choices.29
A relevant example may help to clarify this view: The desire
for security gives content to the end of peace; peace is valued as a 
potential solution of  insecurity, and is evaluated as such in terms of 
the potential success of the means of achieving peace. As the desire 
for security is also a causal condition of successful peace, it must be
appraised as a means of achieving peace. The desire for security 
may manifest itself, for example, in a violent reaction to threatened 
insecurity (the 'is* of impulsive desire), but it may manifest itself 
differently when critically judged in relation to social conditions. 
Where an initial violent reaction breeds further violence and
compounds insecurity, the desire for security may manifest itself - if  
social conditions permit - in mutual restraint or some o ther
28 Ibid., p. 56.
29 Ibid., pp. 32-3.
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cooperative solution (the 'should be'). It is this latter manifestation 
which gives content to the end-in-view o f peace, and informs the 
choice of peace over some other end in terms of a critical appraisal 
of the desire for security itself as a potential means o f  achieving
peac e .
Thus 'evaluating values' is a process which depends on an
assessment o f  the prospects for successful realisation of a given 
value, in view of the means of its realisation (including desires and 
interests) as judged in the context o f  existing social conditions 
(whether o f  a particular national society or of world society, or 
perhaps both). Because the conditions and consequences o f  this 
process of valuation change, so must values themselves: empirical 
knowledge of this change means that what were assumed to be
authoritative values and interests are subject to revaluation, and
conversely their authority will be sustained by an absence o f
c h a n g e .
The notion that valuations do not exist in empirical fact 
and that therefore  value-concep tions have to be
imported from a source outside experience is one of the 
most curious beliefs the mind of man has ever
entertained. Human beings are continuously engaged 
in valuations. The latter supply the primary material
• f
for operations of further valuations and for the 
general theory of valuation.3 0
Dewey's theory o f  valuation grounds values in human experience,
30 Ibid ., p. 58.
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and admits that no abstract theory can stand in judgem ent o f
existing valuations. Therefore any new values cannot be dictated by 
such a theory, but must 'grow out of existing valuations, subjected to 
critical methods of investigation that bring them into systematic 
relations with one another '.3 1 That there is no ready means o f  
relating diverse and mutually ignorant values is both cause and
effect o f  a priori  theories which locate values 'outside' or ’above' 
actual valuations: a cause in that the need for system atic
understanding is so great as to encourage grasping at such theories;
an effect in that once such theories gain prestige, they 'conceal the
necessity  for concrete methods of relating v a l u a t i o n s ’ . 32 This 
relates to discussions (elsewhere in the present work) concerning 
the inadequacy of correspondence theories of truth, requiring some 
external referent, and coherence theories which support various 
truth claims by placing them in relation to one another. Thus the
im pedim ents  to es tab l ish ing  re la tiona l/coherence  theo ries  are 
la rge ly  o f  the p rac tica l varie ty ,  o r ig in a tin g  in p e rs is te n t
in s t i tu t io n a l i s e d  p rac t ice s  which are u n c r i t ic a l ly  acc ep ted .
Institu tionalised traditions are also the source o f  an apparent
relativism, a problem which plagues normative inquiry. Such 
relativism could be challenged from the perspective of a broader
value context, but the institutions would have to be challenged as
well. However, that the practical difficulties are great does not
*
warrant mistaking them for theoretical obstacles.
Acknowledging the problem of relativism does not necessarily 
leave normative theory in a dilemma. Terry Nardin, for example, 
suggests that relativism may be a reasonable middle ground between
31 Ibid., p .  6 0 .
32 ibid., p .  6 1 .
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’the poles o f  dogmatic certainty and radical doubt'.^3 What is more, 
the nature of relativism is not necessarily that which is so readily 
assumed in international relations, as a consequence of anarchy - 
that is, values being relative to particular national societies or
nation-states. Relativism may well refer simply to the international 
social con tex t,  values  being conce ived  the re fo re  as e i th e r
h is to r ic a l ly  re la t iv e  or re la tive  to in te rp re ta t io n s  o f  the
in ternational condition .
These circum stances are redolent of the conditions  o f
particular cases o f  national life, which simply exhibit more limited 
forms o f  rela tiv ism , and do not suggest that any particu lar
theoretical difficulties are novel or unique to the international
system. The only qualification required is that the instruments o f  
authority differ between domestic and international societies (hence 
the problems of applying the domestic analogy), but this does not 
suggest that relativism is any less problematic for national societies 
simply because authority has closed the debate. Writing on the 
domestic analogy, Hidemi Suganami describes a relevant debate in 
the literature o f  international relations theory:
from the late 1970s to the present, which, on the one
hand, saw a well-articulated attack by Bull and others
on contemporary institutions and proposals embodying
*
various forms of domestic analogy, and which, on the 
o th e r  hand , w itn essed  a se r io u s  d e fen c e  o f  
cosmopolitanism by Beitz and Linklater neither  o f
whose argument, as we noted, involves the domestic
33 Terry Nardin, The Problem of Relativism in International Ethics' 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1989), p. 159.
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analogy as an essential feature. This, however, does not 
mean that Beitz or Linklater would necessarily be 
opposed to insti tu tional proposals  which make a 
selective use o f  domestic analogues...-*4
Heller and Feh6r suggest that '... it is ill conceived to establish 
a direct relation between the increasing relativism of world-views 
(philosophies) and the relativism of morals'. The relation may be 
inverse: moral relativism is exacerbated by making absolutist claims 
for any one world-view, and the more constructive solution is an 
acceptance o f  mutual relativisation and seeking only
a single and restricted common ground: a few moral 
norms and values which might be regarded as valid and 
binding for all of us.
The d ivers i ty  of w orld-v iew s, ph ilosoph ies ,  
metaphysics and religious faiths does not bar the 
emergence o f  a common ethos, unless one o f  the 
com peting world views com pletely determ ines the 
commandments and interdictions, and does so not only 
for its own adherents but also with a universalizing
asp ira t io n .^  5
■f
The Normative Literature
34 Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 164.
35 Agnes Heller and Ferenc FehSr, The Postmodern Political Condition, op. ci/.,
p. 50.
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The definition of normative theory employed here is, quite simply, 
theory which addresses norms. There is nevertheless a distinction to 
be made between essentially traditional theories which happen to be 
applied to problems connected with certain norms, and theories 
which take a normative perspective as their starting point. This 
latter type o f  theory represents the subject of this thesis: theory 
concerned with the origin, evolution, and dissolution of norms and 
normative structures, which are held to be the substance of socio­
politica l experience rather than a product of some external
d e t e r m i n a n t s . 36 in some respects, those theoretical undertakings 
(very often hypothesis-testing, or commentary, as opposed to theory 
proper) which deal with normative problems from more traditional
perspectives are responsible for constraining the development o f  
normative theory proper. The literature in the field of international 
re la tions which is explicity  concerned with norm ative theory 
p roper is rather limited. However - and because the term 
'normative' is generally interpreted to mean moral or ethical, or
even idealistic - there is a large body of theory concerned with
particu lar normative issues (justice, human rights, arms control, 
peace, etc.), if  not with normative theory per  se. If normative 
theory is understood to address the perennial questions o f  politics 
(justice and order, authority and legitimacy, law and morality, war 
and peace), then we must also include in this literature the classical 
writings o f  political philosophy and early works in international 
r e l a t i o n  s. 3 7 As we will see in a subsequent chapter, a broad
36 See K.R. Minogue, 'Epiphenomenalism in Politics: the quest for political 
reality', Political Studies (Vol. XX, No. 4, December 1972), pp. 462-74.
37 In addition to Chris Brown, The Modem Requirement? Reflections on 
Normative International Theory in a Post-Western World', Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 2, Summer 1988), see also a useful overview of the 
various facets of the normative international relations literature (and the difficulty of
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understanding of normative theory involves many of the abiding 
concerns o f  philosophy in general, including the foundations and 
transmission of ideas.
Mark Hoffman states that the 'roots of normative theory can 
be found in the classics of political philosophy: from Plato and 
Aristotle to Aquinas and Augustine, and from Grotius, Vattel, Wolff 
and Pufendorf to Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Hume, Burke and 
M i l l ' . 3** Hoffman goes on to set out four normative approaches 
(legal, realist, classical and cosmopolitan) which roughly coincide 
with developments in international relations theory: The legal
approach  ranges  from L au te rpach t 's  legal reduc t ion ism  (a ll  
conflicts are essentially legal rather than political), predominant in 
the inter-war period, to McDougall's instrumental view of law as a
means o f  achieving shared values (law being co-extensive with 
politics), this latter view being especially relevant to the more
recen t in te res t  in human rights; The realis t approach  is 
characterised by moral scepticism, relativism, consequentialism and 
the primacy o f  national interest (all arising from the conflict
betweem morality and raison d ' i ta t), and various examples can be 
found in such realists as Niebuhr, Aron, Carr, Morgenthau, Kennan, 
Hoffmann, Thompson, Kissinger, etc. This continental tradition is 
distinguished by Hoffman (after Wolfers) from the universalistic
Anglo-Saxon tradition (cf. the 'English School') grounded in natural 
law and the social contract, which emphasises international society 
(with 'common practices, customs, norms, principles and rules') and
so classifying it) in his International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches. 
op. cit.
38 Mark J. Hoffman, 'Normative Approaches’ in Margot Light and AJ.R. Groom 
(eds). International Relations: A Handbook of Current Theory (London: Francis Pinter, 
1985), p. 27.
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is exemplified by Bull, Manning, James, the trilogy on international 
political theory edited respectively by Donelan, Mayall, and Navari, 
and just-w ar theory (e.g., Walzer). Finally, Hoffman sets out the 
cosmopolitan approach as an attempt to depart from state-centrism 
and apply notions of distributive justice (e.g., Beitz, after Rawls) and 
basic rights (e.g., Shue) to a broader world society of individuals, to 
which the s tate is merely instrum ental,  or secondary (e .g .,  
Linklater) - this implying the necessity o f  structural reform in the 
international system (note also Galtung, Burton, and authors o f  the 
World O rder Modelling Project such as Falk and Mendlowitz). 
Hoffman concludes his survey by suggesting that 'it is impossible to 
have a comprehensive theory of IR which does not incorporate and 
account for the normative aspects o f  world s o c i e t y ' . 3 9 For this 
reason no doubt, normative issues are addressed (in different ways) 
in all o f  the various approaches discussed previously.
However, the conclusion about the need to account for 
norm ative aspects would seem to fall short o f  cosm opolitan  
aspirations, and of the present argument, by characterising valuc- 
phenom ena as something to be incorporated into some la rger 
picture of the world. This view is not too far removed in its effect 
from realist scepticism - which does not (to be fair) ignore 
normative questions, but doesn't know quite what to do with them.
To some degree, therefore, the marginalisation of normative issues
f
may be perpetuated even in their defence. The role of normative 
theory argued for here - even without going so far as suggesting 
tha t it m ight consti tu te  a general background theory  for
39 Ibid., p. 37. Hoffman provides a valuable overview, not done justice by this 
brief summary of it. The authors mentioned are cited in detail in Hoffman's lengthy 
bibliography, itself a useful reference.
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international relations - places normative concerns at the fore, both
as a consequence of their epistemological priority in general and of
their centrality in politics in particular. Any other starting place
will naturally lead to difficulty in accounting for normative issues, 
having skipped the vital initial stages in which value questions must
be addressed - in the foundations of a philosophy or methodology, 
and so in the construction o f  a theory of international relations. 
That there are always new and contingent value questions should 
not be surprising in any open and active society, but they may go
unrecognised, be misunderstood, or be actively ignored i f  the
prevailing conception of international society denies it a normative
character, as well as content.
Of the various approaches outlined by Hoffman, the realist 
approach is the only one which system atica lly  m arg ina lizes
normative questions in the international political realm. The legal,
classical and cosmopolitan approaches all take normative questions 
seriously , but the first two are caught up with s tate-centric  
s tructures which limit their ability to take a robust view o f
normative theory. Thus it is only the cosmopolitan approach which
meets the more rigorous requirements demanded here, by placing
fundamental values at the beginning rather than the end. The core
o f  cosmopolitan arguments, says Vincent, is the commitment to the 
value of h u m a n  life, and that
it is not reasonable to allow this value to be diluted by
the mere boundaries which human beings happen to
have constructed against each other.4 0
40 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 125.
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Thus Charles Beitz writes of the tension between 'Cosmopolitan 
Ideals and National Sentiment'.41 The conclusions of his earlier 
influential book, Political Theory and In ternational R e la tions .4 2 
(which are worth quoting at some length) are that
p revailing  theore tica l concep tions  o f  in te rna tional 
re la tions  are inadequate  and lead to in co rrec t  
normative principles of international practice... The 
refutation of international skepticism and the critique 
of the idea of state autonomy clear the way for the 
fo rm u la tio n  o f  a m ore s a t i s fa c to ry  n o rm a tiv e
international political theory... Such a theory provides
structure and purpose for the empirical study o f  
international re la tions ... .4 3
In making the connection between normative theory and empirical 
study by means o f  'structure and purpose', the epistemological 
significance o f  normative theory is emphasised without diminishing 
the role o f  empirical research in locating substantive content
(whether norms or some other aspect of socio-political relations).
Beitz also concludes that
It is important to distinguish moral structures from 
political ones, and to recognize that global normative
41 Charles Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment', Journal of 
Philosophy (Vol. 80, No. 10, October 1983).
42 Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979).
43 Ibid., pp. 179-83.
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principles might be implemented otherwise than by 
global institutions conceived on the analogy o f  the
state... Thus far, such systematic moral debate about
international relations as has taken place has been 
between adherents of international skepticism and the
morality of states. However... the more pressing issues 
are those that divide the morality of states from a
cosmopolitan m orality.44
As elsewhere, 'normative' is used to mean 'moral' and although Beitz
is clear about the epistemological role of a normative approach, 
when he distinguishes the moral from the political he is not as clear 
about the relation between normative structures and politics. This 
implies a distinction between normative theory and political theory 
which his overall argument does not suggest. Perhaps this puzzle is
resolved by Beitz himself (ten years later) when he writes that 
normative theories are often criticized for indeterminacy, and that 
the criticism reflects an aspiration for mechanical precision which 
is to be resisted because 'it reflects a radical misconception o f  the 
nature of practical reasoning and of the role that political theories
can be expected to play in it'. He suggests that theoretical reflection
can clarify convictions about political ethics and 'concentrate the 
force o f  our normative commitments on the problems of practical 
decision', where the goal is to arrive at well-founded choices. ’Yet it 
is not the theory but the theorist who is responsible for these
choices. Political theory should guide practical judgem ent, not 
replace it'.4 5
44 Ibid.
4^ Charles R. Beitz, Political Equality: An Essav in Democratic Theory
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Thus Beitz d is tingu ishes  between practical in s ti tu tiona l 
structures in the realm of politics and the moral structures which 
inform them. This does not do full justice to the moral assumptions 
underlying practical judgement, in the sense that even what is 
practically  desirable requires some prior assignation o f  value: 
practical judgement is made in an existing socio-political context. 
The ambiguity about whether 'values’ are a moral or practical 
category creates difficulties in applying the term 'normative': values 
can be understood as having b o th  moral and practical significance, 
and being in both senses normative (having to do with norms) but 
not n e c e s s a r i ly  only in the sense of normative e th ics  (i.e., morality). 
The normative character of politics can be acknowledged and the 
strict delimitation of theory and practice avoided. Indeed, Beitz is
quick to point out that
the institutional problems that a theory must address 
help shape our conception of its subject matter, and the
content of the theory informs our understanding o f  the
issues of principle that the practical problems pose.4 **
Andrew Linklater writes, in Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  
In terna tiona l R e la t io n s , of the tension between membership o f  the 
human race and citizenship of a state - 'between two concepts o f
obligation, two modes of moral experience'. He claims that Kant was 
the only rationalist to approach a 'coherent vision of world political 
organisation', but because of the historicist critique o f  rationalism,
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 226-7.
46 Ibid., p. 4.
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Linklater seeks 'a non-rationalist foundation for the traditional 
belief in obligations to humanity, and for the recovery o f  the 
critique of the international states-system'.4? He states
It is within theories which sought to comprehend the 
nature of man as an historical subject, as a self-
developing and self-transforming being realising the
conditions of his freedom, that I locate the foundations 
of a modem theory of international relations.4 **
Thus, Linklater employs what he sees as a uniquely human capacity
- self-determination - as the basis of a cosmopolitan argument for 'a
moral community more inclusive than the sovereign state'.49 This
in turn allows him to assess evolving forms o f  international 
relations in terms of their realisation of this capacity, especially 
th ro u g h  o vercom ing  in te r -so c ie ta l  e s tran g e m en t in m ov ing
(through a history of Reason) towards some kind of unity o f  the 
sp ec ie s .
One recent exponent o f  normative theory, Mervyn Frost,
argues that
the main reasons for the dearth of normative theory in 
in terna tional re la tions  are to be found in the 
u n d e r ly in g  p h i lo s o p h ic a l  and m e th o d o lo g ic a l  
assumptions implicit in the main approaches used by
4^ Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. x.
4 ** Ibid., p. xi.
49 Ibid.
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scholars in the discipline.5 ®
He seeks to uncover in particular the positivist bias, and to challenge 
positivism. Distinguishing between the 'scientific' and the 'classical' 
a p p r o a c h e s , 5 1 Frost says that these two approaches nevertheless 
share an empiricist methodology and have in common
a radical distinction between the status accorded to 
factual judgem en ts ,  to which the d isc ip lin e  o f  
international relations should aspire, and that accorded 
to value judgements. Facts are given epistemological 
p r io r i ty .5 2
This line of argument is carried further by pointing to the 
problems of interpretative social science (which might be thought 
'neutra l ',  while being attuned to subjective values), and the 
necessity o f  engagement in debate: a critical approach denies the 
possibility o f  a neutral stance, and undermines the 'assumption 
about the incorrigibility of people's self-understandings'.5 3 On this 
account the subject 's  considered  reaction to a theory about 
themselves or some immanent subject (their life) determines the 
validity of the theory. Of course, this does not resolve the problem of
50 Mervyn Frost, Towards a Normative Theory of International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 2.
51 The 'scientific' and 'classical' (liberal historical) approaches, combined 
with Marxism (this last approach not well developed, as Frost says) may be seen as 
fitting the three-paradigm scheme of Realism, Pluralism and Structuralism in the 
study of international relations. For a useful development of this scheme see Mark 
Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the Interparadigm Debate’ in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon 
Mangasarian (eds) The Study of International Relations: The State of the Art (London: 
Macmillan, 1989).
52 Frost, Towards a Normative Theory.... op. cii., p. 15.
52 Ibid., pp. 22ff., and pp. 27 and 35.
143
finding an objective or in ter-subjective foundation for shared 
knowledge or shared values, but clearly there can be no structure 
without reference to normative ideas - and right away people are 
bound together in making reference to them, at the least.54
Normative issues, says Frost, arise only in the context o f  
shared understandings, or a given practice of normative argument; 
within a domain of discourse. In a world of state centric practices, 
normative issues thus make direct or indirect reference to the state. 
How to act in relations with (or in regard to, or even as) a state is 
thus a central question.55 Frost sets out to find a justification for 
such rela tions, and crit iques  various approaches (conflic t o f  
ideology, natural law, etc.) before adopting Dworkin's method of  
starting from settled norms, and locating a background theory (to 
justify  social institutions as a whole) which accords with these 
norms. Difficult normative problems (’hard cases') can then be 
resolved by considerations of ’fit’ with the settled norms.56 Frost 
suggests there is such a body of settled norms for international 
relations, and provides a list of them.
The real issue in this line of argument is the nature o f  the 
justificatory background theory for those norms that are apparently 
settled, since this provides the basis for more general agreement. 
Frost examines theories invoking order (he discusses Bull), those 
invoking utilitarian principles (e.g., Waltz, Theory of  International 
P o l i t i c s ) , those invoking rights concepts, and those invoking 
contractarian  principles (e.g., Waltzer, Just and Unjust W a rs ) . 
Finally, Frost lays out his own Constitutive Theory o f  Individualism
54 Ibid., pp. 62ff.
55 Ibid., pp. 84-86.
56 ibid., p. 102.
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which, by reconciling the tension between r i g h t s  norms and 
s o v e r e ig n ty  norms (something contractarianism promises, but can't 
deliver), provides a background theory justifying settled norms. 
This theory draws on Hegelian views of the social context o f  the
individual, and in deriving from settled but necessarily contingent 
norms, is essentially anti-foundationalist.
This theme is picked up by another writer on normative
theory, Chris Brown, who characterises anti-foundationalism  as
tending to
deny the possibility of grounding those notions that lie 
at the heart of he enlightenment ideal > notions such as
'truth' and 'reason' - whether applied to scientific or to
moral discourse.57
Brown points to Nietzsche and Heidegger as precursors of the post­
structuralist thought of Foucault and Derrida. He also notes the
challenge to scientific rationality o f  Anglo-American philosophers
such as Kuhn and Feyerabend, and the radicalised American 
pragmatism o f  Rorty, but suggests that the great variety among
these  schools  o f  thought should not obscure  a com m on
c h a r a c te r i s t i c :
the im pact o f  all varieties o f  an tifoundationalis t  
thought on the level of confidence with which it is
possible to assert the universal relevance of the values
of modernity.58
57 Chris Brown, The Modem Requirement?...', op. cit.% p. 344.
58 Ibid.
145
Thus the values of the enlightenment and of modernity simply do
not provide the stable foundations required by conventional views 
o f  morality. Brown suggests that post-modernists like Rorty would 
argue that
new moralities can emerge based on the practices
human beings create among themselves, and assessed
not by reference to grounded values but in terms o f  the 
extent to which such practices pragmatically 'cope'
with the world and the degree to which they promote 
pluralism by allowing space for the em ergence o f  
a lternative practices.6 9
The important idea o f  'coping' will called upon in subsequent
discussion, being a distinctive feature of normative theory as 
characterised in the present argument, in contrast to the 'grasping
at straws' of absolutist theory.
Friedrich  Kratochwil approaches a sim ilar po int from a
sligh tly  d ifferen t perspective , em phasising  a 'p rob lem -so lv ing '
character as a generic feature of all norms. He invokes a theory of 
'comm unicative action1 such that 'within a normatively secured 
framework o f  communication' grievances can be aired and value- 
choices debated, even if such debate is not only about instrumental 
q u e s t i o n s . 60 Accordingly, theory which rests on physicalis t 
observational facts, such as Waltz's Theory of International Politics
69 lbid.t p. 346. Brown is referring here to Richard Rorty, The Consequences 
of Pragmatism (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982).
60 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 14-16.
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(which attempts a systemic theory on the grounds that there is a gap 
between intentions and the systemic meaning of acts), fails to 
comprehend that action is only meaningful in terms of the rules 
(norms) governing interaction - and this is conceded by Waltz's own 
argument that decision-makers have to become socialised into a 
sy s te m .^ 1 As Griffiths points out,
[M orgenthau and W altz 's] shared descr ip tions  o f  
in te rna tional po li t ic s . . .  and the p resc r ip t iv e  and 
evaluative stances that flow from them, are woefully 
inadequate to the complexity of the subject-matter.^ 2
K ratochw il argues that human ’human action is ru le- 
governed' and that this is methodologically important, especially in 
reference to ac t ion :  norms influence decisions through the medium 
o f  d e l i b e r a t i o n . H e  suggests that a distinction between norms (as 
rules) and values can be exemplified by reference to two ideal- 
typical theories of society, one basing social order on r ig h ts  (norms) 
and the other on v a l u e s  (attitudes). The latter represents an 
emotional attachment to communal values while the former is a 
rationalised expression of rules or of law.**4 (Note that the present 
thesis holds that any rights-based theory must acknowledge that 
rights can only acquire meaning in the context of an existing social 
order, so values must be given existential and epistemofogical 
priority and rights must be seen as ex post facto  ra tionalisa tions .)
61 Ibid ., p. 28.
62 Martin Griffiths, Realism. Idealism and International Politics: A 
Reinterpretation (London Routledge, 1992), p. 34.
63 Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions, op. cit., p. 43.
64 Ibid., p. 64.
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Kratochwil characterises norms as problem-solving devices, which 
perm its  v iewing rules or rights as con tingen t so lu tions  to 
acknowledged problematic value differences. Thus he attempts to 
s h o w
not only that rules emerge even in the absence o f  
explicit communications, but that rules in explicit form 
are necessary in order to overcome the conflicts that 
are bound to arise.66
This, he says, involves a transition from tacit rules o f  behaviour to 
intersubjective rules f o r  behaviour (his emphasis), which 'either 
shore up trust or attach penalties'.
Here the argument reflects some of the themes raised in the 
p re c e d in g  d is c u s s io n  c o n c e rn in g  the  p ro b lem s  o f  a n t i-  
foundationalism , and the ir  reso lu tion  through in s ti tu tiona lised  
forms of meaning. Once again, a distinction is drawn between 
descriptions of the values at play and prescriptions based on the 
recognition o f  these values. Since co llective recognition is 
ev idenced  in d iscourse , which describes acknow ledged value- 
structures, this becomes the tenatative foundation for prescription 
(subject to change). Thus Kratochwil is able to derive a 
characterisation o f  the prescriptive force of norms: a claim to
validity mediated by language such that validation occurs in the 
context of a discourse.
Hence the possibility of discussing normative issues requires 
abandoning not just strict fact-value distinctions but also the view
65 l b i d . t p. 94.
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that values and norms are ’all of the same cloth’,66 We may recall 
here Dewey's distinction between valuing and valuation - valuing 
may be reflected in the assertions of an intitutionalised society, 
while valuation is a process sensitive to change in the actual social
conditions and therefore implicitly critical. Knowledge of such 
change (which is descrip tive/em pirical)  'would surely lead to 
revaluation o f  desires and ends that had been assumed to be
authoritative sources o f  valuations'.^7 A similarity with Frost's view
is also discemable in Kratochwil when he says
The question of compliance with norms is part o f  a 
wider argument through which individuals act in a
social context, enabling society as well as the 'se lf  o f  an
actor to reproduce themselves.^ *
The next step in this line of argument is to adapt this conception of
norms to more familiar theoretical practice. Lakatos is invoked to 
suggest that the criterion for the success of normative theory is the 
'fruitfulness' of the whole research program. Kratochwil is aware of 
the problem of refutation (failure in a single case would be
damning), but suggests that 'rules and norms can then become 
"causes" in that they determine, but only p r o b a b i l i s t i c a l l y  so, 
outcomes (decisions)'. He infers that 'explanation involves the 
identification of the rules that constitute a "form of life'", though 
presumably these remain subject to debate.^ ^
Dewey makes a related point in discussing the continuum of
66 Ibid., p. 98.
*>7 Dewey, op. cit., p. 58.
68 Kratochwil, op. cit., p. 97.
69 Ibid., p. 100-1.
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ends and means: He says that the f o r m  of an attained end or 
consequence (outcome) is always adequate co-ordination; both 'a 
r e i n s t a t e m e n t  of a unified on-going action1 and 'an e n a c t m e n t  of a 
new state of affairs'. In the continuous process of forming a 'co­
ordinated and co-ordinating unity, a constituent activity is both an 
end and a means'. In this sense norms can be viewed as causal 
conditions o f  action, as well as well as the 'consummatory resolution' 
o f  previous activity with an end-in-view.7 0
Kratochwil reflects this view in using the term 'co-ordination 
norms', in reference to Humean rule-utilitarianism as opposed to
act-utilitarianism (the latter being dependent on the conventional 
distinction between means and ends). He continues his argument
with an elaboration of the idea of communicative action, holding it 
to be the source of a framework for ascertaining the conduct-
guiding force o f  norms. Durkheim's distinction between moral 
authority and material or physical supremacy is introduced, to 
suggest that moral facts are valid because of their duty-imposing 
character, arising in the context of an ideally symbolised society 
which provides coherence and objectivity:
With its duty-imposing claims upon the individual, it is
the absolute, and at the same time only a relative order,
for all obligation results from the form o f life that
characterizes a specific society.7 1
In such an environment valuations are conducted, and values 
determined, in relation to the existing normative structure.
7® Dewey, op. cit., p. 49.
7  ^ Kratochwil, op. cit., p. 125.
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Precisely because the individual experiences a conflict 
with others concerning the goals, the issue arises o f  
how such conflicts can be mediated by norms and 
ru le s .7 2
Kratochwil argues that intersubjective meaning is only atta ined 
when a 'moral point of view' emerges. He suggests that natural law 
provides a way of structuring the discourse on grievances. O f 
course, if natural law is viewed only instrumentally, the natural law 
doctrine is defeated (note the critique o f  natural law in the 
preceding discussion of realism), however the reference here is to 
P ufendorfs  version of natural law which, is not ontological or 
grounded in religion. The emphasis is on the attribution of moral 
status, or on attitudes toward an act rather than the act itself. The 
moral point of view need not be static, and it is the form rather than 
the specific content that makes normative structures significant.
Nevertheless, all normative structures do have a content, and 
it is frequently the subject of debate and analysis. This is part o f  the 
interactive relation between theory and practice, in which theory 
informs practical judgement, and the 'facticity' of common practice 
throws up theoretical problems. It will be fruitful to look at some 
examples o f  work which engages more directly with practical, 
substantive normative issues. '
Normative Applications
72 Ibid .% p. 129.
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This section will briefly examine three examples of normative 
approaches applied to problems and issues of international relations:
intervention, values in foreign policy, and human rights. These
examples illustrate both the nature o f  normative inquiry in the 
study of  international relations, and the limitations imposed upon it
by traditions of thought which keep it at the margin of study.
I n t e r v e n t i o n
An example of a debate which addresses both the existing political
condition and competing theoretical interpretations o f  it is that 
about intervention. A brief examination of this debate will bring 
this chapter back to the central theme by shedding light on a typical 
confluence o f  the traditional concerns o f  international relations 
theory and the more extensive demands of normative theory.
The issue of intervention has its roots in ’the old Westphalian 
system of a world of non-interventionist states’ in which
the absolute sovereignty of a state rested on a dual basis 
whereby internal authority was matched by freedom
from external in terference; and in this way the 
principle of cuius regio eius religio , codified in the
Religious Peace of Augsburg, laid the foundation o f  the
modem state s y s t e m . 7  3
7^ Philip Windsor, 'Superpower Intervention’ in Hedley Bull (ed), Intervention 
in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
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Thus intervention is defined as coercive interference with 
the ju risd ic tion  o f  a sovereign state (or independent political
c o m m u n i ty ) .74 Forms of intervention are various, both in character 
and extent, but for theoretical purposes the significant feature o f
intervention is that it is a matter of principle. An instance o f  
in tervention is both a violation of principles  governing and 
defining the states system, and yet (if justifiable) an enforcement of
one or another of these principles, or principles of a putitatively 
higher order. Windsor argues that two principles or 'modes o f  
d iscussion ' dom inate  the issue o f  in tervention: public o rder
(internationally) and historical legitimacy (in reference to 'natural
p r o c e s s e s ' ) . 75 Naturally, the questions are then 'what order?' and 
'whose history?'.
It is commonplace with matters of principle that there are
various com peting principles to be considered, ju s t  as it is 
commonplace in international relations for intervention to occur 
even as the context in which it occurs presents an inherent 
principled opposition to it. Intervention may even be a logically
inherent feature o f  a states system. Consequently, neither the fact 
o f  intervention nor the existence of a political system founded on 
the principle of non-intervention provides a satisfactory basis for a 
theory of international relations; rather it is the common feature o f  
reference to principles, inconclusive as it may be, that suggests the
essentially  normative character o f  these political relations and 
therefore an appropriate starting point for a theory which accounts
for them.
74 This is extracted from the definition used by Bull in ibid., p. 1, which he 
derives from Oppenheim.
75 Windsor, op. cit., pp. 60-1.
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This perspective need not deny an existing political condition,
or even require its overthrow (in any direct sense), although it is 
critical and does imply reform. More specifically, a normative 
approach to the study of in ternational relations en jo ins  all 
practitioners and students to reconceive the project of international 
relations in normative terms, as a matter of priority - a work on
normative theory ’would say that' of course, and other theoretical 
works make their respective demands of an audience. The demands 
o f  normative theory are not, however, of the sort which necessarily 
undo everything else; on the contrary, the frequently h idden 
significance of traditional theories of politics and international 
relations may be revealed in the light o f  a normative approach 
which alleviates the self-imposed constraints of ’reality’.
In respect to the system of sovereign states, for example, the 
definitional role of sovereignty may be brought into question when, 
as Linklater says, 'the principle of sovereignty becomes a barrier to
the realisation of the goals which it was originally summoned to
p ro te c t ' .7 ^
Furtherm ore , this and other princip les  o f  in te rna tional 
relations that do not serve the needs of particular constituencies of 
humanity (that is, particular states or societies) may not, by the same 
token, serve the needs of humanity in general; an international 
system which does not have universal recognition is by definition 
i l l - f o u n d e d .77 This is not merely a question of competing interests, 
but of the value invested in those principles which guide the pursuit 
o f  interests.
7^ Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1982), p. 194.
77 See the discussion in Michael Akehurst, 'Humanitarian Intervention' in Bull 
(ed), op. cit.t pp. 111-2.
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Values in Foreign Pol icy
Robert C. Johansen provides a useful case study of 'policy-relevant' 
v a lues ,  w hich also brings out the theore tica l im plica tions .
Employing a value-framework of 'global humanism', he analyses U.S. 
foreign policy to distinguish between professed values and implicit 
v a l u e s . 7 ** The latter are derived from observations of state 
behaviour and the actual impact of policy. He employs 'a value- 
centered approach’ to foreign policy, 'admittedly a break with the 
prevailing intellectual tradition' which usually focusses on the use 
o f  pow er w ithout giving very much attention to the value
implications o f  policy:
Traditional approaches have impoverished reality and
discouraged use o f  the im agination by excessive
emphasis on the way things are and by inattention to
the way things ought to be.7 9
Johansen implies a general definition of politics, and continuity
betw een dom estic  and in ternational po litics , by sta ting  tha t 
'understanding  o f  political events is enhanced if  in ternational
politics is viewed as a value-realizing process’. Thus the particular 
concern of his analysis (the contradictions of U.S. foreign policy)
reflects a broader awareness of the importance of normative theory:
7** Robert C. Johansen, The National Interest and the Human Interest: An 
Analysis of U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 22.
79 Ibid.. p. 23.
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The value impacts of specific foreign policies then 
provide intellectual handles by which one may grasp 
the normative direction in which a changing system of
world order is moving.8 0
Here, the normative approach is characterised as an investigative 
tool: an aspect o f  its descriptive role which em phasises the
m ethodological s ignificance o f  norm ative theory. A fu rther  
example - the traditional normative topic of ’human rights' - will 
suggest the consequences  o f  applying both descrip tive  and 
prescriptive aspects of a normative approach.
Human Rights
R.J. Vincent examines the place of human rights in the study and
practice  o f  international relations, pointing to the theore tica l
problem o f  particularised citizenship and universalised morality,
and the practical problem of identifying or maintaining cultural 
differences in the face of a expanding global culture. He remarks 
that 'humankind is itself a project as well as this or that branch of it' 
and because of this, 'rights have a built-in push towards universal 
application ' and, while human rights doctrine is not perfectly  
reflected in actual practice, 'there is nevertheless evidence for the 
existence o f  global norms'.8 1
80 Ibid., p. 24.
81 R.J. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 3. Note that Vincent is also involved in the 
debate about intervention: R.J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order
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In a chapter on human rights and the theory of international 
relations, Vincent distinguishes between moral questions (what 
ought to be done) and d irec tly  practica l concerns  (w hat 
governments should do), with the former informing the latter. This 
reflects the distinction he initially makes, in respect to 'the project 
o f  humankind',**2 as between the 'normative' aspect o f  universal
applications and the 'positive' aspect of an actual global culture. 
Such a d istinction between morality and political practice is 
symptomatic o f  the influence of realist thought in traditional 
international relations theory, as discussed in the previous chapter 
(and being also a focal point of the present critique).
However, Vincent is clearly aware of these issues. He argues 
that a theory of world politics, understood 'as reflection on the 
public arrangements that ought to be made for the government o f  
h u m a n k i n d ' , 82  should begin with human rights for both 
definitional and historical reasons: definitional because political
theory is axiomatically concerned with humanity; historical because 
o f  the tradition o f  liberal reason, in which natural rights and 
natural law provide a starting point. Thus, while there is dispute 
about the content of human rights, there is a common vocabulary or 
language of human rights - as Vincent says, 'the dispute is precisely 
the point'.8 2
Such dispute about content can occur even as the form of 
political life is implicitly acknowledged, universally. Yet in noting 
that rights determine the political milieu in which action takes place 
as well as guiding action itself, Vincent remarks that
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).
82 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, op. cit., p. 111.
83 Ibid., p. 112.
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there is less distance between the prescription of a
moral principle and the description of a political milieu 
than might have been implied just now.**4
This suggests that talk of rights depends on an existing normative
structure for its meaning, a view which undermines the usefulness 
o f  rights as a starting place. Of course, from an anti-foundationalist 
perspective, any starting place is problematic. The point here is that
a norm ative theoretical approach provides the opportunity  o f  
incorporating particular normative issues, such as human rights, 
into a conception of world politics. While disputes about the 
importance of particular norms (about the content of human rights 
for example) may continue, they do not by virtue o f  the ir  
intransigence diminish the political realm in which they are
carried out: indeed, they are the very substance of politics. The 
substantive debates of politics may extend even to descriptions of the 
political milieu itself, and Vincent notes three views of the political 
world: a morality of states, cosmopolitan morality, and an 'amoral' 
view of rights as mere interests.
Of these three views, cosmopolitan morality is unique in its 
commitment to humanity - the core of the cosmopolitan argument 
(as described by Vincent) is noted in the previous chapter. The 
traditional theories ascribe to one or the other of the remaining two 
views: the 'morality of states' is typical of English School classicism 
which emphasises a 'society of states', while the somewhat different 
sta te-centrism  o f  A m erican-sty le  realists  ironically  share with
84 Ibid.,  p. 113.
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M arxist structuralism a reductionist view of rights as interests, 
rather than value-exprcssions. The similar treatment of values and 
interests in Weber and Marx, as noted above, is seen here in theories 
of international politics influenced by their ideas. Vincent cites 
Adam Watson's suggestion that moral ideas, like any ideas, are 'prone 
to the following of fashion', but he rightly responds that 'the fact of
the ir  topicality does not diminish their im portance’.8 ^ What is
suggested here is that such ideas are topical just because o f  their 
(im plicitly) acknowledged importance.
C onc lus ions
In respect to the relation between the topical and the important, 
theoretical concern should not simply be with specific ideas or
particular moralities (established, if relative norms) but rather with 
the nature and status of ideas, and with ethical and meta-ethical 
questions addressing the role and developm ent o f  norms in
international political life. Even modified realist positions lean in
this direction:
Morality presupposes human choice, but also limits and
channels the realm of freedom towards certain ends 
(the good life) and away from others (the bad life),
whatever these ends may be. The realm of freedom is 
synonymous with the realm of morality, and this realm
permeates the realm of necessity. Nothing in politics
85 Ibid.,  p. 128.
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has to be accepted in a natural sense, only in a practical 
(or 'realistic') sense. A corollary of this understanding 
is the necessity of societal moral guide-lines which 
enable positive freedom.8 6
Broader theoretical concerns of this sort are addressed by
Vincent when, for example, he concludes that
Instead of being driven out by the moi co m m u n , the 
moi humain is coopted by it.8 7
Of course, the abstract, universal notion of ’humanity' is only a
heuristic category if substantial meaning, including the meaning of 
'human', can only be found in the context of a normative structure 
as provided by the collective experience of a society or community. 
Yet, society can exceed contrived state boundaries in many respects - 
what Vincent refers to as 'transnational recognition' is an external 
universalising condition on states and societies. These latter may 
only comprise layers in a mille feui l le  of norms and a hierarchy of 
references that give contextual meaning to both domestic and world 
politics. The relative position of particular cases of humanity within 
the global (universal) context is itself determined by the norms
governing social divisions. Linklater, for example, claims that
a progressive development of international relations 
necessita tes  the transference of unders tand ings o f
Martin Griffiths, Realism. Idealism and International Politics: A 
Reinterpretation (London Routledge, 1992), p. 25.
87 RJ. Vincent, Human Rights and International Relations, op. cit., p. 151.
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social relations from their original domestic setting to 
the international arena.8 8
In the theory (and practice) of world politics, the dominant norms 
remain those which describe and prescribe a system of states.89 A 
normative theoretical approach reveals that these particular norms, 
like any others, are subject to political debate. The human purposes 
underwriting these norms can only be served when the ethical 
content o f  politics is acknowledged; when 'ethical life gains a 
foo th o ld '.90
Beginning with values rather than interests also places 
theoretical undertakings on a sounder footing, from which we may 
better confront the political character of existing conditions and 
better cope with the abstract universal context of their existence. 
Uncertainty about socio-political foundations may leave us, as 
Alasdair MacIntyre states it, with a ’fundamental incoherence which 
is too disturbing to be admitted to self-conscious awareness except on 
the rarest of occasions’.91 Yet, recognising the importance of values 
admits the prospect of coherence without the necessity  o f  a
88 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations, op. cit., p. 193.
89 Note a recent (though essentially traditional) work which describes the 
ethical code devised by states to govern their relations, but which has not yet been 
fully effected in political practice: Dorothy V. Jones, Code of Peace: Ethics and 
Security in the World of Warlord States (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
Jones goes to some length to point out the somewhat paradoxical connection between 
ethical rhetoric and political practice, but does not go so far as to recognise the 
immanence of ethics in politics, and thus perpetuates the traditional distinction 
between ethics and politics which so hobbles normative analysis, including her own. 
It is nevertheless a useful investigation of international norms.
90 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations, op. cit., p. 195.
91 Alisdair MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (London: 
Duckworth, 1989). The quoted passage is from an extract in The Independent. 4 Feb. 
1989, p. 15.
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universalised absolutism, whether in science or politics. It is in this 
la tter respect that the study of  international relations has been 
burdened and constrained by absolutist categories which limit the 
possibilities for self-conscious awareness.
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C h a p t e r  F o u r
N o rm a tiv e  T h e o ry ,  Id e a s  an d  Id eo lo g y
Among the constrain ts  visited upon normative approaches by
canonical traditions in the discipline of International Relations is 
the distinction between theory and ideology. When applied to the 
practices o f  interpretative social science, and the subjective and
intersubjective categories which it employs, this distinction implies 
that any theory arising out of the interpretation of human practices 
is likely to be tainted with a political project, and its results mere 
ideology as opposed to objective description.
B ecause  much o f  n ine teen th  and tw en tie th  cen tu ry
in ternational relations has involved ideological conflic t ,  m ost
theories of international relations incorporate some position on the
importance o f  ideology as a political force, and explanations o f
particular phenomena such as the bipolarity of the Cold W ar period
differ on this point. This chapter will investigate the relationship
between normative theory and the role of ideas in political theory
and practice. For the purposes of this thesis, the distinction will
help to define the parameters of normative theory as applfed to
international relations; it will also indicate some limitations o f  this
body o f theory, but without prejudice to its import. The facile
dismissal o f  normative approaches on the grounds of being 'mere
ideology' is answered by pointing to the central role o f  ideas in
political life, and the importance of normative theory as a means o f
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reintegrating ethics and politics.
Knutsen places this discussion into the historical context o f
the early nineteenth century development of new theories and 
ideologies:
This proliferation of ideas at first overwhelmed the 
explorers of international relations; they were expelled 
from a garden carefully tended by a few legal and
historical authorities into a new, uneven terrain o f
dense, theoretical foliage.1
Out o f  this theoretical foliage grew the principal themes o f
radicalism , liberalism and conservatism  which continue to  be 
reflected  in contemporary paradigmatic debates o f  in ternational 
relations scholarship. Because these themes were for the most part 
developed in reference to states and national societies, domestic 
politics built around national social values could be distinguished 
from competitive and violent international politics, allowing a more 
ready separation o f  ethics and politics at the international level. 
This conception o f  international relations is challenged by the 
identification and critique of value structures, which is the task o f  
norm ative theory.
This chapter will, in particular, d istinguish the rational 
characteristics of normative theory, in respect to its definitional and 
regulatory roles as an interpreter o f  empirical data, from the 
transcendent rationality of those belief systems whose teleology 
incorporates an after-life or deity, for example. These transcendent
1 TorbjOm L Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 128.
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rationalities lead to the subjective differences which are wrongly
held to be the failing of normative analysis. While beliefs no doubt 
have a significant role in the formation of social and political
values, and are central to ideologies, the purpose o f  normative 
theory in explaining the structure and dynamics of these values is 
dis tinct from explanations o f  their  origin which refer  to a
transcendent rationality. As Laszek Kolakowski has said,
There is no access to an epistemological absolute, and 
there is no privileged access to the absolute Being
which might result in reliable theoretical knowledge
(this last restriction is needed, as we may not a priori  
exclude the reality of mystical experience that provides 
some people with this privileged access; but their
experience cannot be re-forged into a theory). This
double denial docs not need to end up with pragmatic 
nih ilism ; it is com patib le  with the b e l ie f  tha t
metaphysical and non-pragmatic insight is possible as 
a result of our living within the realm of good and evil 
and of experiencing good and evil as one’s own.^
Some care in the use of the term transcendent is necessary here
because in a sense any foundation for individual or collective
identity (and hence meaning) must transcend the most immediate
and con tingen t (for exam ple, the possib ili ty  o f  non-p riva te
language depends on references external to the purely subjective); 
it is a question of what is being transcended. The distinction should
2 Laszek Kolakowski, Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988),
98.
be made between the transcendent (an object of faith) and the 
transcendental (a rational heuristic abstraction).
Similarly, there are problems in speaking of rationality, since 
this too is a product of a Western Enlightenment tradition o f  thought 
w h ich  has  been only  subsequen tly  u n iv e rsa l ised  by the  
predominance of Western science - a product, in this sense, o f  a 
particular normative system functioning in the realm of knowledge.
We may proceed nevertheless, but cautiously, in the awareness that 
even the language of the present argument is a hidden influence or 
constraint on our understanding.
The strength and motive of normative theory in addressing 
the underly ing value s tructures in international rela tions lies 
precisely in the ability to suggest rational grounds for the adoption 
o f  coherent policy m easures which conform to, ra ther  than 
frustrate, these underlying values. The rational grounds for such 
policy lie in the commonalities of normative systems arising from 
the ir  social and political functions, not from their apparently 
disparate origins in the transcendent rationalities of religious belief 
systems, or the aspirations of ideologies. Hence, the case to be made 
here is that normative systems are essentially (but not strictly) 
rational, in the Humean sense of 'conventions ',3 and that their 
historical, existential and ontological foundations are not to be 
conflated with the 'extra-rational' tenets of belief systems which
f
may inform a normative structure.
3 Hume's critique of natural law, and his observation that 'reason is and ought 
only to be the slave of the passions', are based on the distinction between the formal 
implications of deductive reasoning in parts of logic and mathematics, the more 
tenuous reasoning of empirical discovery, causal relationships and ascriptions of 
value. See the discussion of reason, fact and value in George H. Sabine (revised by 
Thomas L Thorson), A History of Political Theory. 4th ed (Hinsdale, IL: Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, The Dryden Press, 1973), p. 550ff.
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In this context one may also wish to address the empirical 
foundations of normative systems, while bearing in mind that 
normative approaches raise questions about empiricism. These 
issues have been discussed in Chapter One, but may be raised here 
again in the process  o f  d is t in g u ish in g  betw een em p ir ica l  
observations, ideas, ideologies and beliefs, between common sense 
and philosophy, and between practice and theory.
The present argument will suggest that in the commonly 
percieved hierarchy or continuum whose categories range from the 
tangible to the abstract, normative theory lies rather closer to the
former than conventional wisdom would allow. Having pointed to 
the proximal relationship of the empirical and the normative in 
Chapter One, the task remains to define the limits o f  abstraction in a 
normative theory o f  international relations, and the purpose o f  
a b s t r a c t io n .
The context of the present discussion is the broader one of 
social science, where 'sc ien tif ic ' means 'non -ideo log ica l '  and 
international relations theory is tested against the standards o f  
normal science.
... as with traditional political theory, this move towards
science has reified social insti tu tions and social
relations, negating in general the active part that
*
humans play in the production of their social world, 
and removing from consideration the possibilty  o f  
analysing other than the most ubiquitous a p p e a r a n c e  
of change.4
4 John Maclean, 'Political Theory, International Theory, and Problems of 
Ideology', Millennium (Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1981), p. 119.
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In this and other chapters normative theory in the study o f
international relations is contrasted with other theory in the field,
in the context of competing fundamental ideas: ideas about human 
nature, about national political life, about relations between states, 
and ultimately about the significance of theory in the search for
'true knowledge'. An important aspect of this investigation is
defining the limits of normative theory, and distinguishing it from 
ideology. In the process, 'mainstream' realist theory will be 
similarly examined to show what its limitations are and whether it, 
too, can be distinguished from ideology. The contrast will allow a 
clearer understanding not only of the relative 'scientific' strengths
of the different bodies of theory, but more importantly will focus 
attention on the role o f  theory in achieving both knowledge and 
political goals: being both product and source of different and often
competing ideas, theories will be seen as key actors in the politics o f  
knowledge. It will be argued that normative theory can provide a 
stabilising background theory for such epistemological competition, 
and does not readily produce an oversimplified or particularistic 
version o f  'truth'.
Normative Theory and Ideology Distinguished
■t
The pr inc ipa l d is tinc tion  between norm ative  th eo ris in g  and
ideological polemics lies in a difference of purpose. While ideology
acquires its meaning in political engagement and action, in relation
to political consciousness or adopted political ideas, normative theory
involves questioning such ideas - no doubt a form of engagement as
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well, but an engagement with the play of ideas; with the politics of
knowledge rather than with practical politics in isolation.
Reinhold Niebuhr, in 'Ideology and the Scientific Method',
provides a useful characterisation of the rela tionship  between 
knowledge and ideology, which also shows that the dogma o f  
Christian realism it is not that o f  scientific realism:
...the field of historical observation presents us with 
in fin ite  grades o f  engagem ent from the obvious 
engagement o f  the practical statesman through the
observations of social scientists who stand upon some 
c o n te m p o ra ry  g round  o f  im p a r t ia l i ty  to th e  
observations o f  social and historical scientists o f  a
subsequent age who have gained a perspective in time 
upon the scene o f  conflict between various interests
and passions. These various shades of engagement also 
determine the degree to which selves ra ther than 
minds must be appealed to. If it is a self rather than a 
mind, no scientific method can compel a self to cease 
from engaging in whatever rationalisation o f  interest 
may seem plausible to it... No perfection of method can 
thus completely overcome ideological conflict.^
At the level of the self and broader collective identities, the 
questions o f  normative theory are in a sense questions about Being 
(ontological questions), which may subsequently shed light on the 
nature of world affairs and the place o f  national policy in them, but
5 Reinhold Niebuhr, 'Ideology and the Scientific Method' in Christian Realism 
and Political Problems (New York: Scribner's, 1953), p. 93.
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without simple assertions, thoughtless fatalism or mere 'problem- 
solving*. Although Kratochwil argues that 'all rules and norms are 
problem-solving devices for dealing with the recurrent issues of 
social life: conflict and cooperation',6 the importance of this view is 
that a normative perspective emphasises the fundamental role o f  
norms in the continuous p r o c e s s  of political life, rather than the 
p a r t icu la r  instances in which norm s may be conciously  or 
unconciously employed for some purpose.
Norms are not simply or only 'tools' for analysis or action: 
they exist in human affairs, and our challenge is to understand how 
they exist. A theory of normative structures intends, like any 
theory, to offer a general explanation; a starting place. Thus 
norm ative theory provides a context for political inquiry and 
understanding which is prior to political action, so that while 
ideologies (in contrast) provide a rallying point for political action, 
they cannot escape the broader political environment in which they 
a r is e .
O f course, the phenomenon of ideology itself has a broad
sweep o f  manifestations, and the fragmentation of Western political
thought into radicalism, liberalism and conservatism around the
turn o f  the nineteenth century in themselves constituted competing
ideo log ies  whose influence remains. However, ideology is
distinguished by its special relationship to political action, and
*
political action requires political actors (nation-states, for the most 
part, in international relations): 'An "ideology" is a systematic body 
of beliefs about the structures and processes of society; it includes a
6 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions of 
practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 69.
170
comprehensive theory of human nature that sustains a programme 
o f  practical po li t ic s '.7 The the connection of ideology to the 
p ra c t ic a l  ac t ion  p rogram m e o f p a r t i c u la r  p o l i t ic a l  ac to rs  
undermines its wider explanatory capacity and distinguishes it from 
a normative theory of international politics.
The foundation of national action (according to the 'national 
will ', o r  the 'national interest') is a self-understanding o f  the 
national character in relation to others, which provides meaning 
for the nation and its decision-makers. Of course, this is true for any 
who aspire to political leadership, whatever ideological position they 
may represent. It is also true for actors other than nation-states, 
who must be equally aware of their relative position to other actors 
in the international arena, whether or not these are nation-states. 
In order to be effective, such self-understanding must provide an 
explicit, self-critical and questioning awareness of the global socio­
political environment; a world-view (to be discussed in Chapter 
Four). As we will see in Chapter Five, the advent of nuclear weapons, 
and the deterrence strategies that accompany them, forced this 
questioning upon us in a most profound way for the first time - and 
they are precisely and obviously questions of existence; o f  Being. 
With the collapse of Cold War structures, and increasing awareness 
o f  global environmental change, natural environmental problems 
provide a new focal point for such questioning.
While the prescriptive aspect of normative theory necessarily 
adopts and recommends certain values (and provides reasons for 
doing so), the descriptive aspect o f  normative theory locates and 
explains values in the context o f  the value-systems in which they
7 TorbjOm L. Knutsen, A History of International Relations Theory 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992), p. 133.
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arise, providing the grounds for prescription. For example, a 
particular ideology may reflect some set of values that appeal on a 
p r i o r i  grounds, yet leave the practical import of these values 
undeterm ined in the first instance. A descrip tive norm ative 
analysis would provide an explanation for (and estab lish  the 
meaning of) these values in the context of the society to which they 
apply. Once an ideology is fully subsumed in the culture of a society 
(that is, in the full range of normative activity), an analysis o f  
ideology will be coincidental with an analysis of social values. But of 
course, there may be several ideologies or sets of values at play 
within any society - or within the state - leading to political and 
social tensions.
This is not to say that political ideologies represent the totality 
o f  socially relevant ideas, for there are other normative features o f  
societies which are equally important and similarly subject to the 
ebb and flow of ideas: aesthetics (in art, architecture, and music), 
ethics (in business and personal relations), and epistemology (in 
science, where truth and verification are at issue). No doubt 
ideologies are conditioned in various ways by these other aspects o f  
social life, whose influence cannot be dismissed. Nevertheless, in 
the exam ination o f  international political relations and foreign 
policies, ideology may be considered a key area for normative 
analysis, while remaining distinct from normative theory.
The following sections introduce the character of ideas, the 
philosophical context o f  ideas in relation to normative structures, 
and the contrasting features of ideology which distinguish it from 
norm ative theory
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Ideas: the subject and object
What is essential in this discussion of ideas and normative theory is 
that political ideas, perhaps represented in ideologies (whether well 
or ill-defined), are subject to the influence of other 'external' ideas, 
political or otherwise. Ideas find definition in their contrast with
alternative ideas, or, in Nietzschian fashion, they cannot be defined 
if they have a history. Thus the historical collective experience o f  a 
society is employed in selecting and assessing political ideas, which 
may be taken up in and by ideologies, and both the process and its 
content (ideas) are subsequently open to normative analysis. It is 
the position of ideas in the broader socio-historical context that can 
be revealed  by a norm ative analysis, rather than simply a 
cataloguing o f  historical ideas. (It is in this context that a work such 
as Knutsen's can be judged.) Consequently, ideas can be viewed as 
normative in character, in the way that other aspects of culture and
politics  are normative. Predominant ideas become intellectual 
norms, directly participating in normative assessments of social and 
political behaviour, and no more free of such assessment themselves 
than ostensibly empirical events. In this sense, there is no escape 
from norm ative evaluation by reference to ostensibly objective 
intellectual positions, since ideas are part of the experiential process
by which all norms are established (whether social, political or
*
intellectual) and partake of the same communicative, educational, 
con sen su s -b u ild in g  cha rac te r is t ic s  that inform percep tions  o f  
reality in all its aspects.
Ideas, however, unlike other features of accepted (normal)
reality, are not constrained by the most concrete norms concerning
empirical phenomena and are consequently the first to effect, and
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be effected by, change. Being subject (like all norms) to variations 
in other aspects of experience, ideas may be assessed differently as 
the social context changes around them, losing or gaining currency 
and credibility. For Marx, ideas and material social existence are
inseparable - the grounds for arguing that class conciousness, class 
interests, and therefore class struggles are the substance of human 
history. And yet, since political ideas are open to broader
interpretation than, for example, the colour green or the shape of a 
cube, they may be adapted to changing circumstances, or revitalised 
by finding new points of reference in a new empirical reality. For
the purposes of empirical analysis, therefore, ideas may be thought 
indeterminate, unidentifiable, and of little importance or use. On the
contrary, ideas are the most important of all aspects of experience, 
and for precisely the same reasons that they are often discredited by
those who would found a 'hard' science of politics. Such a science 
may be possible, but clearly not through discrediting ideas: axioms of 
politics cannot be concerned with specific circumstances or events 
anymore than natural science seeks specific findings in preference 
to generalisations, and specific ideas must likewise be understood in 
terms o f  ideational or ideological processes rather than incidental
c o n te n t .
Once prepared to accept that ideas are not fixed or
independent o f  one another - or indeed of the world in which they
*
are formulated and expressed - one may readily adopt a view of ideas
as being both the context and substance of an evolutionary (perhaps
dialectical) process. This process may in turn be viewed as one
which can be understood in normative terms; one which follows the
same patterns of normative evolution, affirmation, communication,
reassessment, critique, devolution, and reformulation as do other
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socio-cultural processes. Such evolution is not ideological or bound 
necessarily to some idea of progress (that is, to programmatic forms 
of Hegelian or Kantian philosophy), but is nevertheless bounded by 
the acceptability of variation or novelty. A synthesis is not arrived 
at by some mathematical correlation of thesis and antithesis, but 
rather by a political process which is itself subject to normative 
constra in ts , and whose outcome is in some way proscribed . 
Furthermore, because ideas play a central role they are not merely 
the subject or substance of such a process, but are also the medium 
through which all such processes function and evolve: ideas are the 
currency of normative systems - and ultimately, of consciousness.
Ideas, on a common-scnse account, are the philosophical 
maxims or artefacts of theory which populate ordinary language and 
und ers tan d in g  as these  la t te r  are em ployed  in n o rm a tiv e  
interactions. That ideas may be inauthentic, misappropriated, or 
misunderstood on occasion does not diminish their role, though it 
should be said that ideas must be effective in their role in order to
survive. This last point is evidenced by the testing of ideas in the 
form o f  debate and criticism, which is a feature of ordinary life, 
though described here in more abstract terms as being part o f  a
normative evolutionary process. Of course, ideas may be understood 
in a less common-sensical way as being philosophically problematic 
in themselves: they arc, for example, the subject (and title) o f  
Edmund Husserl's work on pure phenomenology, which influenced 
the course of twentieth-century philosophy by its radical departure
into philosophical methodology. Naturally enough, Husserl's ideas 
have not escaped criticism and subsequent development but they are
n ev er th e less  re levan t to, among o th e r  th ings, the p re sen t  
u n d e r t a k in g .
175
The establishment and development of the academic discipline 
o f  International Relations, during and following two world wars and 
the advent of nuclear weapons, has provided a new venue - and new
reasons - for debates on fundamental (usually m etaphysica l)  
questions which is well suited to departures from traditional
philosophy. This is not to say that the study of  international 
relations has modern origins, since any account of this endeavour 
records ancient antecedents and abiding influences from every era®
- which only underlines the obvious point that in ternational 
relations is a dimension of human affairs. However, certain aspects 
o f  human affairs become more salient in particular his torical
contexts, and novelty of context demands novelty of thought. For 
one thing, the existence, form, and meaning of the nation-state - as a 
principle feature o f  political organisation - becomes a central issue 
in the context o f  international relations, not only in respect to
relations between different states and societies, but also to the
relationship between state and society (in individual cases of these), 
as well as relationships between the state-structure of one nation­
state and the society of another (and vice-versa).9 Thus, the
question of the stale arises in the context of systems of states or a
global society, depending on theoretical perspectives, such that the 
security of ultimate reference to the historical accident which is the
nation-state is no longer a tenable means of grounding social values,
*
w hether  for ind iv idual consc iousness  or co l lec t ive  soc ie ta l
8 See, for example, F Parkinson, The Philosophy of International Relations: A 
Study in the History of Thought (London: Sage, 1977), William C. Olson and AJ.R. 
Groom, International Relations Then and Now: Origins and Trends in Interpretation 
(London: Harper Collins, 1991) and Knutsen, A History of International Relations 
IhEQTX. ibid.
9 See Fred Halliday, 'State and Society in International Relations: A Second 
Agenda', Millennium (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987), pp. 215-29, and on this last point, 
especially the passage about State Interests and Social Forces (p. 223).
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consciousness. Consider, for example, the notion o f  a global 
c o m m o n s , 1® or the tension between the organising principles o f  
states and those of markets.1 1
Thus the endeavour of international relations theory itse lf  
reveals the source and dynamic of cultural and political crises: these 
practical developments cannot be addressed simply in terms o f  
conflicting national interests but rather must be understood in 
terms arising from parallel developments in modern political theory 
and philosophy, which in turn inform the academic endeavour. The 
status o f  ideas lies at the heart of these developments, and the 
corresponding philosophical debates can be well understood in 
normative terms.
Philosophical Background for Normative Theory
Inquiry into the distinctive characteristics o f  normative theory 
requires investigation of its philosophical antecedents. Because the 
definition o f  normative theory employed here is not coextensive 
with the general use of the term as a synonym for prescriptivism, 
this investigation will make the distinction clearer by revealing its
^  See Harlan Cleveland, The Global Commons: Policy for the Planet (London: 
University Press of America / Aspen Institute, 1990).
11 See Susan Strange, States and Markets (London: Pinter, 1988), John Stopford 
and Susan Strange, Rival States. Rival Firms: Competition for World Market Shares 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), and Susan Strange, 'States, Firms and 
Diplomacy', International Affairs (Vol. 68, No. 1, January 1992) in which she 
addresses (p. 11) the conventions of international relations thus: The standard texts 
in the subject subscribe to the dominant 'realist' school of thought, which holds that 
the central issue in international society is war between territorial states, and the 
prime problematic therefore is the maintenance of order in the relations between these 
states. This traditional view of international relations also holds that the object of 
study is the behaviour of states towards other states, and the outcome of such 
behaviour for states: whether they are better or worse off, less or more powerful or 
secure.'
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ph ilosophica l referents. The rela tionship  between norm ative 
theory, ideas, and ideology will also be clarified by reference to
pertinent signposts in the history and development of philosophy.
David Hume held that ideas are the 'faint images' o f  forceful
perceptions, or impressions, in thinking and reasoning, but he was
sceptical about the external correspondence of ideas and maintained
the Cartesian dualism (as between subject and object). Immanuel
K an t su b se q u e n tly  in t ro d u c e d  a t r a n s c e n d e n ta l  a rg u m e n t,
em ploying the notions o f  p h e n o m e n a  (things perceived) and
n o u m e n a  (things in themselves), which held that there can only be
know ledge  o f  phenom ena (hence phenom eno logy) and tha t
synthetic  (non-analy tica l,  non-trivial) knowledge o f  phenom ena
( th e re fo re  o f  a p r io r i  truths) is necessary  - because  o f
consciousness, and not simply as a matter of habit as Hume would
argue. Thus, for Kant, the world we know is the real world; ideas
about the world constitute the world. There is a primacy o f  the
knower over the known such that objects n e c e s s a r i l y  correspond to
consciousness, not vice-versa. But, of course, we may still ask how
free the individual is in the construction of ideas - in consciousness
- and whether there are not influences of a normative character on
the es tab lishm ent o f  ideas, and hence know ledge, especially
knowledge o f  universal and necessary a priori truths. (For example,
the constraints imposed by the notion of n o u m e n a , and the denial of
*
dualism, break down somewhat in Kant's justification of his ethics).
G.W.F. Hegel constructed a systematic philosophy to give
absolute truth and knowledge which adopts an anti-dualist position
with respect to truth, but changing knowledge of it through a
d ia lectical 'becoming' o f  knowledge (which always 'was', in a
te leo log ica l sense). This position allows Hegel to accept
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contradictions as a natural, even healthy, condition and to adopt a 
contextualist view of the world - and explanations of it - which is 
reflected in his notions of the 'collective idea' or Spirit of the Time 
(Z e i t g e i s t ), the national V o lk s g e is t  and the world-historical V e l tg e i s t  
(and simply the Spirit or G e is t ) .  Thus ideas are reflections o f  the 
Spirit in logic, such that logic is  m e taphysics ;  log ic  and  
contradictions are both 'in the world'. This contextualism is clearly 
norm ative in character, though 1 use 'normative* here in the 
analytic/epistemological as opposed to ethical sense. Of course this 
contextual perspective would also apply to morality, as a reflection of 
the Spirit and an absolute which remains to be fully known through 
the becoming of knowledge and thus not yet universal or, rather, 
un iversa lly  com prehended, interim in terpreta tions  o f  it be ing  
various. This contextual view of moral absolutes provides a means o f  
coping  with theoretical problem s o f  moral rela tiv ity  w ithout 
abandoning the notion of morality itself as a universal feature o f  
human relations which can be accounted for by normative theory. 
Of course this interpretation of the Spirit may be criticised, as in 
Ricouer's view that the Spirit is a totalitarian concept as opposed to 
being properly intersubjeclive since it implies everyone sharing 
the same view or perspective rather than engaging in a discourse 
about views, although this latter would have a kind of collective (and 
norm ative) outcome nevertheless.
*
The inherent contradictions or paradoxes of reason, which
are a problem for Kant but a virtue for Hegel, are addressed in a very
different way by those who criticise systematic philosophy. Soren
Kierkegaard, a founder of existentialism, argues for the resolution o f
these paradoxes through individual c h o i c e , while Hegel employs
reason itse lf  in the context o f  collective (Spirit) being. The
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emphasis on the individual thinker, on 'subjective truth', and on the 
need for passionate choice concerning a way of life, reflects a view
of philosophical questions as being concerned with what to do 
(practice), rather than with conceptual dilemmas (theory). The
Concept, the medium of systematic philosophy, is unimportant to
Kierkegaard in as much as he argues that existence is not reducible 
to a concept but requires the application of the rule: 'cognitive 
reality' and 'ethical reality' are distinct, as they are for Kant, but the 
o n l y  reality for the individual is her own ethical reality. The
existential dialectic - paralleling but repudiating Hegel's historical 
dialectic - suggests that while life must be understood backwards  ( a s  
in Hegel), it must be l ived fo r w a r d s , and hence the 'ethical paradox'
is the need for com m itm ent under conditions  o f  ob jec tive
uncertainty. This rather strong subjectivism does not play down the
significance o f  values, but emphasises the great burden o f  choice 
and the difficulty of maintaining a subjective justification of ethical 
c h o ic e .
This portrait o f  individuals as asocial beings, mastering their
own lives and authoring their own values, places an appropriate
emphasis on the responsibility o f  individuals, but is not fully
convincing with respect to the character of human existence. It is
difficult to make sense of individual life in the absence of a social
context, however limited, even if individuals must in the end choose
for themselves. Having accepted the need for an historical
understanding of life, it is difficult to see how an individual might
progress in the absence of a social context and other artefacts o f
collective historical experience. How is one to choose values, which
concern human relationships if  anything, without an appreciation
of their meaning as given by social experience? How will the
180
normative character of values be comprehended? It is one thing to
emphasise the need for choice, but quite another to suggest original
sole authorship o f  values. The role and significance o f  ideas, 
including ideas about values, is clearly diminished when they are 
not communicated through time and space, and such communication 
is by definition an interactive or relational process. Obviously, 
K ie rk eg a a rd  does not escape  the need for language  in
communicating his own ideas, and although making the distinction 
between cognitive reality and ethical reality may ironically allow 
values to escape the normative characteristics o f  knowledge, this 
distinction is at the heart of the ’is-ought’ debate discussed Chapter 
One. Indeed the processes of systematic knowledge (science) itself 
exhibit normative characteristics which suggest that value non- 
cognitivism undermines cognition altogether. These observations do 
not, however, stand in the way of viewing the human experience as
one o f  commitment to values in and through acting rather than one 
of acting in accordance with values - a view which is the foundation 
of  Sartre’s revolutionary theory of value - but they do suggest that 
values arise in the context o f  a broader normative system rather 
than being adopted by individuals through Kierkegaard's 'leap o f  
faith'. The notion of individual authorship of values implies an 
u n l ik e ly  o r ig in a l i ty ,  g iven  tha t s u sp ic io u s ly  w id e sp re a d  
'coincidental' agreement usually indicates some sort o f  inadvertent
f
p la g ia r i s m .
In a further assault on systematic philosophy, Friedrich
Nietzsche argues that every proposition should stand alone; that
systems are merely subjective expressions in the guise of objective
truth. His epistemological nihilism (in accordance with the 'death of
God' thesis) maintains - as against all philosophies from Descartes to
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Kant - that there is no distinction between the apparent and real 
world, that there are no 'facts' but only interpretations, and that 
language determines metaphysics (not vice-versa). In his emphasis 
on self-perfection Nietzsche points to the practical value of making 
life a 'work of  art', and in turn suggests a merging of theory and 
practice such that metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics are all 
interpretations with practical consequences. On this account reason
is n e c e s s a r y  but not s u f f i c i e n t  for morality; passion is also required. 
Nietzsche argues for a balanced relationship between 'Dionysian 
frenzy' (passion) and 'Apollonian control' (reason): as reason is
already socially derived, a social morality is unnecessary, and 
passion provides for individuality. This moral nihilism leaves open
the question o f  substantiating values, and for Nietzche this is the
central problem o f  philosophy. Thus ideas may be seen, under
epistemological nihilism, to play a role in the interpretation o f  the
apparent world (the o n ly  world, for Nietzsche), while under moral
nihilism values must find substance in their relevance to our life in 
this world.
With respect to the present argument, ideas remain the
currency o f  self-referential normative systems. The notion o f  
balancing passion and reason can be seen as analogous to balancing 
se lf-consc iousness  and social consc iousness ,  or (fo r  p resen t  
purposes) nationalism and internationalism. For Nietzsche there is
y
no absolute truth to be had through reason (as Hegel argued) but
rather reason must be the slave of passion (as Hume argued): the 
master creates values where the slave is given them. However, even 
a benign view of nihilism as a destructive force making way for new
creations still leaves the creative process undirected: a problem not
resolved e ither by Nietzsche's nihilism or Hume's sceptic ism .
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A dopting H egel's  more contextual view o f  the m aster-slave
relationship might have led Nietzsche to see that the master's
c o n s c io u s n e s s  o f  h is  c r e a t iv e  a b i l i t i e s  r e q u i r e s  th e  
acknowledgement o f  the slave, and that acceptance of the given 
values is a necessary condition of their creation. So while 
N ie tz sc h e ’s c leans ing  n ih i lism  is en l ig h ten in g  it is a lso  
unsatisfying, while both Hegel, and later Husserl, are prepared to go 
fu r ther  (in the pursu it o f  p resupposition less  ph ilosophy) by 
arguing for at least s o m e  necessary truths of the non-empirical sort.
If these truths concern relationships, either in the abstract realm of 
conceptual knowledge or in human experience, then the role o f
normative theory comes to light once again at the most fundamental 
level o f  understanding.
H usserl  in troduces  phenom enology  as a rad ica l new
philosophical method, re jecting both scepticism and logical
pos itiv ism  in es tab l ish in g  a non-judgem enta l m e thodo log ica l
position. The 'natural s tandpoin t’ and judgem ents  about the
'external world' are suspended (Husserl's 'e p o c h e ') in the search for
necessary truths. On this account naturalism is unsound because it
confuses natural science with a pr iori  science, (ph ilo so p h y ) :
phenomenology allows a radical empiricism which examines the
experience o f  objects of consciousness, not of the objects themselves.
Necessary truths are truths about the s t r u c t u r e  of experience and
*
the meaning or e s s e n c e  of  consciousness, and the only source of
truth is the 'pure experience' o f  this radical empiricism. For
Husserl, all concepts (including Kant's a priori concepts) are derived
from a b s t r a c t i o n s  o f  experience. Phenomenology is necessarily
self-justifying, resting on the validity of its concepts, but this is true
of other methods: for example, where phenomenology rests on 'pure
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description’, analytic philosophy rests on linguistic meaning. So 
where cognition occurs through the c o g i t o  for Descartes (and
others), it occurs through the transcendental ego for Husserl: there
are 'ideas' rather than 'one having ideas'. Of course, all of this is 
p rob lem atic  in as much as an in tersubjective  transcenden ta l 
com m unity  (on w hich H usserl in s is ts )  con fl ic ts  w ith  the
apprehension of necessary truths through a phenom enolological 
consciousness: the transcendence does not resolve the dualism.
Husserl seeks a rationalistic  'science' of philosophy, but his
transcendental idealism is perhaps too demanding. Nevertheless, the 
influence o f  the phenomenological method on la ter philosophy
shows in the ex isten tia lis ts ' attempts to es tablish  a radical 
phenomenological ontology, in contrast to Husserl's anti-ontological 
phenomenology. Husserl himself went so far as to claim that he had 
established the only true philosophy.
What may be gleaned from Husserl’s philosophy, for the
purpose of supporting the present argument for normative theory,
are those aspects o f  the phenomenological reduction which place
id e a s  at the heart of true knowledge. Husserl argues that necessary
truths are not merely analytic, based on a causal relationship
between experience and the 'real' world, but are phenomenological
truths based on the consciousness of experience. It is difficult to
place traditional notions of fact and object in this scheme (because
of the dominant influence of positivism and empiricism), but the
emphasis on a necessary structure of experience, and an essential
structure o f  consciousness, suggests some intersubjective stability in
the apprehension o f  truths from the phenomenological standpoint.
It is the intersubjectivity of the transcendental 'community o f
consciousness' that suggests a normative quality in these structures,
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and the issue is then the necessity of the structure. If it is the case
that s o m e  structure is required for consciousness, then any given
structure may be sufficient. This does not provide much assurance 
on the matter of an absolute truth, nor for the prospects o f
discovering fundamental genetically-given principles o f  mind, but
it does allow for a conception of truth as being dependent on a 
structure o f  consciousness which itself is subject to normative 
processes, and influenced by values.
Husserl, as a mathematician, was interested not only in
knowledge of necessary truths, but in the possibility of necessary
truth - he held that a pr ior i  truths are not conventional o r
normative, but are ideal  laws,  requiring the new science o f
phenomenology for their investigation. Husserl was him self very
unsys tem a tic ,  being more concerned  with the p h i lo so p h ica l
endeavour (method) than with attaining truth, and suggested that
we must always be in doubt, always questioning, always beginning.
Perhaps it is the prospect of never overcoming doubt, o f  never
attaining the ultimate and absolute truth, that presents the best case
for adopting the perpetually penultimate stage of knowledge as the
foundation and starting point of a pervasive normative process. This
kind o f  epistemological agnosticism is not nihilistic, yet reduces
dependency on absolute knowledge. As we will see in Martin
H eidegger's  existentialism , knowledge becomes in a sense less
■*
important when the primitive relationship to the world is seen as
c o n c e r n , rather than knowing.
The problem of Being is the central issue for Heidegger, and is 
the focus of his principle work Being and Time (Sein und Zeit). He 
d iffers  from his teacher Husserl in denying an 'ego ' which
constitutes the world, but holds rather that there is only Being-in-
185
th e -w o r ld  (D a s  e i n ) .  This B eing-in -the-w orld  is on tica lly  
distinguished by its having concern with the question of Being: 
while all other existence is merely ontic, Being-in-the-world is 
ontological. Heidegger blurs the distinction between literature and 
philosophy, arguing that 'Being' requires a new grammar, its own 
conceptual scheme. While he agrees with Kierkegaard that the self 
is ethical ra ther than cognitive, and thus attacks conceptual 
analysis, his concern with both Being and the concept 'Being' is so 
intertw ined that his own ontology may amount to conceptual 
analysis, on a conventional understanding of these categories of 
thought, though Heidegger's philosophy is in fact neither of these 
or perhaps a hybrid o f  the two. Robert Solomon points to P.F. 
Strawson’s distinction (in I n d i v i d u a l s )  between prescriptive and 
descrip tive m etaphysics, suggesting that H eidegger’s philosophy 
might be understood as being prescriptive, but that this presents 
problems of evaluation: Heidegger would hold that the evaluation o f  
philosophical theory must avoid this conventional distinction and 
rest instead on the adequacy of a system of thought, or o f  a 
'language', to describe the world.12 On this account, for example, 
ontology is perverted without an understanding of what it is to exist; 
o f  the m etaphysical meaning o f  Being. H eidegger makes a
distinction between 'common sense' concerning practicalities and 
philosophy; between historicism (the cultural relativity of truth)
and historicity (living in time): ignoring the question of *Being 
enslaves philosophy to particular cultures and underm ines the 
exposure o f  prejudices which are the roots o f  common sense.
12 Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism: The Existentialists
and their Nineteenth-Centurv Backgrounds (New York: Humanities Press, 1978), p.
187. I rely heavily on Solomon's clear exposition throughout my overly brief survey of 
modem philosophy because his chosen path fits well with my objectives here.
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Metaphysics is related to ethics in the sense that the meaning and 
goals o f  Being inform evaluation and commitment. Thus the 
question o f  Being is the foundation of all disciplines (not ju s t  
philosophy), and the source of cultural tensions. It may be seen how 
this account leads to the quests for values and for truth being 
indistinguishable, and to the blurring of the fact-value distinction. 
Being-in-the-world implies being in a world of possibilities, in 
which 'things' only become conspicuous as such when they fall out
of this context of the self and world as one - otherwise 'things' are, as 
Heidegger argues, 'equipment* employed in the process o f  being 
which have existential meaning through use. For example, a wrist-
watch becomes a 'thing' when it is broken or lost, and falls out of the 
context of its value in use.
It is the normative framework which establishes meaning, 
and when the equipment in question is a social institution like the
state (or a states-system) - a normative structure in itself; a set o f  
ideas - then it too becomes a 'thing' when disconnected from social 
values, to be abandoned (or opposed, or changed) when it loses its 
value in use; when it fails to provide meaning.
One further aspect of Heidegger's philosophy which may be 
usefully employed here is his notion of ' a u t h e n t i c i t y ' , 1 3 based on the 
existential structures o f  E x i s t e n z , Faclicity, and Fallenness. Existenz 
is the recognition of choice for every individual; the conception o f  
the world and oneself as possibilities. Faclicity is finding oneself 
already in a given world, and being attuned to it. Fallenness
(fallenness from Being) is equivalent to alienation, in the sense o f  
losing oneself in society, and being restricted by communal ties
*3 This notion is criticised by Adorno in The Jargon of Authenticity.
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from recognising possibilities. Thus the 'authentic' person is one 
who discovers the self in the world, understands and projects this 
recognition, and engages in authentic discourse about this discovery 
and recognition. 'Inauthentic' persons live out an enforced refusal 
to see themselves as they really are, and thus act b lindly , 
substituting means for ends.
As we shall see later, this confusion of means and ends is a 
critical problem in foreign policy formation, and may be viewed as 
the result o f  ’inauthenticity ' on the part o f  the nation-state in 
generating policy - a failure to be concerned with self-knowledge, 
and with the global context of its existence. Once again we see how 
ideas profoundly influence not only self-knowledge, in the limited 
sense (ideas as concepts; the substance of analytic philosophy), but 
also knowledge of the world and one's place in it (ideas as the 
currency o f  normative systems, both theoretical and practical). Of 
course for Heidegger universal values are rejected as being values 
imposed, and his existentialism (Being-in-the-world) requires that 
one choose one's own mode of existence. Again, as with Kierkegaard, 
the issue o f  value authorship arises, and for Heidegger's 'authentic* 
person the role o f  normative systems must be limited to an 
interpretation of the character of value discourse, rather than the 
foundation and maintenance o f  values, while in the case o f  
Fallenness, or 'inauthenticity’, normative systems are in full swing 
as determinants of everyday Being.
The later existentialists, such as Jcan-Paul Sartre, continue to 
reject Husserl's notion of an 'epoche' or 'bracketing' of the natural 
standpoint for philosophical purposes, but continue to employ the 
phenomenological method to disclose 'Being' (Sartre’s Being and
N o th in g n e s s  is subtilled 'an essay in phenomenological ontology*).
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For Sartre, Being-in-the-world is revealed through a comprehension
o f  nothingness, which allows a freedom of consciousness from
'external' causation. Nothingness in this sense is both an object o f
experience, and the productive or renewing activity o f  nihilation.
Thus consciousness can be seen as 'nothing' (the state o f
'nothingness'): a post-reflective intentionality directed to objects,
from a non-dualist perspective in which acts of consciousness and
objects  o f  consciousness are not distinguished, nor the object
perceived and the object imagined. The French phenomenologists
carry Heidegger’s investigation of the preontological ( 'primitive ')
conditions of experience to considerable length, and maintain an
existentialist emphasis on the individual consciousness as the only
source o f  reality. Maurice Merleau-Ponty, in emphasising self-
consciousness as the essential activity o f  the mind (of Being), is
driven to say 'I am the absolute source'. (We may discern here a
refined echo of the Cartesian 'Cogito ergo sum'.) Again we are faced
with the prospect not only of eternal doubt, an epistemological and
ethical nihilism, but with potential chaos in the practical activity o f
social existence. Inauthentic or not, there is normative social
organisation. It may be that there is sufficient common experience
for individuals to authentically conclude, coincidentally, that some
values are shared. As with Kierkegaard, it is the emphasis on
individual responsibility  both for one's own existence and -
*
necessarily  - for existence in general (Being), which is the 
persuasive influence of existentialist thought. Late in life, Sartre 
confirmed in an interview that
... the idea which I never have ceased to develop is that
in the end one is always responsible for what is made of
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one. Even if one can do nothing else besides assume 
this responsib ility .14
H ere  it is u se fu l to c o n s id e r  the p o s tm o d e rn is t  
deconstruc tion is t  position on know ledge, which suggests  tha t 
knowledge is contingent or textual - layers of text on text. This view 
is generally  associated with Jacques Derrida or Jean-Franqois 
Lyotard, but has been reiterated by others such as Gyatri Spivak.1 ^ 
We may also wish to consider the related views of such thinkers as 
Roland Barthes (who suggests the distinction between the written 
and the read) or the semiology of Umberto Eco. The key to the 
deconstructionist line of thought is an immanent contradiction 
arising from a concern for knowledge (this much being shared with 
other views, obviously) which yet contends that truth can never be 
fully articu la ted , and is always contextually  dependent w hen 
articulation is attempted. This creates, as Spivak notes, a rather 
melancholy mood; a mood which philosophers such as John Searle 
(who once proposed an analytical derivation of ’ought' from ’is' via 
the institution of  p rom ising16) find uncomfortable, since some 
foundation is required. A truth referent is needed for intelligibility, 
and the deconstructionist view undermines the possibility o f  'truth'.
Deconstructionism argues that traditional theory is too easily
14 The New York Review of Books. March 26, 1970, pp. 22ff. Solomon, op. cit., 
concludes his book with this quote, suggesting that it expresses the essence of 
existentialism.
See Jacques Derrida, On Grammatologv (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1976) translated by Gyatri Spivak; Jean-Frangois Lyotard, The Post- 
Modern Condition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985); and Gyatri 
Chakravorty Spivak, In Other Worlds: Essavs in Cultural Politics (New York and 
London: Methuen, 1987).
16 John R. Searle, *How to Derive "Ought" from "Is"', Philosophical Review (Vol. 
73, 1964).
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seduced by a simple route to truth, and compounds the ill effects of 
simplification until, reaching the limits of correspondence theory it 
rebuilds through crisis. In effect, a deconstructionist view places 
the lim its o f  correspondence much c loser  by insis ting  that
correspondence itself is never fully explored, and perhaps cannot be 
(because o f  the infinite realm of the 'unsaid' textuality).
A slightly different position in the philosphy o f  science, is 
constructivism, which argues that
'the world that scientists study, in some robust sense, 
must be defined or constituted or "constructed" from 
the theore tica l tradition in which the sc ien tif ic
community in question works'.* 7
This constructivist view is reflected in Kuhn's treatment o f  scientific 
paradigms, which has had such an influence in the social sciences 
generally, and in the study of  international relations in particular.
Hence the influence of theoretical traditions and the epistemological
p r io r i ty  o f  norm s (as d iscussed earl ie r)  follows from the 
requirements of 'constructing' the world in light of tradition.
Charles Pierce described philosophy as 'a theoretical science 
o f  discovery' dealing with the ordinary facts of everyday existence.
He d iv ides  it into phenom enology, norm ative  sc ience, and
■9
metaphysics - the first cataloging the data of experience, the second
17 Richard N. Boyd, The Current Status of Scientific Realism' in J. Leplin (ed). 
Scientific Realism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 52, quoted 
in Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989), p.
39. See, for examples of constructivism, Bas C. van Fraasen, The Scientific Image 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981) and Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of 
Scientific Revolutions. 2nd Ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
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ju d g in g  and evalua ting  them, and the third a ttem pting  to 
comprehend their reality - in order of logical priority. Obviously,
phenomenology is the prior necessity of normative science, but note 
that the two are interactive once normative science is got underway 
since normative science creates new experiences and phenomena 
which must be classified. Pierce's philosophy identifies (like Hegel, 
though from a different starting point) three universal categories 
corresponding to the modes of being: possibility, actuality, and law. 
These are related to the three normative sciences of esthetics, ethics, 
and logic > these in turn relating to feeling, action, and thought
(aspects  o f  the ca teg o r ie s ) .1** For the theory and practice o f  
international relations the second normative science (ethics) most 
directly bears on the interpretation of the 'real' world (actuality) 
and on the problems of foreign policy decision-making (action).
Here, the normative characteristic is not the moralising tone so 
often associated with ethical concern, but the dynamic of acceptance 
regarding judgem ents and evaluations in the Humean sense o f  
'c o n v e n t io n s ' :
Consequently virtue is merely a quality of action or
mind that is generally approved. Like religion it can
have a natural history but the force of moral obligation
depends upon the acceptance of the propensities, the
*
wants, the motives to action that give rise to it. No 
other validity is p o s s ib le .1 9
111 V.G. Potter, Charles S. Pierce On Norms and Ideals (Worcester, MA: U.Mass 
Press, 1967), p. 8ff.
^  From a description of Hume's ethical critique in George H. Sabine (revised 
by Thomas L Thorson), A History of Political Theory. 4th ed (Hinsdale, IL: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, The Dryden Press, 1973), p. 553.
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What remains to be said for normative interpretations o f  
epistemology and social experience? To begin with, although an 
extensive normative system would seem to impose order, and like a 
religion relieve individuals of ultimate responsibility  for the ir  
world, individual responsibility is not abrogated under a normative 
system necessarily. Indeed a normative system may aid in the 
assumption and execution of such individual responsibilities, or, for 
that matter, it may be that the normative system itself (in requiring 
support) is an object of responsibility. Such normative systems are 
apprehended, interpreted or explained through normative theory.
Of course no society can maintain opportunities for authentic
individual existence if the society itself (or associated structures) is
permitted to overwhelm the beneficial aspects of social cooperation.
(Examples being cases o f  Fascist, Nazi, Communist, racist or
'personali ty  cult ' regim es d ic ta ting  political behav iour  in a
restrictive and exclusive manner). But this is either the result of a
failure to assume responsibility, or the burden to be shouldered by
those responsible (those affected - everyone, ultimately). This is not
unique to despotic societies and is also a well understood problem of
democratic political life: the system is only as good as those for whom
and by whom it operates. Furthermore, this is as true for systems of
knowledge as it is for systems of political organisation (both require
vigilant questioning), and to the extent that stability is desirealrfe in
both cases it is not surprising to find normative processes at work in
the functioning o f  such similarly cooperative ventures. Neither
should it be assumed that normative systems - open to change and
interpreta tion  - arc antithetical to the ex is ten tia lis t  positions
outlined above: normative systems are an aspect o f  the world as we
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find it (Heidegger's Faclicity), and of the historicity o f  human 
experience (Being-in-time). In as much as ideas fall under 
normative systems, whether in the epistemological literature or in 
everyday discourse, they too are an aspect of Being-in-the-world - 
and equally so for the authentic person's commitment in action and 
the inauthentic person's acceptance of 'pre-packaged' thought.
It is here we may begin to consider the nature and role o f
ideology, and its relationship to normative activity and theory.
Ideology: the form of engagement
In the aftermath of the French Revolution, with the collapse 
of the a nc ien  r e g im e , a new basis of political association was 
required to provide a source of enlightened policies and civic
virtues. To meet this need (and by happy coincidence with 
philosophical developm ents) the French m ateria lis t ph ilosopher 
Antoine Destutt de Tracy coined the term ideology to describe a new 
'science o f  ideas: an encyclopedic and authoritative form o f
k n o w l e d g e ' . 2 ® D.J. Manning writes that de Tracy 'claimed this 
science to be the fruit o f  the attacks on scholasticism  and
metaphysics led by Bacon, Locke, Helvetius and Condiallac, and he 
judged that the maturation of the discipline could not have been
more timely', and also that he 'attributed to ideology the power to 
demonstrate the relationship between experience and ideas, and the 
relationship between truth and a well-ordered human world'.2 1
2® Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghagcn, Richard Jay and Rick Wilford, 
Political Ideologies: An Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p. 24.
2 * DJ. Manning (ed.). The Form of Ideology (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1980), p. 2.
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The most influential figure to make use of the term ideology 
(as it it now understood) is Karl Marx, who included in it morality, 
religion and metaphysics, and - through an inversion of Hegel's
philosophy - suggested that 'Life is not determined by consciousness, 
but conciousness by life1.22 Drawing on the Hegelian view that 
reality and consciousness meet in thought, Feuerbach (by a revision 
o f  Hegel's views on God) pointed to the falsity of religion arising
from and with the alienation of true human potential (being at least 
partially embodied in some greater Being). Marx then pointed to the 
o r ig in  o f  th is  fa lse  co n c io u sn ess  in m a te r ia l  e x is te n c e ,
c o r re s p o n d in g  fo rm s o f  c o n c io u s n e s s  only  su b s e q u e n t ly  
manifesting themselves in religious beliefs. From here it is a small 
step to seeing material existence as the origin of political beliefs, or 
ideology. Thus de Tracy's 'knowledge' becomes knowledge with a
purpose, related to its origin, and directed to political choice and
action. For Marx, ideology is a static representation of changing
reality which belongs to the ruling (e.g., capitalist) class, and
consequently all ideologies are destined for the dustbin of history
(along with ruling classes). This docs not mean that ideologies are 
not a significant feature of political life, but only that given
instances o f  them will not survive (though, for Marx, all ideology
must eventually subside in the face of universal understanding). It 
has been argued subsequently that, for example, all theory is 'for'
something as much as 'about' something, but there is a distinction to 
be m ade  b e tw ee n  a s p i r a t io n s  to o b je c t iv e  k n o w le d g e  
(no tw ithstand ing  the a ttendan t problem s) on which to base 
decisions about action and a system of knowledge which is expressly
22 Karl Marx and Freidrich Engels, The German Ideology (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1965), p. 38.
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purposive, calling for particular a c t i o n s . ( j n Chapter Four, an 
interestingly similar distinction will be made concerning purposive 
and practical political association). For Marx, the only objective 
view is that o f  d ialectical materialism - everything else is 
ideological, or subjective. Yet here we are addressing the manner in 
which (claimed) knowledge takes on an applied manifestation in 
political life, and ideas become activated in practice. With respect to 
understanding the role of ideas in politics, it matters little whether 
they are ideologically contaminated, so long as they are recognised 
as such.
In this sense, particular ideologies may throw up political 
ideas and suggest political action - indeed, ideology may in some 
sense be necessary to political action but need not determine the 
outcome of political decisions, nor effect the grounds on which ideas 
and ideologies are judged, so long as ideologies are recognised and 
the norm ative  charac ter  of political processes is understood. 
Furthermore, ideas and ideologies arc maleable to a degree, may 
survive change, and may continue to be effective political forces.
The potential tyranny of a single ideology masquerading as objective 
knowledge is always a danger, but no more or less a danger than 
political tyranny as conventionally  understood (coercive in a 
practical sense), providing that the role of ideas in political life is
23 Robert W. Cox states that Theory is always for  someone and for  some 
purpose’, and goes on to say that There is, accordingly, no such thing as theory in 
itself, divorced from a standpoint in time and space. When any theory so represents 
itself, it is the more important to examine it as ideology, and to lay bare its concealed 
perspective’. See Robert W. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond 
International Relations Theory' (Millennium. Vol. 10, No. 2, Summer 1881, p. 128.). 
Note also development of Cox's point on the distinction between problem-solving 
theory (operating from within a perspective) and critical theory (which admits the 
possibility of changing the perspective), in Mark Hoffman, 'Critical Theory and the 
Interparadigm Debate' in Hugh C. Dyer and Leon Mangasarian (eds). The Study of 
International Relations: The State of the Art (London: Macmillan, 1989).
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not underestimated. Ideology remains a means of substantiating 
claims about the world and how to act in it.24
Ideologies share two principal charac teris t ics : an
image o f  society and a political program m e...A n 
ideo logy , then, provides a coheren t pe rsp ec t iv e  
through which to understand and act upon the social
w orld .2 ^
Again, the distinction between ideology and theory is not a 
clear one, since we may wish to push the meaning of ideology, as
Mannheim does, from particular judgements about ideas, through 
collective world-views, and finally towards a sociology of knowledge 
- just where normative theory finds its footing.2** Yet modem
discussions of ideology lend to center on political interaction, rather 
than abstractions concerning the status o f  knowledge. The
connection between these two concerns - thought and action - is
important and significant in our discussion o f  normative inquiry 
(hav ing  a bearing on judgem en ts  about the re levance  or
applicability of normative theory) but should be distinguished from 
the relationship between theory and practice, for reasons discussed 
be low .
The c lassical understanding  o f  the term ideo logy  is
24 Plamenatz suggests, in reference to his discussion of class ideology, that 
social and political theories fall into two broad divisions: the first takes the human 
condition as a given starting point, the second sees man [sic] as changing or possibly 
'progressing'. John Plamenatz, Ideology (London: Pall Mall, 1970), p. 111.
2  ^ Eccleshall, et al, Political Ideologies: An Introduction, op. cit.t pp. 7 and 8.
26 Karl Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia (1929) sparked a great debate about 
methodology and epistemology in german social science. See V. Meja and N. Stehr, 
Knowledge and Politics: The Sociology of Knowledge Dispute (London: Routledge, 
1990).
197
problematic, as Manning suggests:
... the use of the term ideology by de Tracy, Marx and 
Mannheim, in so far as it is intended to persuade us to 
accept or reject particular ideological com mitments, 
could not serve as a corner-stone in any well- 
constructed account of what is to be u n d e r s t o o d  by 
ideological commitment in political life. That to which 
we may choose to adhere cannot serve in an account of
a d h e re n c e .^  7
Equally, a modern sociological understanding o f  ideology 
(insp ired  by Marx and M annheim) is also p roblem atic  for 
emphasising the explanation of sociological origins of ideas (in 
material class interests, for example), rather than addressing the 
effect of these ideas in politics, and for not taking adherence to an 
idea or belief at face value. If beliefs require explanation, in this 
sense, the prerequisite for explaining them is the presupposition 
'that the beliefs involved have the substance and meaning which 
they appear to have’.28 T.J. Robinson argues that the justification of 
beliefs cannot be connected with testable knowledge, and that 
epistemological questions about justification arc inappropriate. The 
questions should, rather, be concerned with how beliefs arise, and 
how they are related to action. Robinson characterises ideology as 
the language of adherence. Relating ideological thinking to ideals, 
he suggests that 'an ideal, sincerely believed in, is an idea o f  how 
persons both c a n  and should  live', which indicates a political
22 Manning, The Form of Ideology, op. cit.,  p. 11.
28 L.G. Graham, 'Ideology and Sociological Understanding’ in ibid., p. 21.
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possibility and recommendation. These arguments are presented in 
the context of a general scepticism about political theory, on the 
grounds that the primary object of study (human nature) is without 
reference in political theory (it is a prior assumption), and that such 
incoherence makes theoretical investigations in politics impossible. 
Robinson further argues that the important relationship between 
theory and practice should not be construed as analogous to the 
relation o f  science to technology, as if theoretical knowledge of 
politics could provide reliable political tools.
... having rejected the implied relation of theory to
practice found in political theory, the form o f  the 
discussion will be that primarily of ethics, and perhaps
som eth ing  analogous to aesthe tics ,  and not an 
e p is te m o lo g ic a l  co n ce rn  w ith e x p la n a t io n  and  
prescrip tive theory .3 9
Of course this makes the distinction between political theory 
and ideology clearer, but the significance of ideology for normative 
theory remains because o f  the shared 'form of the discussion' 
(ethical). Furthermore, the earlier discussion of  the intimate 
re la t io n s  betw een  ep is tem ology  and e th ics  underm ines  the 
distinction with respect to normative theory, if not with respect to
conventional approaches to political theory. What Robinson finds 
troublesome in political theory is the incoherence of refering to 
'some logically independent k n o w le d g e '^  in defining our identity, 
which can then be mirrored in political arrangem ents. In
29 T.J. Robinson, 'Ideology and Theoretical Inquiry' in ibid., p. 69.
30 Ibid., p. 63.
199
normative theory that identity is located in the normative structure 
o f  social and political life, and the problematic relationship between 
theory and practice (in politics) may be usefully understood as a 
relationship between a characterisation of the (collective) human 
condition - an 'identity of man' - and institutionalised associations, 
such that there are criteria for judging political action. This is just
what political theory attempts to account for, according to Robinson. 
Indeed, such a view reflects the significance of ethics - which he 
claims is related to ideology rather than theory - and supports the 
claims made here for n o r m a t i v e  theory. However, this relationship 
between theory and practice is not static (as implied in a 
'technological' understanding), but in a process of dialectic change 
in as much as experience of political practices provides reasons for 
theorising, and theory provides reasons for choosing a practice. The 
possibility of a knowledge of politics that is somehow 'independent' 
is undermined by a normative approach indicating a politics o f  
knowledge itself. At the same time a purely ideological account of 
politics is undermined by the declaration of a purpose (other than 
understanding), and the recognition of other competing purposes.
Having examined the characteristics of ideology which make 
it a 'form of engagement', it will be useful to introduce at this stage a 
more comprehensive and subtle account of ideology which reflects 
the broader purpose of this discussion with respect to the thesis as a 
whole. It is an account offered by Sasson Sofer in the context of a 
m ore general c r it ique  o f  in te rna tional re la tions  theory  as
underestimating the importance of ideology:
There are three main components to ideology that are
the source of its centrality and importance for politics
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and international relations. First, ideology is an action- 
related system of ideas that provides a framework for 
individual and collective action and judgement. Second, 
ideology fills the dual function of shaping a conception 
of reality and interpreting reality. Third, ideology is 
normative in the sense that it refers or is oriented
towards what is politically desireable, and at times 
describes the program or stages leading to ultimate 
goals.  ^  1
Thus, ideology is particularly important in understanding the 
motivations and dispositions of policy-makers, the nature o f  the 
political milieu in which policy choices are formed, and the 
conception of the world to which they are directed. Nevertheless,
this does not provide, and docs not aspire to, a comprehensive theory
o f  international relations.
Ideology, as a form of engagement in politics, is itself unable 
to provide an objective account of political life - though it should be 
recognised that the very apprehension o f  political life may be 
conditioned by it. While we need reasons to act, which may in turn
require individual commitments founded on ideology, these can 
never be disconnected from the political world functioning beyond 
the boundaries of any particular belief system (of course, this is
par ticu la r ly  true of in ternational rela tions). As with the
existentialist position described earlier, where the need to take 
responsibility  is em phasised, so here the need to engage is
emphasised - but it is an engagement with a larger process and
31 Sasson Sofer, 'International Relations and the Invisibility of Ideology', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 3, Winter 1987), p. 491.
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system, and one which is ultimately of collective (intersubjective) 
concern however much responsibility individuals may choose to 
ta k e .
Normative theory, as a form of engagement in political 
understanding, provides a background for purposive engagement in
political life; a means of coping with the rise and fall of particular
practices, and a framework for comprehending the nature o f  the 
political processes by which these practices come to be known, 
accepted, and no doubt inevitably overthrown. Thus, in relation to 
ideology, normative theory may be viewed as a method of relating 
epistemology and the language of commitment - knowledge and 
action. As Jameson writes, that
"ideology" in the narrower sense is a mass o f  opinions, 
concepts, or pseudoconcepts, "worldviews," "values," 
and the like, is commonly accepted; that these vaguely 
specified conceptual entities also always have a range 
of narrative embodiments, that is, indeed, that they are
all in one way or another buried narratives, may be 
less widely understood and may also open up a much 
wider range of exploration than the now well-worn 
conceptual dimension of the ideology concept. Yet it 
was not to replace the cognitive by the narrative that 
my proposal was made but rather to coordinate both by 
way of a definition that insisted on their necessary 
alternation: Ideology is then whatever in its very
structure is susceptible of taking on a cognitive and a
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narrat ive form al ternately.32
C onc lu s io n s
What may be said in conclusion is that there is a distinction to be 
made between normative theory (essentially rational) and ideology 
(essentially committed), but it is a subtle one, conditioned by the 
elusiveness of the fundamental object of study, and by the political 
character of knowledge itself. Particular world-views - particular 
sets of ideas - cannot be discounted in the attempt to understand 
political life whether or not they are 'properly justified' theoretical 
views or ’mere' ideologies. Thus while ideology is necessarily o f  
concern to normative theory, as a phenomena to be accounted for, 
normative theory is not to be confused with ideology any more than 
with moralism, if by these is meant some static and purposive 
o r ie n ta t io n .
The potential source of confusion lies in the approach and 
methodology of normative theory which, being sensitive to the 
importance of norms in both politics and knowledge, and being 
disposed in some cases to prescriptive exposition, may be mistaken 
for an overt form of advocacy somehow disconnected from the real 
or objective world (the same sort of perjorative description that is 
often applied to ideology).33
On the contrary, a normative perspective assumes that norms
3^ Frederick Jameson, from the Forward to Algirdas Julien Greimas, On 
Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiology (London: Francis Pinter, 1987), pp. xiii-xiv.
33 See inter alia, Sasson Sofer, 'International Relations and the Invisibility of 
Ideology', op. cit..
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arc an in trinsic  feature of both the 'real ' world and our
understanding of it, and consequently that ideas (as both an object of 
study and an aspect of subjective viewpoints) and ideology (as a basis 
o f  political action) are worthy of  our attention. Ideas, and their 
corresponding values, lie within our understanding and are thus 
also part of the world; of what is to be understood.
The point here is that normative theory cannot provide an 
absolute point of reference to underpin commitment or belief, and
its relation to ideas and ideology is at 'arm's length’. Normative 
theory can offer a sociology of ideas and an explanation o f
ideological commitment as these bear on the study of international
relations, but the limits of normative theory are the limits o f  
p r e s u p p o s i t i o n l e s s  p h i l o s o p h y  and  a n t i - f o u n d a t i o n a l i s t ,  
cons truc tiv is t  epistem ology. Normative theory is not 'mere 
ideology’, but a tool of systematic inquiry necessarily functioning 
within these limits.
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C h a p t e r  F ive
M o ra l  L a n g u a g e  an d  N o rm a tiv e  C o n c e p ts :
F rom  E th ics  to E pis tem ology  via D iscourse
With the limits o f  normative theory in view, it is nevertheless 
possible to show that international politics are rife with normative 
features that can be systematically revealed and examined by the 
application of normative theory. These normative features appear at
all levels o f  international life, but most importantly, they can be 
identified in the cornerstones o f  social interaction and systematic
knowledge, and in the very means of communication about both.
This chapter is concerned to locale the function or role of 
language in international politics, and subsequently to show the
influence of moral language on the development of normative
concepts. The importance of language in political life provides 
grounds for arguing that these normative concepts are an intrinsic 
part o f  our understanding of politics, such that what is often judged 
to be purely ethical - and consequently uninteresting to the study of 
the 'real world' of international politics - should be understood in 
relation to epistemologies that provide the foundation of our claims 
to political knowledge. As Kratochwil says,
we have to understand how the social world is
intrinsically linked to language and how language,
because it is a rule-governed activity, can provide us
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with a point of departure for our inquiry into the 
functions of norms in social life.1
Among the functions of norms is to provide a stable point o f  
reference for meaning in language, for principals in ethics, and for 
fundamental assumptions in epistemology.
There are a few preliminary considerations which require 
attention. First, in the following discussion o f  moral language and 
norm ative concepts a d is tinction is m aintained between m oral 
language  p roper,  as it will be d iscussed  here , and the  
m isappropriation  o f  moral language in ordinary d iscourse and 
p o l i t i c s . 2 Similarly, a distinction is maintained as between 
normative concepts proper and the misapplication (or invention) o f  
normative concepts. Of course, in both cases the latter exception is 
dependent on the former rule, in the way that the success o f  a lie 
depends on the convention o f  truth-telling. The distinction that is 
made here is consequently a difficult one to maintain, since the 
'authentic' and 'inauthentic' versions of discourse share commonly 
recognised features, and yet the distinction is important since we are 
concerned to discover which features arc significant for theoretical 
purposes as opposed to those which are merely convenient for 
practical purposes.
Secondly, wc will wish to distinguish between language and
*
discourse, especially when trying to understand the role o f  language 
in politics. This distinction is important to the overall argument, and
1 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions: On the conditions of 
practical and legal reasoning in international relations and domestic affairs 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 6.
2 This can be understood in terms of right and wrong rhetoric, as elucidated in 
Plato's dialogues on the subject: the Gorgias and the Phaedrus.
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is the subject o f  a separate section below, since the normative
consequences of language arc to be understood in terms of social or 
political meaning. A related difficulty arises in distinguishing 
moral language from language in general, since there may be 
nothing to distinguish the two in terms o f  linguistic performance, 
a lthough there  will be charac teris t ics  which ind ica te  m oral 
s i g n i f i c a n c e . 3 The distinction concerning authenticity is not
dissimilar to that made between ideas and ideology, for example, in 
the sense that the latter is a practical and purposive application o f  
the former (this dependency relationship may be reciprocal, but for 
clarity's sake this possibility will be left alone for the present). 
While both 'authentic' and 'inauthentic' versions of discourse are 
a s p e c t s  o f  e x p e r ie n c e ,  u n d e r s ta n d in g  the m e a n in g  o f
'inauthentic ity ' requires an understanding of what it is to be
'a u th e n tic ' .4 Trying to make the distinction may in itself amount to a 
simplistic assumption (that it is possible to have stable authenticity), 
but we would be hard pressed to do without it, as we would to do 
without morality (see Hare's remark below), and so the following 
discussion will engage with issues that follow from observations 
about epistemological foundations in the preceding chapter.^
The Communication of Ideas
3 See G.J. Wamock's argument in 'Ethics and Language', in his Morality and 
Language (Totowa, NJ: Barnes and Noble, 1983), pp. 147-58.
4 We may be content to accept Heidegger’s or Adorno’s definition of 
'authentic', if a definition is required at this stage in the discussion. Oakeshott also 
offers a definition in the section on law and morality below.
3 See, for example, Marvin Minsky's discussion of ‘genuine’ thoughts, and 
beliefs (the latter being conditional). He suggests that making such distinctions is 
vital to our moral and legal schemes, but they seem less absolute when beliefs reveal 
ambiguities under closer inspection. Marvin Minsky, The Society of Mind (London: 
Picador, 1988), p. 302.
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The play o f  ideas in the normative activity o f  es tab lish ing  
epistemological foundations entails further problems of judgement. 
These latter are not simply problems concerning the selection o f  
criteria for assessment, but more fundamental problems concerning 
the description and communication of such criteria. This chapter 
will investigate the nature of these descriptive and communicative 
activities, the logical requirements of form and content which
attend them, and the necessity o f  normative structures which 
underlie them. That is to say, ethical and epistemological structures
exhibit a similarity of form, and appropriate content for each is 
conditioned by the structural form in the way that gram m ar
influences the content of linguistic communication. Because o f  the 
ubiquity o f  language on the surface of international relations (in 
both theory and practice), language provides an avenue of approach 
to the deeper issues of ethics and epistemology. furthermore, since 
form and content are in this respect related to a world-view, the 
outcome of this discussion will be a perspective on the role that 
normative concepts play in the formation of world-views and the 
theories which support them.
At one level, morality requires a particular use of language in 
order to be effective. At another level, normative activity in general 
- including language itse lf  - requires the com m unica tion  o f
i
underlying agreement on principles: language requires 'morality' , 
or some such normative structure. As R.M. Hare has said,
If we tried to do [without morality], we should have to 
reinvent it under another name. The same holds for
moral language; for it would be hard to practice
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m orality  w ithout some way o f  express ing  m oral 
o p in io n s '.^
Anthony Holiday claims that
ju s t  as the ex istence o f  certain minimal natura l
regu la r i t ie s  is an ex ternal p re requ is i te  for the  
possibility o f  human language, so the existence o f  
certain moral regularities is an internal precondition 
for the realisation o f  that possibility.
He continues his argument for normative necessity, pointing to an
overlap  betw een m oral,  sem antic , and h is to r ica l  
necessity , enabling us to identify the 'ought' o f
morality with the 'is' of the publicly accessible realms
o f linguistic coherence and historical change.?
and draws support for his case from the works of Wittgenstein and 
Marx. Once again the 'is-ought' debate which is so central to moral 
philosophy comes to bear, and it is worth examining some aspects of 
the debate once again (but without entering into the debate proper) 
in order to show the significance o f  moral language, and o f
language in general, in theories o f  international relations. These 
theories inevitably take up, and produce, normative concepts.
It is worth considering what it is about language that makes it
^ R.M. Hare, 'Why Moral Language?’ in Philip Pettit, Richard Sylvan and Jean 
Norman (eds). Metaphysics and Morality (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), p. 86.
7 Anthony Holiday, Moral Powers: Normative Nececessitv in Language and 
History (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. xi, xii.
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such an important feature of political life, even if we are already 
content that it has importance in human affairs generally (a 
common sense appreciation of the ubiquity of language). An 
immediate response is this: if  language is important in human 
affairs, it must be important in politics, since politics is the medium 
by which order o f  some sort is brought to human affairs. However, 
this observation does not bring much clarity to the phenomenon o f  
language beyond what most people already understand  from 
everyday experience. Indeed, it is just because language is so 
commonplace that it is necessary to consider its uses and influence.
Language and Discourse
Here we would do well to once again bear in mind the distinction, 
such as it is, between language and discourse. For the moment we 
may adopt the view that language has formal structures while 
discourse has a social content (though o f  course, this begs some 
questions about language). It is clarifying to quote Michael Shapiro 
on this point:
T ex tua lis t  or pos ts truc tu ra l is t  modes o f  ana lysis  
emphasize 'discourse' rather than language because the
t
concept o f  discourse implies a concern with the 
meaning and value producing practices in language 
r a th e r  than  s im p ly  the  re la t io n s h ip  b e tw e e n  
utterances and their referents.8
8 Michael J. Shapiro, 'Introduction II (or I): Textualizing Global Politics', 
unpublished paper presented to the IGCC/ADIU Summer School, University of Sussex,
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Here we wish to pursue comparisons with ethics and epistemology 
respecting governing principles, so it is perhaps best to remain 
(no tiona lly )  within the realm o f  language for the p resen t.  
S u bsequen t developm ents  in the d iscuss ion  w hich in d ica te  
normative features in language will, of course, bring us closer to the 
perspective o f  discourse analysis: If one peals back the layers o f
political life, revealing the levels o f  normative interaction, one will 
see that discourse, and then language, are among them.
At the most fundamental level, language may reflect those yet 
to be discovered principles o f  mind which dictate the logic and 
ca tego ries  o f  human percep tions  and experience. A less  
red u c t io n is t ,  and more readily  com prehended co ncep tion  o f  
language would be: that medium of com m unication (not yet
considering content) into which the young are indoctrinated and in 
which the mature participate. Because there arc variations in the 
use of language - and, indeed, different languages - it is clear that 
while language is a universal phenomenon, the use  of language is a 
participatory activity intimately related to particular societies and 
culture. This latter feature o f  language need not effect the general 
application o f  the present argument, however, any more than the 
investigation o f  normative structures is hindered by variations in
1988, p. 6. This paper is reproduced as Chapter Two in James Der Deriali and Michael 
J. Shapiro (eds), Intemationai/Intertextual Relations: Post-modern Readings in World 
Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), where the quote appears on p. 14. 
See also Shapiro's Language and Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1984) 
and Reading the Post-modern Polity: Political Theory as Textual Practice 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992). The poststructuralist or 
postmodernist context is provided by works such as Jacques Derrida, Speech and 
Phenomena (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1973), Michel Foucault, The 
Archeology of Knowledge (New York: Pantheon, 1972) and Jean-Francois Lyotard, The 
Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press, 1984).
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t h e s e . 9 It is the universal features of language, of any human 
language, which interest us here. This is obviously true in respect 
o f  our interest in discovering generalisations about language, but 
also true about the normative features of political life that may be 
revealed by an examination of the use of language in politics - what 
grammar is to language, tradition is to international relations (both 
in practice a n d  in theory). For exam ple, Noam Chomsky 
d is t in g u ish e s  be tw een  'func tiona l  ex p lan a t io n s ' and 'fo rm al 
explanations' (concerning grammar) of the properties o f  language, 
suggesting that the latter offer principles which being
not e ssen tia l  or even natural properties  o f  any 
imaginable language... provide a revealing mirror o f  
mind (if correct). Such principles, we may speculate, 
are a p r io r i  for the species - they provide the
framework for the interpretation of experience and the 
construction o f  specific forms of knowledge on the
basis o f  experience.1 ®
Thus Chomsky is lead to a humanistic conception of man by the
observation that even such simple features of human activity as the
ordinary use o f  language seem to be founded on 'unknowable'
principles - principles o f  mind, in this case - not unlike the
*
unobtainable absolutes discussed in the previous chapter. Chomsky 
carries his argument so far as to say that:
9 Of necessity this work is in the English language, hence a part of Anglo- 
Saxon, Judeo-Christian, Western culture. In acknowledging the inevitable and often 
hidden constraints this must impose, it is hoped that extrapolation of the arguments 
beyond this culture will not be confounded by cultural diversity.
10 Noam Chomsky, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (London: 
Fontana/Collins, 1972), pp. 41-2.
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The principles of mind provide the scope and limits o f  
human creativity. Without such principles, scientific 
u n d e rs tan d in g  and crea tive  acts would no t be 
p o s s ib le .1 1
The point o f  m aking a com parison between the underly ing  
principles o f  language and the absolutes of morality and knowledge 
for this discussion is that the close relationship between ethics and 
epistem ology is necessarily  mediated by language, s ince our 
conceptions of morality and knowledge are not aspects o f  sensory 
experience that might be represented by primitive responses o r
signals but are products of thought which require the use of word-
concepts. All three - morality, knowledge and language - are 
characterised by a tension between the functional demands o f  the 
public  domain (w here changing norm ative features are m ost 
obvious) and the in trinsic  formal requirement o f  an ultim ate 
referent (where determinism and dogma lie in wait).
The principles to which Chomsky refers are interesting to a
d iscuss ion  o f  n o rm ative  theory particu la rly  s ince  norm ative
activities are 'rule-governed' (as discussed in Chapter One), and
principles are rules p a r  excellence.  To apply the game analogy,
principles - like rules - both describe and prescribe (saying what
*
the game is, and saying how to play it). Setting aside the problem of 
discovering fundamental principles and focussing instead on the 
co m m o n -o r-g a rd en  e f fo r ts  o f  in d iv id u a ls  and so c ie t ie s  to  
approximate such principles in their life activity, it becomes clearer
11 Ibid. ,  p. 45.
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that description approaches prescription as the certainty o f  ultimate
foundations recedes and apprehensions of reality become a matter o f  
’debate’, however subtle.
In developing a new conception of human psychology in his
book The Society of Mind. Marvin Minsky provides a number o f  
clearly stated insights in both knowledge and language:
Naturally, we'd prefer to think of knowledge as more 
positive and less provisional or relative. But little good
has ever come from trying to link what we believe to
our ideals about absolute truths. We always yearn for 
certainty, but the only thing beyond dispute is that
there's always room for doubt. And doubt is not an
enemy that sets constraints on what we know; the real 
danger to mental growth is perfect faith, doubt's  
a n t id o te .1 2
Minsky's thesis is that the human mind consists o f  many small
processes ('agents') which, interacting according to the scheme he
calls 'society of mind’, lead to true intelligence. The import o f  this
thesis  is that 'the power o f  intelligence stems from our vast 
d iv e r s i ty ,  n o t  from  any s in g le ,  p e r fe c t  p r i n c i p l e ’. 1 3
R esourcefu lness  and versatility  arise from in teractions  in the
•9
'society of mind' processes.
With respect to language, and in contrast to Chomsky, Minsky
12 Minsky, op. cil., p. 301.
^  Ibid., p. 308. It is templing to turn this notion on its head, to suggest by
analogy that there is a 'mind of society' (a collective world-view, or 'world of thought' 
as Minsky says) and to raise the possibility of changing society in much the same way 
that we change our mind - not all at once, but on reflection - as is our prerogative.
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suggests that we can scarcely even speculate about underlying
processes and early language-learning steps since we know so little
and have no coherent theories. While both authors alude to some
und iscern ib le  p rior entity (w hether 'p rinciples ' or 'underly ing  
processes ')  they differ on the significance of gram m ar (as a 
phenomenon), Chomsky suggesting that the formal explanations o f  
grammar reflect principles of mind, and Minsky arguing that there
are so many similar language-like processes in the mind that the
acquisition o f  speech is not surprising. Of course, Minsky's 
argument may fall into Chomsky's 'functional explanation' category
when he says, for example, that 'in the course of learning language
we accumulate various processes and tactics that enable us to 
partially reproduce our own mental operations in other speakers'.14
What is not surprising is that neither author is prepared to
push his argument as far as identifying a priori  principles, but 
rather they are content to suggest the presence o f  such principles 
for theoretical purposes - perhaps as far as anyone would wish to go. 
To fall short of such principles, however, is to remain in the realm 
o f  normative discourse, and it is here that language describes and 
prescribes, caught up in the very processes which it mediates.
Ethics and Epistemology
In this chapter we are interested to see how criteria o f  judgement 
are apprehended, and then communicated in such a way that a 
relatively rigid normative structure is built up (in the manner o f
14 Ibid.,  p. 271.
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morality) such that reference to it could carry some of the weight o f  
principles - even if going so far as to establish or discover absolute 
principles seems impractical. As Minsky says, '...in mental realms, 
we make up countless artificial schemes to force things to seem 
o r d e r l y ' . 1^ It is not surprising that when such schemes are widely
accepted, forming the basis both of our social world and our 
percep tions  o f  the physical world, that their  artif ic ia l and 
contingent origins should be forgotten:
When growing up in such a world, it all seems right 
and natural and only scholars and historians recall the 
mass of precedents and failed experiments it took to 
make it all work so well.1 ^
Minsky points to the great complexity of 'natural' worlds, which is 
only overcome where we impose rules of our own making. This is 
certainly as true of the social world as it is of the physical world, and 
our theories o f  both are impositions of self-made rules, however well 
they may represent 'reality '.1 ^ As such, theories not only describe 
the world, but in doing so prescribe how the world should be 
understood, and ultimately, how we should act in order to correspond
15 Ibid., p. 65.
16 Ibid.
For an enlightening discussion of reality, and how this troublesome notion 
is made and remade in the very communication of it, see the delightful book by Paul 
Watzlawick, How Real is Real? Communication. Disinformation. Confusion (New York: 
Random House, 1976) or Edgar Roskis’ translation of it, La r£alit6 de la rlalitd: 
Confusion, disinformation, communication (Paris: Editions de Seuil, 1978). 
Watzlawick prefers metaphoric and illustrative (and entertaining) examples, but for 
those who prefer the use of examples as proof he suggests Peter L. Berger and Thomas 
Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality (New York: Doubleday, 1966). For a 
relevant work on international relations, see Nicholas G. Onuf, World of Our Making: 
Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations (Columbia, SC: University 
of South Carolina Press, 1989) which views language as social performance.
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best with the accepted truths about our world - that is, how to behave 
r a t io n a l ly .
We are concerned to make choices on rational grounds, in
order to be successful in achieving the ends to which our choices
are directed; to make the means of their achievement accord with
the rationally structured world in which they are to be achieved. In
ethical matters we are concerned to make the 'right choices', on
rational grounds of course, but not only on rational grounds (such as
pure self-interest, for example) since the distinguishing feature o f
moral choice is some reference to moral grounds, or principles.
Thus G.J. W arnock argues that the analysis o f  l ingu is tic
performances, even those with moral content, is an exercise in the
philosophy o f  language and 'has nothing in particular to contribute
to moral ph ilo so p h y '.18 The concern of moral philosophy is to
enquire about what content makes a linguistic act (or any other act)
a distinctly moral act rather than, say, a practical act. This is the
sense in which the distinction at the beginning o f  the chapter is
made between moral language proper and moral language which is
significant only for its expedient practical effect. The point made
m ore im m ediately  above concern ing  the common fea tu re  o f
reference to principles (in morality, knowledge and language) is
that language and knowledge are no different from morality in their
need for stable references, nor are their points o f  reference any
*
more secure. Furthermore, it is only by removing the more 
contentious aspects of knowledge and language to the realm o f 
morality that we are able to maintain the illusion o f  the fundamental 
soundness of the former pair in contrast to the essentially elusive
18 Warnock, op. cit.% p. 157.
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grounding of the latter. It is this relegation of overtly normative 
aspects of human (social) experience to the category of morality that 
leads to the marginalisation and relative devaluation of morality, 
which now qualifies as a case of Foucault's ’subjugated knowledge',19 
and perm its  an evasion of value considerations in pursu ing  
otherwise practical affairs, as though values were never a part o f  
practical life, or of systematic knowledge:
The loss of memory is a transcendental condition for
science. All objectification is a forgetting.2 ®
Here Adorno is concerned that the great progress brought by the 
Enlightenment is at risk when we lose sight o f  our aspirations and 
fail to live up to the values which we struggled to establish.
It is the assumption of knowledge - that is, that we can have
certain knowledge - which leads us away from value considerations,
when in fact it is the adoption of values that provided the foundation
for knowledge (such as it is) in the first place. Hence a degree of
scep tic ism  b rings  an aw areness  o f  the value co n ten t  o f
epistemological arguments. The problems of first principles are
similar in both ethics and epistemology; so much so, indeed, that it
has beeen argued that epistemology amounts to a special branch of
e t h ic s .21 At the very least, there are close parallels in the kinds of
*
justifications sought for both types of principles - these not being
19 Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 
(New York: Pantheon, 1980), p. 82.
2® Theodor Adorno, 'Le prix du Progrfcs’ in The Dialectic of Enlightenment 
(London: Verso, 1979), p. 230.
21 For example, by R.M. Chisholm, taking a noncognitivist position. See 
Richard Brandt, 'Epistemology and Ethics, Parallel Between’ in the Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy..
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self-justifying. For example, three main views on the meaning and
verification of principles apply equally well to both ethics and
ep is tem o logy :
N a t u r a l i s m  holds that ethical and epistemic terms are 
meaningful, that statements employing them are true 
or false, and that these terms can be explained by 
empirical and logical concepts.
N o n n a t u r a l i s m  holds that while the terms are 
meaningful, and the statements true or false, they can 
not be confirmed empirically. Hence knowledge o f  
them is synthetic a priori  knowledge.
N o n c o g n i t i v i s m  holds that such terms and statements 
are not true or false, and can not be empirically 
confirmed. They nevertheless have a function in 
language and perhaps and inde fin ite  desc r ip t ive  
m e a n in g .
Of course, confusion about the 'truth' of ethical and epistemological
statements does not prevent them from being widely employed in
social activ it ies  ( including science, and natura lly  in ternational
relations as well). The question remains, however, o f  how they are
and should be employed - for what purpose, and to what end. The
assumption, or rather illusion o f  certain knowledge simply buries
these issues. Certainly, social existence requires an answer to
questions about truth, whether in ethics or epistemology, and not
asking a question is no substitute for answering it, but where a
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question is unanswerable there is great temptation to do just this.
Here lies the heart o f  the matter: where the question is
unanswerable, or unaskable, an answer must be assumed. The issue 
is how deeply the assumption is (or should be) buried in culture, and 
what the consequences are o f  exhuming it for reexamination or 
r e p la c e m e n t .
In as much as the principles of ethics and epistemology are 
maintained and transmitted in language, language may be seen as 
the soil in which these principles are buried. Thus Umberto Eco 
writes that
we must not be amazed then to hear people say that the 
given language is power because it compels me to use 
a lready  fo rm ula ted  s te reo ty p es ,  in c lu d in g  w ords
themselves, and that it is structured so fatally that, 
slaves inside it, we cannot free ourselves outside it, 
because outside the given language there is n o t h i n g . 2  2
To the question of how the constraints of language can be
escaped, Eco answers: 'By cheating. You can cheat with the given
language. This dishonest and healthy and liberating trick is called
l i t e r a t u r e ' . 23 Indeed it may be only through literature, and other
cultural activity, that intellectual liberation can be achieved - that
•*
is, from within culture, but at its margin. But if literature allows an 
'internal' escape from the problems of language, how are their close 
relatives, the problems of ethics and epistemology, to be resolved in
22 Umberto Eco, 'Language, Power, Force’ in Travels in Hvperrealitv: Essavs 
(London: Picador, 1987), p. 241. In this essay Eco is addressing the views of Barthes 
and, indirectly, Foucault.
23 ibid.
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th inking about international relations where the questions are 
compounded by a multiplicity of cultures? Even when it is 
liberating to recognise what Foucault calls a 'regime of truth', which 
may be challenged, the sense of liberation is tempered by the 
prospect of entering into another such regime;
...the mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statement, the means by
w hich each is sanc tioned ; the tech n iq u es  and 
procedures accorded value in the acquisition o f  t r u t h ^ 4
If  we view theory as the language of scholarship, it is easy to see 
how a given theory is power, and that in as much as theory is 
necessary (as language is), we can only choose which theory will
exercise its authority over our thought. Being unable to escape 
theory in general we can choose only to exchange one set o f
constrain ts  for another in adopting a particular theory. The 
questions about truth in ethics and epistemology serve to alert us to
the nature o f  these constraints, which allow considered and self- 
conscious selection, but carry with them always the risk o f  
undermining our faith in theory generally. Here it must be noted 
that the illusion o f  certain knowledge has another aspect: the
illusion  that certain knowledge is necessary for the general
• f
possib ili ty  o f  know ledge. The greatest libera tion  from the
constraints o f  a given theory of morality or knowledge is the 
recognition that in all that has gone before certainty was not
requisite, and that the illusion of it was only a device to secure what
24 Foucault, Power/Knowledge, op. cit., p. 131.
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can not be secured.
With the constraints of this illusion removed, the foundations 
o f  theory remain indefinite but may still be described systematically.
Such systematic description can be achieved by em ploying a
coherence theory of truth, by which experiences and judgem ents 
are true to the extent that they cohere with one another, forming a 
coherent system. This theory of truth was preferred by Post- 
Kantian idealists (Fichte, Hegel, Bradley) but it need not be entirely
unsympathetic to the motives of a correspondence theory of  truth as 
accepted by the British em piricists  and early V ienna C ircle
positivists (Schlick, cl al.), since coherence itself may be conditioned 
by what Heidegger refers to as the facticity of being-in-the-world.26 
That is to say, it would be difficult to accept a coherence theory of 
truth where there is contradiction of facts, but then correspondence 
to fact depends on what the facts are taken to be, and this may
already be determined by coherence. As Foucault says, 'the world is
not the accomplice of our knowledge'.26 With this view in mind, we 
may proceed to examine the means of justifying a theory without
capitulating to the power of a theory once justified.
When the close relationship between ethics and epistemology 
is understood in terms of  comprehensive normative theory, the 
n e c e ss i ty  o f  in c o rp o ra t in g  ( ra th e r  than e x c lu d in g )  v a lu e
considerations can be seen as blurring the demarcation between 
science and speculative metaphysics intended by Popper’s theory o f
26 Heidegger also employs a coherence theory of truth: facticity requires being 
'tuned in' to the world around one, and is the counterpart of angst or dread _ the fear 
of nothingness. See Robert C. Solomon, From Rationalism to Existentialism: The 
Existentialists and their Nineteenth-Centurv Backgrounds (New York: Humanities
Press, 1978), pp. 213-4 and p. 236.
26 Michel Foucault, 'The Order of Discourse’, in Michael J. Shapiro (ed), 
Language and Politics, op. cit., p. 127.
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falsi fi abi 1 i ty . This la tter  theory holds that since sc ientific  
generalisations are not, by their nature, verifiable, falsifiability is 
the only means of constraining the conditions of truth. Since 
m etaphysica l propositions are neither verifiable nor fa ls ifiable  
(though still significant as the origin of what is today science), they 
may be imposed, while propositions of science proper win ground 
'through argument, demonstration and discussion'.27 The issue here 
is whether argument and discussion leading to agreement on a 
scientific proposition is any less of an imposition than positing a 
metaphysical proposition. That is, having shed the constraining 
illusion o f  certain knowledge we are still vulnerable to the 
imposition o f  metaphysical knowledge by convention; by normative 
agreement on justification. Yet the weight of normative convention 
concerning appropriate knowledge seems to be different only in 
degree from the more restrictive but nevertheless conventionalist 
conditions of normal science.
Understanding the general possibility of knowledge from a 
normative perspective shows that value considerations are not to be 
relegated solely to ethics, but belong at the heart of epistemology too. 
(The debate concerning value-free social science seems to have gone 
quiet in the post-behavioural period)28 . In attempting to establish
27 D.E. Weston, Realism. Language and Social Theories: Studies in the Relation 
of the Epistemology of Science and Politics (PhD thesis, University of Lund, Sweden, 
1978), pp. 60-1.
28 For useful discussions of this issue see Sheldon Wolin, Tolitical Theory as 
a Vocation', American Political Science Review (December, 1966), Sheldon Wolin, 
'Paradigms and Political Theories' in Preston King and B.C. Parckh (ed), Politics and 
Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), and the broader surveys 
of Richard J. Bernstein, The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1976), who in sympathy with Sheldon Wolin says, 'the very reality with 
which we are concerned in the human sciences is itself value-constituted, not an 
indifferent value-neutral brute reality.’ (p. 104), and David M. Ricci, The Tragedy of 
Political Science: Politics. Scholarship, and Democracy (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 1984.
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knowledge of international relations, reference to 'objective data' is 
to be viewed with suspicion, especially where these data are treated 
as objects independent of a political context. Greimas points to the 
nature of the Epistemic Act (the transformation from unknowing to 
know ing) as involving In terpre ta tion  (an in terpretive  'do ing ')  
which in turn requires Recognition (of truth) and Identification, 
using the knowing/believing universe of the judging subject, and 
no t some referential ' r e a l i t y ' . The significance of such an 
approach to political understanding is the necessity of considering
the normative character of human relations, rather than seeking 
references in an objective world in which humans (and their  
politics) are mere epiphenomena. In particular, language is the
medium through which human relations can be seen as qualifiers of 
em pirical reality:
Georges Dumzil helpfully brought to our attention the 
fact that formerly the Latin c r e d e r e  at the same time 
covered the now separated domains of signification o f  
belief and confidence. This means that an established 
and maintained trust between persons founded a trust 
in their speech about things and, finally, in things 
th e m se lv e s .
This unseemly turning back to ancient sources 
teaches us at least one thing: If we want to found our 
certitudes, then before seeking an adequation between 
w ords  and th ings  we shou ld  ex am in e  open
29 Algirdas Julien Greimas, On Meaning: Selected Writings in Semiology 
(London: Francis Pinter, 1987), p. 168.
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communication between human beings .3 0
Norms in Realism
Those theories of international relations which attempt to emulate 
the natural sciences by adopting the epistemology of  'realism ', 
empiricism and positivism (naive versions of the latter thought to be 
long dead in philosophy) in the hope of more secure claims to truth 
are simply adopting the well-recognised cpistemological troubles o f  
these positions while at the same time moving away from the 
essentially political human experience they intend to address. The 
product of such theory is not only unconvincing on its own grounds 
- though perhaps no worse than other theory in this respect - but 
also fails to acknowledge, and often sytematically excludes the value 
considerations that attend the normative process by which we are 
convinced at all. That such realist theories are sometimes successful 
in predicting the behaviour o f  decision-makers who share the 
theory is simply an example of the normative character of their 
epistemology, but docs nothing to suggest that the theory has any 
self-consciousness of this characteristic, nor that it docs anything to 
address the fundamental issues of global politics beyond the 
superficial 'management' of problems; problems, it should be said, 
that are often of its own making. As Smith says of realist theory.
International institutions, networks and norm s are
considered significant theoretically only to the extent
30 l b id . t p. 166.
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that they structure or affect the competition for power, 
for the p reva iling  re la tions  o f  pow er be tw een  
sovere ign  n a t io n -s ta te s  u lt im a te ly  de te rm ine  the  
character of these institutions and norm s.31
To the extent that this latter kind of theory enters into our language, 
and into theoretical debates, it tends to subvert a self-consciousness 
of normative activity in ethics (and not just morality), epistemology 
and indeed language itself such that value considerations are not 
addressed. This expression of the desire for security in knowledge is
understandable in terms o f  human frailty, but the illusion is 
maintained at some cost, and perhaps at our peril; in a world o f  
nuclear weapons we cannot afford to be self-assured. We might still
wish to be secure in knowledge, having abandoned conventional
approaches  to in terna tional re la tions , but through a m ore 
enlightened view of knowledge and politics which is implicitly self-
critical. As Kratochwil argues,
our conventional understanding of social action and o f
the norms governing them is defective because o f  a
fundam ental m isunderstand ing  o f  the function  o f  
language in social interaction, and because o f  a 
positivist epistemology that
31 Michael Joseph Smith, Rea l i s t  T h o u g h t  from Weber to K i s s in g e r  (Baton 
Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1986), p. 221. In the quoted 
passage Smith is commenting on the realist assumption about 'ubiquitous and 
inescapable' power relations, and he subsequently discusses the problems of treating
power as both end and means. The assumption about power are further complicated if
one applies the radical view of Steven Lukes, particularly when he says ' any view of 
power rests on some normalively specific conception of interests'. Steven Lukes, 
Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 35. Lukes, in turn, makes good 
use of W.B. Gallie's seminal 'Essentially Contested Concepts', Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (Vol. 56, 1955-6), pp. 167-98.
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treats norms as "causes".22
Indeed, it is the search for empirically measured causes that leads 
the study of international relations away from the study of p o l i t i c s , 
of  human relations, as mediated by language in discourse.
Law and Morality
In practical terms, the linguistic transmission of normative concepts 
and the establishment of a political discourse is reflected in moral 
and legal codes. The ethical foundations arising from moral 
language  and the ep is iem olog ica l foundations  a r is ing  from 
theoretical concepts, even as they arc contested, are given stability 
through institutionalisation. It follows from the existence o f  
discourses that institutions are subject to constant (re)evaluation.2 2
Taking into account the tension between ethics and politics in 
the realist understanding of world politics, it is instructive at this 
po in t  to co n s id e r  M ichael O akesho tt 's  ca re fu l d is t in c t io n s  
concerning the character of T he  Rule of L aw '.34 By clarifying the 
relationship between law and morality, it may become clearer how 
morality impinges on foreign policy (and ethics on politics) and 
what the realist effort to maintain the distinction between them in 
international relations amounts to in the end.
The key distinction Oakeshott makes is between the common
22 Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions, op. cit., p. 5.
22 See Cornelia Navari, ’Introduction: The State as a Contested Concept in 
International Relations’ in Cornelia Navari (cd), The Condition of States (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1992), p. 16.
34 Michael Oakeshott, The Rule of Law' in On History and Other Essavs 
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 119-64.
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purpose o f  an 'enterprise association', and a mode of association 
which is not instrumental to any goal beyond association itself. This 
la tter mode o f association is abstract, and characterised by the 
acknowledgement of mutal obligations among p e r s o n a e  who may 
have no relationship (let alone a shared purpose) other than their
recognition of these obligations, which is without regard to future 
contingent circumstances in which these obligations might arise, or 
the particular consequences of observing them - the rule of law.
For Oakeshott, the rule of law is compromised as soon as the
mechanisms that maintain the association (legislation, adjudication, 
administration) are endowed with purpose (policy, interpretation, 
enforcement). Oakshott is not unaware of the (at least) minimal 
qualifications necessary to ensure that association is maintained 
under adverse circum stances (for example, the im position  o f  
subventions to finance the necessary foreign policy - largely
defence), but he insists that these do not bring the association closer 
to the desired condition but rather away from the restricted and 
negatively defined (hence, liberal) terms of the association, which
are without any imbued purpose (not even defence, since this 
involves externalities). However, because it is necessary to qualify
the rule of law in practice, the full range of political questions
concerning justification and purpose creep in right away. Here, his
discussion of moral association is informative.
Moral association is not the same mode as association in terms
o f  the rule of law, but it is significant (given the necessity of
qualifications to the rule of law) that moral association suggests
qualities which underlie the success of association. In particular,
Oakeshott notes that both l ex  (law as enacted), and j u s  (the rather
indeterm inate  conditions o f  jus tice)  must be involved in an
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association in terms of the rule of law. This is because, as in our 
broader discussion of foundations, there will always be questions o f  
the authenticity and 'rightness' of rules. Authenticity can be 
determined by reference to the 'rule book' {lex) ,  and 'rightness' by 
reference to conceptions of justice ( ju s ) - which refers back to the 
terms of moral association.
Oakeshott argues that considerations of justice are a particular 
kind o f  moral consideration, which requires a discerning moral 
sensibility which is able to distinguish between questions of 'virtue', 
'good conduct’, and justice (only the latter determining what should 
be enacted as law). What he does not mention in the possibility that 
a conception of justice may well extend to broader considerations,
and this is precisely the point of arguments for economic rights and 
distributive justice, which go beyond the limiting concern with 
political rights that is associated with orthodox liberalism. Thus the 
content o f  law becomes an issue, in addition to its form.
In moral association, where the rules of association and
notions o f  jus tice  are inevitably ambiguous, these fundamental
questions can only be settled by reference to (respectable) informed,
considered public opinion - which must take some norm as a guiding
principle. For Oakeshott, this is not the nature o f  an association
under the strict terms of the rule of law (the only purpose of which
is inherent in the recognition of law), but it is nevertheless the
necessary condition in which the rule of law arises, and it is the
only means of testing Tightness' (if not authenticity). Oakeshott
h im self  goes to some lengths to show how seldom anything
approaching a pure version of the rule of law is realised, which
raises the question of whether it is possible. In short, a changing
and evolving normative structure underlies even the most rigorous,
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'value-free' construction of political association.
All political association therefore contains elements o f  a 
purposive enterprise association, even if the purpose is simply the 
maintenance of the 'technical realities' of that association. Political 
life is by definition without absolute foundations (or it ceases to be 
political), yet requires some foundation, and such foundations as 
may be established are necessarily contingent human norms. We 
would thus do well to understand them, in both character and 
c o n te n t .
C onc lus ions
In the context of the relationship between ethics and epistemology,
the language of moral and legal association reflects rea lis t
assum ptions about the norms governing association, seen as
'practical' structural causes or foundations. When the element of
purpose in any structure is acknowledged norms can be seen as
embodying the politics of association, and reflecting the ethical
discourse which underwrites the epistemology of association. When
ideas are transferred from epistemologies o f  domestic society to the
international or global realm (as they often are, in spite o f  the
problems of making such analogies) it is essential that the ethical
basis of association is broadened to account for social differences,
and that the terms of interaction arc not assumed to rest on an
absolute foundation. A normative approach to in terna tional
relations allows the play of values to be revealed such that norms are
understood as points of reference in the political world - a world that
is always changing. Clearly norms have influence, but they are not
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to be understood as ’causes', or 'ends', but as qualifiers which provide 
meaning in political life. The study of international relations 
cannot be complete without taking into account this normative 
character of international relations, or global politics, and the place 
that values hold for individuals or nations when they seek to define 
and pursue their interests through political action.
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C h a p t e r  Six
V a lu es  a n d  I n t e r e s t s :
The F o rm ation  of a W orld  View
Previous chapters have addressed the philosophical foundations o f
normative theory, its role in the play of ideas and its limitations in 
light o f  ideological belief, and the fundamental normative structures 
in language, morality and knowledge which underpin the practical 
activity o f  global politics. Here, the role of normative theory will be
shown to extend from addressing philosophical foundations to
addressing the conditions of political action at the global level. In 
particular, values and interests will be shown to be instrumental in
the formation of world views.
The absence of secure and certain knowledge generally, and
o f  undisputed theoretical foundations for global political life in 
particular, leaves the possibility of a 'correct' world view an open
question. Naturally, when political action is necessary the question 
can not be left open, and this chapter will examine the various ways 
in which it is or may be closed.
One way to close the question, o f  course, is ideological 
commitment, but the distinction has already been made (in Chapter
Four) between ideology, with its twin characteristics of 'an image o f  
society and a political program m e',1 and the role of ideas. In its
1 Robert Eccleshall, Vincent Geoghagen, Richard Jay and Rick Wilford, 
Political Ideologies: An Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 1984), p. 7.
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descriptive mode, a normative theoretical account of world views 
addresses the formation of an image of society - in this case, of 
international society or the global political condition - and is not 
concerned with political programmes as such. In its prescriptive 
m ode, no rm ative  theory  may n everthe less  p roperly  p rov ide  
guidance with respect to the formation of political programmes,
since it is not possible to entirely separate political choice from the 
analysis of political life: in separating the wheat from the chaff it 
must be acknowledged that they first grew as parts of a whole - a 
whole, in this case, which defies the 'is-ought' distinction such that 
what 'is' (as discovered by analysis) results from previous choices 
made on the grounds of what 'ought to be', or 'ought to do' (as 
affirmed by commitment).
The task at hand, however, is to uncover the origins and 
foundations o f  our political conceptions, or world views: the starting 
point for claims about political knowledge, and choice. Specifically,
the following discussion will address the theoretical implications o f  
invoking, in policy formation, what are held to be objective interests 
as a means of determining 'correct' action. In examining interest- 
based theory and practice, underlying value assumptions will be 
exposed in order to assess the role of values in determining interests. 
It will be argued that values are prior to interests in theoretical
significance, and that attempts to understand global politics must
*
take into consideration the value structures underlying world views 
as the key to comprehending what is superficially presented as
objective reality, hence grounds for rational action based on interest 
c a lc u la t io n s .
Initially, the problem is one that has been addressed earlier:
the attitude o f  positivism to the apprehension o f  reality , o r
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knowledge of 'what is', which restricts the social sciences to 
f a ls i f i a b le  p ro p o s i t io n a l  s ta tem en ts  c o n c e rn in g  e m p ir ic a l ly  
observable facts. A logical-hermeneutic approach to the same 
reality sees 'what-is ' as something more than simple empirical 
fa c tu a l i ty :
Socia l rea lity  is c o n s t r u c t e d  by m eans o f  
presuppositions (global, a ll-inclusive conceptions o f  
social reality of a religious, ethical, political etc. kind), 
assumptions (epistemological and ontological) and rules 
(constitutive and regulative)... 'what ought to be' and 
'what is' belong to the same order of reality...2
W here traditional positiv is t views in epistem ology, and non- 
cognitivist views in ethics, deny the possibility of knowing reality 
in this comprehensive way, there is naturally a predisposition to 
explain socio-political phenomena in terms o f objective interests 
which can be empirically observed. Yet this view of knowledge 
clearly restricts 'the conditions of possibility for all understanding 
o f  the social world’. If the activity of politics is to be properly 
understood, it is 'important to emphasize the decisive importance o f  
the action of the subject as the provider of contents which condition 
his interpretation of reality'. Actions are thus comprehensible in
y
the context of a shared system of meaning, or language, which
2 Giuliano di Bernardo (cd). Normative Structures of the Social World 
(Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1988), from the editor's introduction. The synoptic 
idea of reality being socially constructed was popularised by Peter L. Berger and 
Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City: Anchor Books, 
1967), but for a more extensive treatment sec Nicholas G. Onuf, 'Constructivism', in 
his World, of. Our. Making:. Rules _and -Rule in Social Theory and International Relations 
(Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1989).
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nevertheless expresses subjective contents:
...if we employ subjective categories such as intentions, 
ends, rules, values, norms...[action] may be explained in 
terms of the contents of the consciousness of the agent 
which are linked with his vision of the world. The 
sense of his actions depends on these contents, and they
contribute to the construction of the social world.3
It follows that perceptions or interpretations of the world may vary 
with these contents of consciousness, and that knowledge of reality 
derives not only from sensory experience o f  it but also from such
general interpretations, or world views. A further consequence is
that values figure prominantly in political understanding from both 
internal and external perspective, since both observer and observed
are engaged in the valuation o f  experience. F inally , the 
significance o f  interests is thereby reduced if these rest ultimately 
on valuations provided by a normative structure.
In the last of eight lectures given at Oxford in 1908,4 William 
James concludes with a discussion of the 'will to believe', and the
'faith-ladder' used in reaching decisions (in this case, about the
relationship between pluralism and monism). He describes the latter 
process thus:
A conception of the world arises in you somehow, no
matter how. Is it true or not? you ask.
3 Ibid.
4 Published with the title A Pluralistic Universe Hibbert Lectures at 
Manchester College on the Present Situation in Philosophy, by Longmans, Green and 
Company, 1909.
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It might be true somewhere, you say, for it is not self­
c o n t ra d ic to ry .
It m a y  be true, you continue, even here and now.
It is f i t  to be true, it would be well i f  it were true, it
o u g h t  to be true, you presently feel.
It m u s t  be true, something persuasive in you whispers
next; and then - as a final result -
It shall be held to be true, you decide; it shall be as if  
true, for y o u .
And your acting thus may in certain special cases be a 
means of making it securely true in the end.
Not one step in this process is logical, yet it is the way 
in which monists and pluralists alike espouse and hold 
fast to their visions. It is life exceeding logic, it is the 
practical reason for which the theoretic reason finds
arguments after the conclusion is once there. In just
this way do some of us hold to the unfinished pluralistic
universe; in just this way do others hold to the timeless
universe eternally complete.^
W hile James' position seems a strong one, the direction o f  his
thought is suggestive of the importance of considering values as an
integral part of practical reasoning. It also raises doubts about the
autonomy of logical systems, as traditionally conceived in logical-
positivism and in the emotivist view of ethics (the 'is-ought1 problem 
once again).
5 William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), p. 148.
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A ssu m p tio n s
W hat is referred to here as a world view encom passes both 
theoretical assumptions about the essential nature o f  international 
relations, o f  politics more generally, and consequently assumptions 
about the 'real world' as well. It is this 'real world' in which 
individuals, groups and organisations (including states) must act, 
and for which theories must provide an account.
Thus for understanding what is presented here as a world 
view, it is necessary to consider the range and character o f  
theoretical assumptions about international relations which are the 
basis of world views. For example, Hidemi Suganami suggests that 
ideas about world order are 'clustered around five basic positions'. 
The first two are the legal school (internationalist, not  cosmopolitan) 
and the diplomatic school, both of which support the idea of a system 
of sovereign states. The third, democratic confederalism, emphasises 
rep resen ta tion .  Federalism , the fourth pos ition , re f lec ts  a 
cosmopolitan view. The fifth position, welfare internationalism, is 
functionalist. Each of these theoretical starting points give rise to 
different conceptions of, and hence prescriptions for, world order/*
It is also necessary to consider the character o f  political 
theory itself, and to recognise international relations as an integral
Tr
part of political life at all levels (in both theory and practice), and 
thus a proper locus for posing political questions.7
In po li tica l theory genera lly ,  fundam ental assum ptions
6 Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
7 See R.B.J. Walker, ‘Ethics, Modernity and the Theory of International 
Relations' (forthcoming), esp. the last paragraph (p.45).
237
concern human nature in the first instance - since this conditions 
both the formation and efficacy of political association - and 
subsequently conceptions of the good life to which political action is 
directed. Assumptions about human nature are thus commonplace in 
theories  o f  international relations, although the in teraction o f  
theory and practice means that human nature and human practices 
are 'constructed ' in part by the theoretical d iscourse which 
legitimates them. This discourse, in turn, is in part a product o f  the 
form of political association in which the discourse arises. Hence 
'image' and 'reality' are intertwined; world views and possible forms 
o f  political association are interdependent. On the matter of political 
association it is useful to consider again the distinction made by 
Michael Oakeshott as between 'enterprise' and 'civil' association,**
and a derivative distinction made by Terry Nardin as between 
'purposive' and 'practical' association.9 The distinction is between 
association for the purpose of achieving a particular goal decided or 
adopted in advance, and association which provides the social 
conditions for achieving any goals at all.
In the first case ('enterprise' or 'purposive' association) a 
common goal or common particular interest must be attributed to the 
participants in a political system. In the international political 
system such common interests seem rare (alliances and treaties
notw ithstanding), and a political theory explaining in ternational
politics would be obliged to account for competing interests and
suggest means o f  resolving competition and conflic t,  i f  any 
meaningful claim to 'association' is to be made. Of course, traditional
** Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 
112- 122 .
9 Terry Nardin, Law. Morality, and the Relations of States (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 4ff and p. 9ff.
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interest-based realist theories of international relations play down 
the notion of association (preferring the notion of anarchy) for just 
this reason.
However, in the second case ('civil' or 'practical' association)
no par ticu la r  goal or in teres t in common is a ttr ibu ted  to 
participants, but rather a set of norms by which the political system 
may function in support of any goals, collective or individual (p a c ta  
su n t  s e r v a n d a , for example). Theory explaining international 
politics thus conceived is obliged to account for the normative
structure governing the pursuit o f  interests, rather than simply the
conduct o f  such pursuits, and consequently addresses questions
about the values represented in the very fact of political association:
... the common good is recognised not as a set of aims to 
be achieved through cooperation among those moved 
by a common wish to achieve them but as a set o f
v a lu es . . .1 0
It is perhaps no less difficult to locate common values (a commonly
held conception o f  the good life) in international politics than to
locate common interests, and yet such constructive interaction as 
there is indicates some acceptance of common procedures and
standards which may be taken to represent a nascent international 
value structure.
It is not insignificant that a similar dichotomy of terms exists 
in the debate about 'is' and 'ought' as it arises in the philosophy of 
language, where the notion of a 'regulative rule' is distinguished
10 Nardin, ibid. ,  p. 17.
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from that of a 'constitutive rule' or 'institutional fact' (notably by 
John S earle11). Regulative rules are antecedent or independent of 
the activity they regulate (e.g., in manners or in driving), while
constitutive rules actually define or create an activity as well as 
governing it (e.g., in games or in political representation). Brute 
facts may be accounted for independently from regulative rules, but 
ins ti tu tional facts must be accounted for by the conceptual
framework established by a set of constitutive rules - there is no 
other intelligible context for such facts. This theory of language is 
also a theory of human institutions in general (including science 
and politics), and while there have been criticisms of it, none are 
d is m iss iv e .1 2
This account docs, o f  course, require  tak ing  certa in
qualifications into consideration. For example, institutions may be 
viewed from an internal or external perspective, and it is only from 
the internal (where the observer 'belongs' to the institution) that
constitutive rules are both known and accepted, and therefore have 
prescriptive force. From the external perspective, rules may simply 
be known, being therefore only descriptive. The latter may be said 
to have resonance in a specifically inter-national view of the world 
as a states-system, but the former (internal) perspective applies 
when all actors are implicated in global politics by a cosmopolitan 
view. In this case, any global value structure is prescriptive as well 
as descriptive, and must be reflected in policy.
11 See John R. Searle, Speech Acts: An Essav in the Philosophy of Language 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969) and Expression and Meaning: Studies 
in the Theory of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Note the 
above quote about 'Social reality...' from di Bernardo.
12 See the detailed discussion of these issues in Ricardo Guastini,
'Constitutive Rules and the Is-Ought Dichotomy' in di Bernardo (ed). Normative 
Structures of the Social World, op. c/7.
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Where such a value structure can be said to exist, at least to 
the extent of providing grounds for communication, there may still
be differences about the nature of the values concerned which can 
be considered differences in world views; as Adda Bozeman argues, 
'ideas are not transferable in Lheir authenticity... The world is a
manifold of political systems as it is a manifold of cultures'.
To begin with, experience of political association and of values 
so established is no doubt generally more parochial than what is 
implied in speaking o f  international relations, yet it must be 
emphasised again that international relations is an integral part o f  
political life as a whole, and national and local politics are equally a 
part of international relations to the extent that they are a source of 
political values. Secondly, there may be considerable differences 
concerning human nature, giving rise to different aspirations for 
political community.
N evertheless, talking about international re la tions at all 
requires some universal claims, whether moral or epistemological 
(the close relation between these two was discussed in the previous 
chapter), and hence a central difficulty is contending with the 
relativism implied above - which is undeniable in some respects - 
while at the same time locating and characterising those features o f  
global political life which are universal.
It is argued here that such universals lie in the common 
objective of human betterment, which may be pursued by diverse 
means; a similarity of form with respect to ends, represented by the 
assumption of values in the face of ultimate indeterminacy, but with
a diversity of means, represented by contingent expressions of value
in political life and in the pursuit of particular interests. As L.T. 
Hobhouse says:
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We consider laws, customs and institutions in respect of 
their functions not merely in maintaining any sort o f 
social life , but in m ain ta in ing  or p rom oting  a 
harmonious l i fe .1 3
We all live in different realities, holding different views of 
our world. If there were perfectly shared perceptions of social, 
political and econom ic reality , the coord ina ting  functions of 
communication would be redundant, and we would enjoy a common 
world view. However, even in the simplest relations (interpersonal) 
variations in experience make such perfect sharing impossible, and 
communication essential. In international relations communication 
is the principal feature, with other cooperative and coordinated 
activity still less commonplace than in intra-national relations, in 
spite o f  increasing interdependence among nation-states (and other 
actors). Communication, if effective, may lead to shared perceptions 
(or at least awareness o f  differences) but perfect communication, 
perfect sharing, cannot be achieved .14 Consequently, different
world views are endemic, and interactions both positive and 
negative revolve around such differences. Positive interaction may 
invo lve  com ing to term s with d iffe rences ,  w hile  nega t ive  
interactions may involve conflicts as one or another world view is 
imposed in order to resolve differences.
13 L.T. Hobhouse, Elements of Social Justice (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1922, reprinted 1958), p. 27.
14 Consider, for example, the argument that translation is always possible 
between human languages, but that understanding of the cultural context, the nuances
and the hidden assumptions of another language requires direct experience.
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Interests - Realist World Views
To a large degree conven tional or trad itional theories  o f  
international relations (principally versions o f  realism) assume a 
shared world view in the form of a power-oriented, interest-based, 
rational technical system susceptible to political managem ent - 
including the management o f  conflict, in the event o f  opposing 
interests, by means of the rational application of technical sources 
o f  power. In the absence of value considerations the possibility o f  
incom m ensurable  world views is not entertained (a universal 
rationality being assumed), unless this can be readily translated into 
conflicts of interest (which would allow power to settle the issue). 
The assumption of a unitary world view of reality in which interests 
are key does not allow the contemplation of alternative world views, 
nor o f  political options which might arise from such contemplation. 
The presumption o f  universal interests does not acknowledge the 
different realities that are experienced by those with different world 
views in spite of how much a dominant (realist) world view dictates 
the terms o f discourse. As Onuf points out, international relations 
are ’pervasively hctcronomous, and the asymmetry of circumstances 
restric ts  the possibility of global com parisons - which might 
underlie symmetric interests - to hegemonic p o w e r s .1 ^
In this way, the governing assumptions of Western political 
thought - which suggest that politics is to do with power, and that 
power is to do with mastery - tend to dictate a particular kind of  
world view which then limits the range of possible interpretations
15 Onuf, World of Our Making, op. cit., p. 282.
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of international political life:
Supreme political power thus comes to be viewed - very 
much in the manner of Max Weber - as a capacity to 
deploy a monopoly of legitimate violence.1 ^
The norm ative significance of this image of political life is 
generally lost among the deeply imbedded assumptions of traditional 
th e o ry .
This is not - in spite of what we sometimes like to think
- because we analyze our political arrangements in
such a hardheaded fashion that the element o f  imagery 
never intrudes at all. On the contrary, the terms in 
which we habitually talk about the powers o f  the state 
are densely metaphorical in texture. The point is 
rather that the metaphors we favor all tend to support
the idea of politics as a realm o f  dom ination , 
subordination, and the exercise of force.17
Of course, this also means that in traditional 'value-free'
theory there is no explicit self-conciousness o f  value content 
expressed through a world view. It also means that, in the way 
discussed above, the imposition of the implicit world view is 
perpetuated by policy based on such theories, and unmediated
^  See Quentin Skinner's review of Gccrtz in The New York Review of Books. 16 
April 1981, op. cil. Skinner also notes the revealing discussion of traditional 
conceptions of power in Steven Lukes’ Power: A Radical View (London: Macmillan, 
1974), which I discuss elsewhere.
17 Skinner, ibid.% p. 36.
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conflict (or capitulation) results. Using an example from the 
literature on ideology, it may be that a lack of political controversy 
suggests 'less the end of ideology than the prevalence o f  an 
oppressive ideo lo g y ',1** serving the interests of a dominant political 
group or actor. ^  Hence, opportunites for coming to terms with the 
diversity of world views in a positive and constructive way are not 
pursued. To the extent that conventional foreign (international) 
policy does take value considerations seriously, they are presented 
in interest-language which which docs not threaten conventional 
theoretical foundations. It is precisely the intimate relationship 
betw een values and in teres ts  that allows this  su rrep tit ious  
m a n o e u v r e .
The shortcom ings o f  traditional pow er-and-interest theory 
may be characterised in another way, still emphasising the absence 
of value considerations: no structure of meaning is provided by
prescrip tions to act out o f  interest; interests are assumed, o r  
(mysteriously) 'defined in terms of power'2®. Power may well be the 
currency of politics, but it is only paper money, and must at some 
point rely on reserves of substantial value. Hobhouse, in discussing 
democracy, suggests that while true political power - rather than the 
locus o f  legal sovereignty is the proper political question, the 
'de term ining  power is e lu s iv e .. . ' .21 As argued previously, any 
interest requires an expression of values to provide a meaning.
18 Eccleshall, et a!.. Political Ideologies, op. cit., p. 11.
*9 See, for example, Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man (Boston: Beacon 
Press, 1964), in reference to U.S. political culture.
2® See Hans Morgcnthau, Politics Among Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 
1978), p. 5, where he describes the concept of interest defined in terms of power as 
the 'main signpost that guides political realism'; it is the second of his six principles 
of political realism.
21 Hobhouse, Elements of Social Justice, op. c/7., p. 197.
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Values provide a 'house of meaning' (as Jung said o f  his 
p s y c h o lo g ic a l  a rc h e ty p e s ) ;  va lues  p ro v id e  an a rc h e ty p a l
explanation and rationalisation of a political system, without which 
in teres ts  are indeterm inate . Thus, a given exp lanation  or
understanding of  politics is buried in a society's political culture, 
which underwrites political claims, justifies interests, and provides 
dram atisations or representations of socio-political relations that 
maintain and perpetuate a system of essentially mythical political 
'realities'. Living in the midst of culture, we are hard pressed to see 
the fragility o f  political assumptions, and are inclined to reify 
political ideas, thereby closing debate on the most fundamental 
political questions.
As Weston argues, there arc insoluble philosophical problems 
(universals, infinitude, etc.) which are nevertheless solved for 
practical purposes, through politics and culture, in every successful
s o c i e t y . 22 Yet it is a common political conceit to universalise 
practical solutions, being unable to acknowledge their subjectivity 
from the sheltered position of a given political culture, and such 
universalisation leads to alienation when the grounds for political 
action require recognition or justification from without the relevant 
political culture.
Values - Normative World Views
In international relations, the global political system (however
22 D.E. Weston, Realism. Language and Social Theories: Studies in the Relation 
of the Epistemology of Science and Politics (PhD thesis. University of Lund, Sweden, 
1978), op. cit.
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conceived) provides an objectify ing  framework in which the 
intersubjectivity of particular political cultures may be recognised, 
but also presents the problem (both in theory and practice) o f  
relativistic definitions, not simply of politics in a given society, but 
o f  the global political system itself. Here lies the significance o f  
world views for explanations or understandings o f  international 
rela tions. In the absence of agreed solutions to insoluble 
philosophical problems, in the absence of a global political culture, 
the traditional solution has been a pseudo-scientific claim to the 
em pirical reality o f  power relations; that this conception  o f  
international politics provides no framework of meaning has not 
troubled those who continue to discuss the protection of national 
interests or the maintainance of a stable (imposed) international 
order. No doubt this provides justification for the activities o f  some 
state actors, but it docs not provide a theory o f  international 
relations. To pretend cither that there is an objective political 
reality (which is revealed by realist theory), or that there is a 
un iversa lly  relevant culture (a W estern m odernist cu ltu re  o f  
rationality, for example) to provide a locus for the resolution o f  
insolubles, is simply to evade the most interesting and important 
political questions - questions which are brought to life  in 
international relations just because they have no cultural solution 
t h e r e .
Hence the problem in international politics is not simply the
location o f  objective interests - these arc indeterminate. The
problem is locating political values that can ascribe meaning to
global political life, and can provide grounds for selecting practical
solutions to insoluble philosophical problems. In locating these
values, however, contrasting or contradictory national cultures may
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stand in the way of agreed solutions. However, asserting cultural 
relativism is no answer to this problem, nor does it close debate: this 
problem of clashing views and opposing wishes is the apogee o f  
p o l i t i c a l  problems, and requires nothing more nor less than a 
political solution. To abrogate political responsibilities just because 
the traditional boundaries of political organisation have been 
exceeded is to abandon our collective fate to the vagaries o f  
historical accident; a dangerous weakness in view of the globalising 
forces o f  late m odernity .2 3 The challenge, consequently, is to 
construct theory which can account for shifting, changing (and 
exchanging) values, and theory which can address the manipulation 
of values. The place that values hold in political understanding is, 
nevertheless, often ignored since the location o f  values remains 
problematic - particularly so in international relations.
The Global Context
Since we are speaking here of social values (rather than individual 
choices), values may be located in any social context. The relevant 
social contexts for international relations, traditionally conceived, 
are nation-states. Yet as the history of international relations (in 
both practice  and theory) has increasingly exhibited systemic 
ch a rac te r is t ic s ,  d is tinc t from the ch a rac te r is t ic s  o f  na t iona l  
societies, values may also be located in this larger social system. 
In c rea s in g  tra n sn a t io n a l  and g lobal d im en s io n s  add new
23 Roland Robertson, 'Mapping the Global Condition: Globalization as the
Central Concept’ in Theory. Culture and Society (Vol. 7, Nos. 2 & 3, June 1990 -
Special Issue on Global Culture), reprinted in Michael Fcathcrstone (ed.). Global
Culture: Nationalism. Globalization and Modernity (London: Sage, 1990).
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characteristics which arc less territorially oriented, but they are 
nevertheless social dimensions which provide a new locus of values.
Globalization is a feature of international relations which 
presents the issue of local perspectives on global phenomena. These 
perspectives are here called world views, but it is important to note
that globalization implies a context in which local world views are
formed under the influence of global processes and intensified 
interconnectedness among states and s o c i e t i e s . W o r l d  views are 
th e re fo re  n ece ssa r i ly  f r o m  a perspective, but o f  the global 
condition. Furthermore, the various local strategies for establishing 
identity while engaging with the world as a whole must come to 
terms with the values expressed in global relations and processes as 
well as those values arising out of contingent local experience.
Consequently, a world view is not likely to be uniquely
identified with any given local perspective, but rather a shared
world view drawn from the paradigms and policies of the global 
vocabulary. It is also possible, of course, that this vocabulary may be 
determined by the most 'literate' (read powerful). Roland Robertson 
in d ic a te s
the problems occasioned by globalization  and the
dangers inherent in attempts by particular societies,
movements or other entities to impose the ir  own
24 Globalization is a relatively new term in the international relations 
literature, although the word 'global' is often used to avoid a state-centric bias. 
Useful recent works on globalization include Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social 
Theory and Global Culture, op. cil., and Andrew G. McGrew and Paul G. Lewis, et al, 
Global Politics: Globalization and the Nation-State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992): 
Definitions of globalization arc more complex than the following summaries indicate: 
'Globalization as a concept refers both to the compression of the world and the 
intensification of conciousncss of the world as a whole' (Robertson); 'Globalization 
refers to the multiplicity of linkages and interconnections between the states and 
societies which make up the modem world system' (McGrew). It is worth noting that 
nothing in these definitions necessarily suggests the demise of the states-system or 
the founding of a world society, or that globalization is unique to modernity.
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'definition' of the global circumstance.2 ^
It may be clarifying to refer to Greimas once again, and to
note a parallel between our problem o f  values in international
re la tions  and his exam ination o f  ethnic litera ture  where he 
distinguishes between two different kinds of manipulation of values:
The first is the 'circulation of constant values (or equivalent ones) 
between equal subjects in an isotopic and closed universe'. We might 
consider this to be the case in domestic or national societies. The
second, following from the first, involves 'the problem o f  the
introduction and removal of these immanent values to and from the 
given universe, and it presupposes the existence of a universe o f
transcendent values that encompasses and encloses the first in such
a way that subjects who possess the im m anen t va lues  appear as
rece ive rs  v is -a -v is  the su b jec t-scn d ers  o f  the tran sce n d en t
u n iv e rs e ' .2<> We might view this latter, then, as the problem of value
exchange in international relations, where the prospect of a shared
system of values depends on such a system being related to the
d is tinct value s tructures of the partic ipating societies. Yet
transcendent belief systems were introduced earlier as exceeding
the limits o f  normative theory, so any universe of transcendent
values for international society must not be a universalised
reflection of  a particular value system, but rather a product of a
collective understanding of international political life as that which
'encompasses and encloses' the particularities of national political
life. In this sense the advent of global (rather than properly inter-
2  ^ Roland Robertson, Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture (London: 
Sage, 1992), p. 6. See also Anthony D. King, Culture. Globalization and the World 
System (London: Macmillan, 1991).
26 A J  Greimas, On Meaning, p. 93, op. cit.
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national) social dimensions suggests the possibility o f  localised 
values participating in, and being understood in the context of, 
global values.
Implications for Theory
International relations theory must, therefore, be viewed as an 
integral part of political theory generally. Indeed, it is in 
in ternational relations that the explanatory power o f  politica l 
theory is put to the greatest test, as national political traditions 
becom e less influential. Nevertheless, political trad itions  do 
resurface in the history of international political thought: theory
itself does not lie outside history. As Walker argues, many o f  those 
political categories that we take for granted arc reifications o f  
traditional notions - the state, sovereignty, etc. - now perpetuated by 
neo-realis t theories .27 These are, of course, notions originating in 
the context o f  a European states system (and thus in European 
political thought) - whether the origins of the system are in the 
fifteenth, seventeenth or nineteenth century is a matter of debate - 
and subsequently globalised through the hegemonic processes o f  
colonialisation and subsequent dccolonialisation, war and military 
alliance, economic dependency, and so on. This is not to say that 
there are not other and older cases of statcs-systcms, but’ their 
influence has waned, and it was European expansion that unified the 
globe, even though this process was itself subject to foreign
27 R.B.J. Walker, remarks made in discussion at a session of the ISA/BISA 
Annual Convention, London, April 1989.
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i n f l u e n c e s . 2 ** While the dominant national actors may have 
changed (some being outside of Europe - e.g., U.S., Japan, China), the 
categories of international political thought have been maintained, 
especially the notion of ’insiders' and 'outsiders’. While there are 
competing paradigms o f  international relations, some emphasising 
g loba l econom ic  s t ru c tu re s  ( re la t io n s  o f  p ro d u c t io n ,  the  
international division of labour, a world market) or cosmopolitan 
pluralism (relative autonomy, world society), traditional realist or 
neo-realist theories o f  power relations remain dominant, especially 
in policy-making.
Yet international politics is becoming more res is tan t to 
simplistic accounts of power relations, and indeed the problems o f  
modernity force us to ask how politics is to be discussed at all, let 
alone how and where to locate 'power'.29 No doubt power, however 
defined, conditions political choices by establishing the 'facticity' (to 
use Heidegger's term) of political life, but the meaning of genuinely 
political power (as opposed to mere force capability) is highly 
elusive, and not clearly related to the traditional political categories 
that power-political theory relies on.
Furthermore, this confusion is not aided by the accounts o f  
realist theory provided by its proponents. Robert Gilpin, in his 
article entitled 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism' 
attributes to realism an interest in constraining excesses o f  elites 
and advocacy of national interest (in contrast to elite interest - 
though it is not clear just how the distinction is to be made), under
2** See the introduction to Hcdley Bull and Adam Watson (eds). The Expansion 
of International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
29 Again, R.B.J. Walker notes 'the difficulty of speaking about politics in the 
late twentieth century', which may 'seem abstract to those who have leamt to treat the 
abstractions of an earlier era as the very stuff of common sense and brute reality'. 
’Ethics, Modernity and the Theory of International Relations', op. cit.
252
rules o f  prudent behaviour, to protect national interests and 
minimize international violence. None of this provides any insight
into the theoretical importance of realism, but rather suggests that it 
is simply a set of guidelines for political behaviour: as Gilpin says,
realists study international practice and theorize about 
it in part to add to the list of "do's and dont’s" o f
Thucydides, Morgcnthau and others in the tradition of 
"advice to princes".3 0
It is interesting to note that Morgcnthau himself chooses to support 
his arguments with the following quote from Abraham Lincoln, 
who, not knowing the will of providence, felt he must
study the plain facts of the case, ascertain what is
possible and lcam what appears to be wise and r ight.31
For Gilpin, an underlying assumption is that 'perennial forces o f
political struggle limit human perfection', from which follows a 
summation of the realist position:
...this moral skepticism joined to a hope that reason may 
one day gain greater control over passions constitutes 
the essence of realism and unites realists o f  every
30 Robert Gilpin, 'The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism', 
International Organization (Vol. 38, No. 2, Spring 1984), reprinted in Robert O. 
Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), p. 320.
3 1 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations. 5th. Ed., revised (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), p. 263.
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g e n e r a t i o n . 3 2
This stands in contrast to the notion of balancing passion and reason 
(in Nietzsche), and the notion that reason must be the slave o f  
passion (in Hume), and offers no account of how values might be 
genera ted  or interests  defined. N evertheless, realism clearly  
comprises an influential, or at least widely shared world view, and 
consequently  es tab lishes  one possible set o f  param eters  fo r  
engaging in political thought and action, which in turn amounts to a 
definition (regardless of adequacy) of such undertakings.
Thus the formation of a world view can be seen as the process 
by which the possibility of discussing politics is articulated, and by 
which theoretical political categories arc justified - and in cases o f  
dom inant world views, sometimes reified. A nalysis o f  this  
formational process, then, provides a means of exposing reified 
political categories (and static theories), opening the way for
rearticulations of political life. Even within traditional approaches 
to international relations, such analysis can provide greater clarity.
In order to characterise the process by which world views are
formed, it is necessary to bring out the relationship between 
underlying social and political values and those putative political 
interests which provide the substance of conventional approaches to 
international relations. In particular, the assumption that interests 
offer a universal language of politics that avoids value relativism is 
challenged on the grounds that any political system must rest on a
system of values (manifested in culture, approved political and 
economic practices, assumptions about knowledge, etc.), and that
32 Gilpin, op. cil., p. 321.
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interests arising from a political system arc only as universal as the 
underlying values: cither universal values are possible, or there is 
no possibility of a universal foundation for politics, and we must look 
elsew here  for political meaning when denied the resort to 
traditional political communities (e.g., sovereign nation-states). In 
effect, the interstices of a system of states are treated as apolitical: as 
relations between self-sufficient entities rather than politics, as an 
adm inistrative no-man's land where talk of political values is 
baseless and confusing. Yet the interactions that take place in this 
space are conditioned by the values underlying participants' actions, 
and the greatest problems arise when interests are assumed without 
corroborating  reference to values. Furtherm ore, the p recise
location of this no-man's land - a notionally cxtrajurisdictional 
political space, inhabited by parties to any 'international' exchange 
- is not clear, given questions about the status of the sovereign state,
its relationship to other such entities, and to civil society (whether 
conceived as national or cosmopolitan). Thus comprehending world 
views is essential to comprehending intentions in any international 
exchange, and to assessing the link between expressed interests and
the values that support them, as will be discussed later in the context
of defence and foreign policy. In all of this, an understanding o f  
value s tructures - hence the role of normative theory - is 
fu n d a m e n ta l .
C onc lus ions
In considering the formation of world views it is clarifying to draw
parallels with political thought and philosophy in general. That is,
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the formation of world views is tied up up with the evolution o f  
thought about the human condition in all its aspects; influences on 
our thinking about the world begin with historical influences on 
our thinking about ourselves, and subsequently about ourselves with 
respect to others (political awareness). In brief, the search for 
universal values requires a reconsideration of all that which has
made us different, in the evolution of conciousness and politics. If  
there is some common end, some shared fundamental value, it has 
long since been buried under the diverse development of cultures 
and civilisations.
T here  arc, then, two possib le  consequences o f  th is  
archaeology: the first is the possibility of discovering commonality
in our origins; the second is the possibility of seeing more clearly 
the hopelessness of our quest. The second possibility suggests a new 
enlightenment concerning our plight to be achieved by clearing 
away the debris of history, of the many follies and grand designs 
which were intended to resolve the indeterminacy o f  human 
existence. What remains after such a dig is complete may not be 
very satisfying, but no doubt it would provide a more solid 
foundation for modern political tasks (and anyway a better shield
against modem political dangers than any technological device). As 
modern philosophy finds itself returning to the prc-Socratics, so the
study of international relations must look to the foundations of
political association. It matters little whether this labour is rewarded 
by a rediscovery of universal political ends, or simply by a clarity of 
vision concerning the political condition. Wishing to know what to 
do in politics, we must know better how  to do politics, that is, how to 
cope with political values other than by asserting interests -
something which assumed interests cannot tell us, and unarticulated
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values cannot teach us.
International relations theory partakes of political theory in 
the sense that its problems are problems of political association on a 
grand scale. Where values are inherent both in the origins of 
association and in the continuing life of any association, there are 
no value-free interests which substitute for the political fact of 
value-laden norms at all levels of associative existence. Where the 
political domain exceeds the traditional confines o f  association by 
incorporating the global dimension these norms are inevitably tied 
up with universal discourses about theory and practice, and norms 
reflect and dictate this global domain of politics. The manifestations 
of  such norms have been characterised here as world views.
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C h a p t e r  S even
N o rm a tiv e  A spec ts  of 
D e te r r e n c e  a n d  F o re ig n  P o licy
The principal weakness in modern understandings o f  
the significance o f  the operations o f  state powers 
.. .com es  from our more or less p an ic -s tr ick en  
imaginative incapacity to face up to the s tunning 
cognitive intricacy of the political universe that we 
need to grasp.1
This chapter attempts to demonstrate the essentially norm ative 
charac te r  o f  the d iscourses governing deterrence theory and 
foreign policy analysis, in order to make out the case that in the 
most important and challenging areas o f  traditional disciplinary 
concern norm ative considerations are central to the study o f  
in terna tional rela tions.
Normative Aspects o f  Nuclear Deterrence
The issue o f  nuclear deterrence, and its attendent problems and
1 John Dunn, 'Responsibility without Power: States and the Incoherence of the 
Modem Conception of the Political Good' in his Interpreting Political Responsibility: 
Essavs 1981-1989 (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), p. 130.
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debates, provides an ideal substantive policy area for the elucidation 
o f  norm ative characteristics  in international political relations. 
Because this issue area is peculiar to modernity, and qualitatively 
different from its closest relatives in the area of military policy, it
provides an opportunity to examine the role of normative dynamics 
in policy formation in the absence of precedents or historical 
exemplars of the sort that generally guide policy choice. Policies of
n u c lea r  d e te rrence  rely heavily  on theory and u nderly ing
assumptions, having little or no empirical data (excepting Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, and weapons testing) to draw on.
Western strategic thought has been based on the assumptions 
of earlier thinkers (largely relating to the Soviet Union and the Cold 
W ar) concern ing  purely rational actors and a techno log ica l
revolution. That is to say, the discourse of strategic thought is
essentially normative, being grounded in certain key assumptions or
th e o re tic a l  n o rm s .2 Furthermore, strategic theory is essentially 
normative in the sense of being prescriptive, both in respect to
definitions o f  the strategic problem and in respect to the appropriate 
policy response.^
Consequently, the role of normative structures is emphasised, 
relative to the more commonly understood parameters o f  policy 
formation provided by ’objective' experience. Furthermore, the 
substantive aspects of nuclear policy-making are overtly moral to a
2 See, for example, the argument in Robin Brown ’Limited War' in Colin 
Mclnnes and G.D. Sheffield (eds), Warfare in the Twentieth Century: Theory and 
Practice (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).
3 Note the effect of strategic categories spilling over into areas where they are 
not appropriate: Philip Windsor discusses the case of arms control, where the 
extended deterrence idea of strategic balance imposed itself in such a way that arms 
control negotiations proceeded 'in a manner contrary to that which would be the 
expected norm'. Philip Windsor, Towards a Hierarchy for Arms Control', Millennium 
(Vol. 15, No. 2. Summer 1986). p. 173.
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far greater extent than other military-political issues, since the 
objectives and methods arc not clearly limited to considerations o f
victory, self-defence or other conventional measures o f  success:
Indeed it is ironic that the measure of success in nuclear policy is
the avoidance of its implementation.
What policies a society should adopt for its nuclear 
weapons is a profoundly moral question. ...there is no 
moral question of any significance that is not fact* 
drenched and no facts' of any importance that are not
inextricably embedded in particular ways of looking at 
the world.4
As for the broader concerns of strategic studies, it may be said 
that a general problem is the concept of 'security', and the security
dilemma: Whose security should take precedence, and need the
security game be 'zero-sum'? What kind of security, and at what cost 
to the social resources which are being secured? Security from
what? These questions are not properly dealt with in the 
mainstream of strategic studies literature, and as Hugh Macdonald
says ,
recent 'mainstream' work has been subjected to a
• f
persistent barrage o f  critic ism , especially  on the 
morality o f  deterrence, the nuclear emphasis o f  the 
superpow ers ' confron ta tion , and the p reoccupa tion  
with military-technological refinements at the expense
4 Philip Bobbitt, Democracy and Deterrence: The History and Future of Nuclear 
Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1988), p. 271.
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of political trust and alternative resource claims. There
have also come voices insisting upon the wholeness o f  
the international system, and hence the indivisibility 
of North from South or of societal well-being from the 
narrow er conspectus o f  m ilitary security , im ply ing
that 'defence of the realm' should no longer be the first
duty of societies.5
We may wish to consider what, then, is the duty of international
society (such as it is) with respect to security. There have been a 
number o f  significant attempts at 'collective security' in the past
(notably failures), but little attempt to transcend the conventional
notion of security as being properly the business o f  governments 
acting for individual societies (p a c e  general references to 'global 
peace and security'). As we will sec, this has something to do with 
conceiving of the international system as being isolated from those 
normative social and political features that are well understood in
national societies.
In order to address the character of this shortcoming in
conceptions o f  international society, as well as some of the related
issues mentioned above, the next part of the chapter will focus on 
the particular issue of ethics and deterrence. Subsequently, the role
o f political purpose in strategy will be discussed to indicate the 
necessary reliance on normative referents.
Strategies o f  Ethics
5 Hugh Macdonald, 'Strategic Studies', Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987), pp. 335-6.
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Questions of ethics and nuclear strategy have, for the most part, 
been posed and answered with the implicit or explicit intent o f  
ju s tify ing  either the strategic status quo or the movement to 
denuclearise international relations. Despite the familiarity o f  this 
simple and artificial dividing line in the ongoing nuclear debate, 
there is in fact a remarkable diversity of opinion. In short, there 
are ethical arguments available to support every position along a 
spectrum ranging from 'first use' to abolition. That there is such an 
active moral debate about the nuclear condition is evidence o f  our
difficulty in coming to terms with it. That there is such a diversity
o f  ethical positions is indicative of our predipositions about the 
m a t te r .
In this chapter I suggest that nuclear strategy presents an 
array o f  issues which arc, like the weapons themselves, qualitatively 
different from anything we have had to deal with in the past (hence 
our difficulty). I further suggest that the nature of the debate, while 
quantitatively different in respect to its scope, is not unique in social 
discourse but merely highlights political aspects of ethics (hence 
our predispositions). It may be that questions about ethics and 
strategy collectively represent a microcosm of the political realm, 
and if  that is the case, it is not surprising that we are presented both 
with a great problem and with deeply held convictions about the 
solution. In his concluding remarks, Philip Bobbitt characterises 
the ex is t ing  c ircum stances  o f  nuclear  s trategy , but w ithou t 
ascribing any necessity to them:
Precisely because nuclear strategy has not arisen from
actual conflict, with the fresh recurrence to (and re-
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evaluation of) first principles that war precipitates, it 
has become ideological, and is unable to cure itself.
Because it has lost its connection to strategic reality, it 
is in fact not disengaged from but at the mercy o f  
public opinion.6
A brief and incomplete survey of the issues and the nature o f  
the debate (regretably restricted, here, to debate in the West) will
allow us to deal with the propositions introduced above. The
questions in this area arc the subject of study by, predominantly, 
ethical philosophers and military strategists. According to Hardin, 
et al.,? the two groups take different approaches to the central 
question o f  nuclear deterrence: The strategists, in general, adopt a
realist perspective in which the Soviets figure as opportunistic 
adversaries ,  and the ch ie f  problem is arms c o n tro l* ;  The
philosophers are principally concerned with the morality of various 
nuclear postures and policies, the chief question being whether evil 
may be threatened or done that good may come. Among strategists 
there is diversity of opinion ranging from the status quo to war- 
f ig h t in g ,  co u n te rfo rcc ,  or s tra teg ic  defence  c a p a b i l i t ie s  to
denuclearisa tion  (but not abolition, on grounds o f  ex isten tia l 
deterrence and 'technological recalcitrance'). The philosophers can
be grouped into deontologists (with an interest in the nature o f
*
actions, per se) and utilitarians (concerned with outcomes of actions;
6 Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 286.
7 Russell Hardin, John J. Mearsheimcr, Gerald Dworkin and Robert E. Goodin
(eds). Nuclear Deterrence: Ethics and Strategy (Chicago, IL and London: University of
Chicago Press, 1985). See my review of this volume in Millennium (Vol. 16, No. 1,
Spring 1987), pp. 141 ff.
* On the relationship between arms control and strategy, see again Windsor, op
cit.
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with consequences).
As one author suggests, even arguments that are concerned 
strictly with what one does, rather than with what happens, can be 
challenged by an appeal to consequences.^ Similarly, there are 
limits to what may be justified by a consequentialist (means to end) 
argument. There is room for moral calculation at the margin, where 
both  perspec tives  are s tra ined . A nother au thor argues  tha t 
deterrence can not be properly addressed in the abstract, from 
either a strictly moral or strictly military perspective (the first 
requ ir ing  agreem ent on prem ises,  the second ignoring  the
su b tle t ie s  o f  m anaging  com peting  in te res ts ) ,  and d esc r ib e s
deterrence as a 'real' issue.10 Regardless of how one understands the 
phrase 'real issue', it is apparent that deterrence presents problems 
that are not easily categorised; perhaps not easily conceived of. That 
ethical and practical considerations are conflated in the analysis o f  
deterrence points to the underlying significance o f  morals in
human affairs, and to the political component o f  morality.
No doubt there is a 'strategy of ethics' as well as an ethics of 
strategy. While strategics o f  ethics may be employed in politics 
generally, here it will suffice to explore it in the context o f  
deterrence policy. This exploration need go no further than the 
nuclear debate, as found in the literature, by which one or another 
o f  a wide range o f  ethical positions is employed to support
•9
predispositions and intuitions about deterrent strategics. Such a 
view accounts for the often incongruous battles for 'moral high 
ground' in the politics of defence, by which various interest groups
9 Jeff McMahan, 'Deterrence and Deontology' in Hardin, el al,op. cit., p. 160.
10 Marc Trachtenberg, 'Strategists, Philosophers, and the Nuclear Question' 
Hardin, et al,op. cit., p. 364.
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attempt to couch their objectives in ethical terms. Unfortunately, 
this leads to the cynical conclusion that interests determine values, 
and does not allow us to recognise how greatly values affect
interests, and ought to. It is just this issue which is so clearly
brought out in the nuclear debate.
The fundamental role of values in social and political groups 
is uncovered when we find ourselves debating, as we always debate 
conventional political issues (who gets what, when, where), about 
our values: These values are a matter for collective agreement. 
Those who have some interest in one or another solution to the 
deterrence dilemma recognise the need to validate their interests in 
terms o f  social values: in terms of morality. By rejecting the moral
content of political issues (as Kcnnan docs in the case of foreign 
p o l i c y 1 1 ), this inherent dynamic o f  the political process is 
overlooked. When the stale and civil society are c learly  
distinguished, and the latter concept is relegated to the field o f
'domestic politics' or sociology, the function of social values in the 
field o f  international relations can be ignored. In spite o f
indications to the contrary (from Clausewitz, for example) the 
conventional wisdom seems to opt for a more sanitary  and 
convenient comprehension of political reality which excludes value 
calculations in favour of 'interests', narrowly defined.
It may be that the unprecedented problems o f  deterrence will
■f
force the abandonment of such conventional understandings in 
favour of a conception that has, after all, always been a part of our 
political experience whether we have chosen to acknowledge it in 
the study and practice of politics or not: Value structures are an
11 See the discussion in this chapter, under 'Normative Aspects of Foreign
Policy’.
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integral component of civil societies, and state apparatuses reflect
these values in their policy choices and in their calculation o f  
national interests. In the context of the nuclear debate it becomes 
apparent that our 'apolitical' beliefs about morality are effecting our 
'amoral' views of politics. What is most significant about nuclear 
deterrence is not the novelty of the problem itself, but how it has
forced  an im poverished  conception  o f  in ternational re la tions
(perhaps of politics in general) to its limits. Under conditions o f  
nuclear threat, the notion of 'national interest' loses clarity, and as
we will see in the next section this is also a difficulty for the study
and formation of foreign policy.
Political Purpose
...at least one important lesson can certainly be drawn
from the history of serious political thought. It is that
virtually every human being or assemblage of  human 
beings  at any tim e has good reason , o f ten  
overwhelm ingly good reason, not merely to check 
carefully whether some of their current factual beliefs 
are in fact valid but also to reconsider whether all their 
current desires, hopes fears and commitments are in 
fact well-advised or morally decent.12
Beyond the truism of 'technological recalcitrance’, we may well be 
su ffe r ing  from the more profound afflic tion  o f  'no rm ative
12 John Dunn, Interpreting Political Responsibility: Essavs 1981-1989. op.
cit., p. 129.
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recalcitrance’ - having learned to 'Stop Worrying and Love the
Bomb', or at least live with it, we may find ourselves unable or 
unw illing  to re-educate  ourselves or to withdraw from th is  
a d d i c t i o n .  *3 Having constructed adequate ju s ti f ica t ions  for 
perpetuating the conditions o f  deterrence, we may find ourselves 
lacking both sympathy for, and understanding of, any variations or
alternatives which may be presented. Lacking the norm ative 
foundations for reassessment or introspection, we may find such 
alternatives not simply idealistic and utopian, but incomprehensible 
and surreal. In the absence of normative reference points, such 
alternatives may fall victim to cognitive dissonance before their 
merits can be considered. Of course, even those alternatives which 
are granted their day in the court of public debate will face the
fierce cross examination of status-quo assumptions. This is not to say
that deterrence can or should be immune to the process of social and
political change, which sweeps all other issues before it, but simply 
that as a recognised dilemma the condition of deterrence should not 
be allowed to achieve the status of an historical necessity in the way 
that technological progress (and perhaps even Enlightenment) has 
slipped beneath (or beyond) our critical gaze.14
The lesson to be drawn from rapid change in Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union in 1989-90 and after is that what seemed to be
an im mutable fact of international life - overt confron ta tion
*
between East and West - has all but vanished, leaving us with the
*3 I confess I am unable to identify the original author of the delightfully 
euphemistic phrase 'technological recalcitrance', but she/he should be congratulated 
for compressing the wealth of implications attending the simple existence of nuclear 
weapons (and the impossibility of 'uninvcnting' them) into such a nutshell. The
phrase 'How I learned to stop worrying and Love the Bomb' is the alternative title of
the film Dr. Stranpelove. made in the sixties and still well-known as a satire on Cold 
War paranoia.
14 See again Theodor Adorno, The Dialectic of Enlightenment.op. cit.
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idea of deterrence but little reason to employ it now that European
security is being redefined. Having backed the rather traditional
notion of deterrence so heavily, we lack the critical and innovative 
approaches which changing circumstances require. A normative 
approach provides a suitable platform for addressing changing
political values, in this case the range of values and purposes
implicated in considerations of security, such that the contingencies 
o f  change  need not p resen t in su rm oun tab le  o b s tac le s  o r  
des tab ilis ing  uncerta in ties .
Being sensitive to the normative development o f  global 
politics and society is not just a means of estimating what is accepted, 
or how to engineer such acceptance - in the sense that Adorno's 
Culture Industry leads us to choose 'sameness' - but is also an 
opportunity to reflect on what it is that is being accepted: Even if  we
are prepared to condemn ourselves to sameness, preserving only the 
illusion o f  choice, we may still (before losing conciousness
altogether) wish to be sure that we can live with the self-imposed
sentence. Living under conditions of deterrence is a troubling 
matter not only because of the potential effects of the irrational acts 
which the ra tionality  of nuclear deterrence dem ands fo r  its 
realisation, but because of the active effects on the collective psyche
of being committed to irrationality. Of course, it may well be that
human existence is characterised by irrationality, but for the most 
part it is possible to seek refuge in the delusion of rational choice. 
Nuclear deterrence offers no such solace.
Perhaps the most obvious point about nuclear deterrence
policies is that they represent a technical solution to a political
problem ; a technical means to achieving a human purpose.
Certain ly , the history o f  human development has often been
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measured by the employment of new technology, but there is some 
room for suggesting that political rather than technical skills are 
required to resolve political problems, and that the application o f  
technology is sometimes dysfunctional. Among strategic thinkers 
there is little doubt that the key to making and understanding 
strategy is the recognition of the predominance of po li t ica l purpose  
as the first and last justification of any strategy. This view is 
invariably supported by reference to the famous philosopher o f  war,
Carl von Clausewitz (who, in crude summary, held war to be an 
extension o f  politics), or to other prominent figures who have 
reiterated his argument, and added their own evidence by way of  
e x a m p l e . 1 5 Definitions of strategy have usually emphasised the
difference between strategy and tactics, and although Clausewitz's 
1805 article in Neue Bcllona criticised Bulow's superficial distinction 
based on range from the enemy, his own definition makes a 
distinction to emphasise the idea of purpose:
Tactics constitute the theory of the use of armed forces 
in battle; strategy forms the theory of using battle for
the purposes of the war.1 6
The 'purposes of the war' arc, by definition, political purposes.
A more modern strategist, Basil Liddell Hart, defines strategy
- i
as
^  See Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kricge (On War), especially: Book 1, Chapters
I and II; Book 7, Chapter XXII; and all nine chapters of Book 8. He argued that the only 
rational thing possible is the '...subordination of the military point of view to the 
political...' (p. 598).
See Peter Paret, 'Clausewitz', Chapter 7 in Paret (ed), Makers of Modem 
Strategy: from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1986), p. 190. This volume is a sequel to another by the same principal title 
(Princeton, 1943 and 1971).
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...the art of distributing and applying military means to 
fulfill ends of policy...17
Having emphasised the place of politics in strategy, it should also be 
said that many strategists have concerned themselves for the most 
part with strictly technical (sometimes tactical) considerations; no 
doubt they are significant considerations, but nevertheless they are 
the minutiae o f  strategy and far removed from the underlying 
political aspects. This has the unfortunate effect not only o f  
reducing awareness of the pervasive political questions, but also o f  
d is tancing  (through esoteric discourse) strategic decision-m aking 
and discussion from non-specialists whether in political office or 
among the general population. In particular, some fundamental 
issues have slipped past the public domain in the rapid advance o f  
nuclear technology. Indeed, even the ’experts’ are hard pressed to 
keep up with new developments in technology, and this has masked 
the need to consider political advances.
Aside from the question of political aims as the justification of 
strategy, a further question has been posed by the advent of nuclear 
weapons and their essentially political attributes, as distinct from 
notable practical attributes. The question is whether a 'nuclear 
strategy' is logically possible at all, since what political purpose 
could be served by using these weapons is unclear, and it would in 
any case be difficult to control their use under the likely  
circumstances o f  nuclear conflict (of which there is, happily, no 
empirical knowledge in the first place). The most consistent theme
17 B.H. Liddell Hart, Strategy: the indirect approach (London: Faber and Faber, 
1968), p. 334.
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in nuclear strategy has been deterrence, which by definition is not 
concerned with 'battle' and 'military means' - at least, not in the first 
instance. The deterrence debate often pivots on what is to be
deterred, and how (for example, can nuclear weapons deter the use
o f  conventional weapons?), and whether the deterrent will be 
credible (seeing is believing, and believing is everything), so 
clearly tactical considerations creep in, but only with respect to
implementing a deterrent and not necessarily in order to effect a 
w ar-fighting strategy (as in the doctrine of 'Mutual A ssured  
Destruction'). There is the further complication o f  preparing for
war as part of a deterrent (as in 'Flexible Response'), but again this 
does not bear on the conceptually distinct notion of deterrence as a
means of a v o id in g  war, not engaging in it. Thus deterrence does not
amount to a strategy at all, if what is meant by strategy is a planned 
application of military means (and this is exactly what is left
unattended by deterrence): the real strategic problem is about what 
happens if  and when deterrence fails. Since the political
significance o f  nuclear tactics cannot be judged in advance, should 
deterrence fail, there arc no guidlincs for action; the elements o f
tim e, irra tionality  and uncertainty deny the foundation o f  a 
politically directed strategy for the use of nuclear weapons, and as
Lawrence Freedman says:
The study of nuclear strategy is therefore the study o f
the nonuse of these weapons. Suppositions about their
actual employment in combat may influence the ir
peacetim e role, but historical experience p rovides
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minimal gu idance .1 **
What this tells us about nuclear strategy is that we are entirely
guided by the norms inherent in our theories of international 
political life, and in our assumptions about the adversarial character 
o f  relations between states or societies.
Philip Bobbitt cites Freedman as being exemplary of an older 
school o f  modern history, 'concerned with how political events
influenced strategic ideas'; His own view is that certain intellectual
patterns, or ideologies, determine the shape of strategic doctrine and 
his approach to the subject, therefore, is to
look for connections between events and ideas, without 
assuming that historical reality is the mold for our 
strategic concepts - assuming, one might say, the 
r e v e r s e .1 9
As we have no concrete, empirical, ’objective' grounds for 
strategy (a partisan interest in survival is not objective), it must rely
on value structures in our strategic thinking rather than in overt 
and tangible interests. This docs not resolve the problem, of course, 
but it does suggest caution, and perhaps even a way of seeking to 
understand the strategic assumptions that we rest so heavily on. In 
his Introduction to Politics. Harold Laski concluded that
A generation, in fact, like our own, whose feet lie so
Lawrence Freedman, The First Two Generations of Nuclear Strategists', 
Chapter 25 in Paret (ed). Makers of Modern Strategy, op. cit., p. 735.
19 Bobbit, op. cit., p. 14.
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near 10 ihc abyss, has no right to optimism about its 
future; the fact that it knows the way is no proof that it 
will choose the way. In this, paradoxically enough, 
there lies perhaps our greatest hope. The dangers 
about us arc so tangible and immediate that we are 
driven to experiment and innovation. We have learned 
by tragic experience the fragility of civilised habits...^®
Though the reference is to the international community, it might 
well be to to the fragility of our habits of mind. Being aware of this 
shortcoming in our understanding of the world, we may be less 
likely to destroy that world out of an ignorance which is attenuated 
only by the values we collectively adopt, or live with. When security 
depends on values, both as the basis of strategic thought and the 
substance of that which is to be secured, it behoves us to approach 
the issue from a normative perspective that is overtly concerned
with the origin and evolution of such values.
Having employed deterrence (reliant on political values for 
meaning) as an example o f  the normative character o f  central 
problems in international relations, it should not then be assumed 
that the lessons of the problems of nuclear strategy can be applied 
in their particulars to the problems o f  international relations in
general. Indeed, Bobbitt makes this point, while noting (in the same
■?
passage) that deterrence theory arises from general assumptions 
about national behaviour and human nature:
N uclear deterrence is, we may be reminded, an
20 H.J. Laski, Introduction to Politics, revised edition prepared by Martin 
Wight (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1951), p. 104-5.
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e x t ra o rd in a r i ly  l im ited  theo ry  tha t r e l ie s  on  
extraordinarily  broad assumptions. The theory is 
limited to those conflicts in which the fundamental 
security of the state is put at risk. Thus the theory is o f  
limited value in international relations.2 1
At the same time, deterrence strategies reflect general assumptions 
about the nature of international relations, and reveal the tenuous 
relationship between these assumptions and that 'knowledge o f  
reality' they aspire to represent. It should also be recognised that 
some aspects of the 'zero-sum' thinking characteristic of Cold W ar 
strategy may have spilled over into the foreign policy-formation in 
g e n e r a l .
Through the employment o f  a normative approach to the 
study o f  international relations, it is possible to address the value 
structures which are the foundations both of this social realm and o f  
our systematic knowledge of it. An appreciation of the contingency 
of existing political practices and cpistcmological assumptions is the 
starting point for a more subtle and flexible theoretical account o f  
the international realm, including such central problems as nuclear 
d e t e r r e n c e .
An example of such contingency is the significant change in
European security relations following political reform in the Soviet
*
Union and Eastern Europe, and Western responses to this reform, 
most notably during 1989-90. What had long seemed a truth about 
East-West relations crumbled along with the Berlin Wall - witness 
two contrasting graffitti painted on the Wall, the first shortly after
21 Bobbitt, op. cit., p. 7.
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its erection, the second after the beginning of its demolition:
VARHEIT 1ST KONKRET (TRUTH IS CONCRETE) - Brecht
DEE MAUER 1ST WEG (THE WALL IS DOWN/GONE)
The undoing of this truth is incomplete and uncertain, of course, 
since the loss of one truth demands the creation of another, and this 
process is only beginning.
Some cling to old and reliable ideas until the last moment, or 
longer, indicating that it is often the domain of values rather than 
the concrete  circum stance that determ ines ’correct ' behaviour: 
following the reunification of Germany in October 1990, officers 
from the Bundeswchr went to inspect equipment newly inherited 
from the disbanded Nationalc Volksarmec (NVA) only to find that in 
spite of recent cordiality in inter-German relations there were row 
upon row of army vehicles fully loaded with ammunition, ready to 
move at a moments notice in the event of invasion from the West -
oddly enough, this was still thought to be a real possibility until the
final moments o f  reunification, indicating 'a m ilitary  machine
whose procedures, attitudes and expectations differed fundamentally 
from those of its Western counterparts'.2 2
A contemporaneous book reviewer notes that in the aftermath 
o f  East-West confrontation 'there exists much talk of new security, 
but little consistency on the concept, its goals or prescriptions', 
while at the same time there is an underlying concern with the
discovery of commonality, which 'must be discovered, exposed and
22 The Independent. 8 October 1990.
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detailed, not simply invoked or alluded to, as is current fashion'.2 3 
Another reviewer notes a speculation concerning perspectives on 
deterrence 'that norms of international behaviour and perceptions 
o f  legitimacy that derive from these norms substantially affect
behaviour, and points to the 'immediate relevance of research into 
the institutionalisation of belief systems'.24
For the purposes of the present argument, these statements
and observations about changing security  relations in Europe 
confirm the general case about the significance o f  norms in
international relations, and support the claim that a normative 
approach to the study of international relations has a unique
contribution to make. One writer goes so far as to suggest that:
If  nothing else, 1989 has demonstrated beyond any
doubt that the study of politics is an art form; it is by no
means a science, even of the 'social' variety.2 ^
This refers, of course, to the unpredictability of events in that 
year. It is, however, possible to pursue 'science' in the sense of
system atic know ledge, providing the contingency o f  both the
subject matter and our knowledge of it is recognised and accepted.
Within those parameters, it is possible to account for the values
which inform both the political relations under scrutiny and
22 See O. Weaver, P. Lemaitre and E. Tromer (eds), European Polyphony: 
Perspectives Bevond the East-West Confrontation (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), 
reviewed by Catherine Murray in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol.
19, No. 2, Summer 1990).
24 See P.C. Stem, R. Axelrod, R. Jervis and R. Radner (eds), Perspectives on 
Deterrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), reviewed by Edward Rhodes in 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1990).
2^ Graham Evans, from his review in Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies (Vol. 19, No. 2, Summer 1990).
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understandings of that political 'reality' in such a way as to avoid the
crisis of truth that must otherwise accompany radical change.
Normative Aspects of Foreign Policy
Having shown the tenuous and indeterminate character o f  nuclear 
strategy, as a particular and no doubt unique aspect of policy which 
is highly dependent on a normative framework, we may now
consider the extent to which foreign policy more generally is 
influenced by values in the process of its formation. If values can
be considered significant in foreign policy formation, the analysis
of  this process - and of the product (policy) - must take account of 
the norms which govern it.To begin with, it is worth considering the
traditional 'normative' question of ethics as it applies to the analysis
and formulation of foreign policy. There is a fundamental premise 
to any discussion of ethical problems in policy formation: policy is 
not amoral. This premise is not universally accepted, and indeed the 
contrary  position is part o f  the traditional realist v iew  o f
in ternational relations (although there is clearly a long and 
honoured tradition o f  concern with moral issues such as, for
example, just war theory, or the implied morality of a balance of 
power in the tradition of Vattel). In order to contend with the view 
that foreign policy is not primarily concerned with moral questions, 
I will provide a brief critique of such an argument.
George Kennan, in his article entitled 'Morality and Foreign
Policy ',  m ain ta ins  the position that foreign policy is the
responsibility of governments ('not of individuals or entire peoples')
and that governm ents must act on considerations of national
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interest, which has no moral quality. in excluding individuals and
peoples, Kennan separates state and civil society, denying the moral
agency of the state. This is a position which may be convenient, but
is problematic at the margin (in times of war, for example). He
argues that governments must protect 'tangible and demonstrable
interests', clearly distinguished from moral principles. In the event,
he recognises that moral principles have some role (at least where a
government has the power to choose between policies), but that
expediency is a common motive for practical reasons. By this
recognition he detracts from his own position, but without providing
an account. He suggests that resources be employed to advance 'the
national interest and the interests of world peace', but does not raise
the possibility that the two may conflict. He states that 'the
renunciation o f  self-interest, which is all morality implies, can
n ever  be ra tionalised  by purely secu la r  and m a te r ia l is t ic
considerations'. He further recommends 'a policy founded on
recognition of the national interest, reasonably conceived, as the
legitimate motivation for a large portion of the nation's behaviour',
but does not acknowledge the connection between 'national interest,
reasonably conceived' and the 'renunciation of  self-interest'. The
question of enlightened self-interest is begged, as it is precisely the
rationality of a conceived national interest which is at issue here.
The necessity of conditioning short or medium term self-interests by
considerations of long term collective interests cannot be denied -
indeed, this is the logic of domestic sources of 'national interest'.
Kennan also points to the risks of nuclear war and the abuse o f  the
natural environment as being overriding concerns, for which past
experience has not prepared us. He asks if there is not a moral
component to addressing these problems. I believe there is,
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obviously. He is unsure.
Kennan concludes by referring to the great force o f  ’true 
moral behaviour', and the risk of losing it through a diminished 
ability ’to distinguish between the real and the unreal'. It is, I argue, 
the p reoccupation  with sub jective  in terp re ta tions  o f  na tiona l 
interest that has been largely responsible for dim inishing our 
comprehension of reality in the realm of international relations, 
and K ennan unw itting ly  m akes an argum ent for no rm ative  
approaches in raising the issue. I contend that Kennan still has it 
wrong, as do many in the realist school, and that no useful 
separation of enlightened interest and moral sensibility can be made 
(absent a naive understanding of morality).
The Current Study o f  Foreign Policy
As consideration of  values has not been a significant aspect o f  
foreign policy analysis in its traditional manifestations, it will be 
useful to discuss the present state of this area of study.
The study of foreign policy has retained many features o f  the 
behav iou ra l  revo lu tion  in social sc ience ,  c o n ce n tra t in g  on  
quantita tive analyses of empirical events; of the 'inputs ' and 
'outputs' o f  the foreign policy making process. A comparative 
method is often used, having the advantage of revealing differences 
and exposing assumptions, but also the disadvantage of generalising 
the conditions of policy formation over different social and political 
systems. An historical perspective may also provide a critical 
distance from the subject matter - 'a temporal rather than spatial
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d i s t a n c i n g '2^ - but again the disadvantage of conflating different 
historical circumstances undermines the scientistic goal of objective 
observation which a comparative approach aspires to. This is not to 
dismiss comparison out of hand, as there are clear advantages to the
method, for example, over a strictly discriptive account of a single 
policy decision. Comparison itself provides a means of relative or 
ordinal evaluation.
Nevertheless, there are shortcomings in the conventional 
approaches to foreign policy analysis, which are to some extent 
reflections o f  the formation of policy (or, perhaps, vice versa). 
Recent authors have pointed to the character of these shortcomings, 
and it is no surprise to sec that they bear on our discussion o f
normative theory. Michael Dillon has pointed to the danger of an 
overly abstract com parative analysis 'removed from ... human 
com munities with specific histories and cu ltures '.27 Elsewhere, 
Harold Saunders has argued that it is necessary to look beyond 
abstract state sytcms to human beings.28 The importance of these 
remarks is both practical and theoretical, having significance for 
both the formation and analysis of foreign policy. Saunders argues 
that there are forces at work in global politics other than the
trad i t io n a l  tools  o f  ra tional s ta tec ra f t ,  these la t te r  be ing  
predominantly instruments of power. There are also instruments o f  
persuasion and cooperation which have 'organising and directing
power' through the formation of ideas and perspectives: 'organising 
power as they become widely accepted ways of understanding events
2^ G.M. Dillon (cd.), Defence Policy Making: A Comparative Analysis 
(Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1988), p. 7.
27 Ib id .
28 Harold H. Saunders, The Arab-Isreali Conflict in a Global Perspective', 
John Steinbruner (ed.). Restructuring American Foreign Policy (Washington: 
Brookings, 1989), p. 226.
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and directing power because of the actions that flow from them', 
which can revealed by paying 'more attention to the larger political 
environment in which peoples reach fundamental judgements about 
peace, war, negotiation, and economic change1.29 Thus Saunders 
emphasises political action over contests of force as a means to 
influence change, and suggests that the concept of 'relationship' be 
used to encompass the interactive political process.
Similarly, Neil Richardson argues for a 'dyadic' approach 
which views the state not simply as an independent monadic actor, 
but is sensitive to the interdependence of decision making processes 
which requires examination of at least 'two stale decision-making 
leaderships sim ultaneously’.30 Further, Charles Kegley suggests that 
what is needed 'to include human beings and their decisions and 
motives in accounts of foreign policy is an integrating concept' - the 
one he offers is 'decision regime’ - and goes on to say that 'the field 
has suffered from the absence of such a concept'.3 1 The above 
concerns, arguments and proposed concepts point clearly to aspects 
o f  normative inquiry which have already been discussed here, 
providing not only support for the present thesis, but examples o f  
normative theoretical approaches in application.
In an article surveying the area of foreign policy studies, 
Steve Smith outlines...
• i
five main ways of studying foreign policy: through a
29 Ibid., p. 227.
30 Neil R. Richardson, ’Dyadic Case Studies in the Comparative Study of 
Foreign Policy Behaviour' in Charles F. Herman, Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and James N. 
Rosenau (eds.). New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (Boston, MA: Allen and 
Unwin, 1987), p. 161.
3 * Charles W. Kegley, Jr., 'Decision Regimes and the Comparative Study of 
Foreign Policy’, in ibid., p. 249.
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domestic politics perspective; international relations 
theory; comparative foreign policy theory; case studies; 
and middlc-range theory.32
Of the first, being governed by the particular normative 
system o f the society in question, there is no guarantee that 
resulting observations of policy formation will provide any more 
than some insight into national bureaucratic structures and political 
practices. Smith says that 'by stressing choice and decision, they 
ignore or downplay constraints and non-dccisional influences on 
behaviour; as such they hinder the task of explaining the dynamism 
o f  international r e l a t i o n s ' . 33 Perhaps more pertinent to the present 
thesis is Smith's suggestion that international relations theory is too 
general to stand as ' t he  theory o f  foreign policy', due to the 
contingent circumstances of its formation and 'different empirical 
c o n t e n t ’. 34 Of comparative attempts to combine internal and 
external causes, he says that the epistcmology is too 'firmly rooted in 
positivism ' to take alternative approaches into account. 35 Case 
studies, or historical analysis - the most prevalent form of foreign 
policy analysis - arc, claims Smith, idiosyncratic and an unsuitable 
basis for theory building, and arc less than forthcoming about the 
theoretical assumptions of these individual a c c o u n t s . 36 Finally, 
middle-range theory offers a middle ground between general theory 
and historical analysis of particular cases. These theories tend to
32 Steve Smith, ’Foreign Policy Analysis and International Relations', 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, Summer 1987), p. 346.
33 ibid.
34 Ibid.
35 ibid .. p.  3 4 7 .
36 ibid.
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focus on a specific aspect of a general feature of foreign policy (not 
unlike the present approach). Smith concludes that the principal 
difficulty about forming a theory of foreign policy is that 'all o f  
international relations seems to be about foreign policy '.37 This 
suggests that most insights on the nature of foreign policy are from 
without the specialised study, or sub-discipline, and gives weight to 
K ratochwil's  observation about the dangers of 'an unw arranted 
narrowing o f  focus in regard to international relations'.3 ®
In the context of this thesis, the problematic in foreign policy 
formation concerns the basis of policy choice the assumptions upon 
which policy-makers must rely as being shared foundational points 
of reference for the state or society on whose behalf they are 
making policy decisions. Traditionally, reference is made to the 
'national interest' as the determining objective of all policy, and yet 
this concept of national interest is notoriously problematic, being 
defined only in vague terms. The sources of this interest, and 
consequently the grounds for claims about its representativeness, 
are highly elusive - arc the interests concerned those o f  the 
government or state apparatus, those of a political elite or o f  
particular interests groups, or arc they genuinely shared interests 
common to the entire society?39
In his discussion of European integration, Paul Taylor notes
the significance of two differing views on the need for a socio-
■?
psychological community to underwrite sovereign authority, which
37 lbid.% p. 348.
3^ Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions, op. cit., p. 5.
39 It is worth noting here the significance of Kenneth Arrow's impossibility 
theorem, from the field of public choice theory, which suggests that the outcome of any 
collective choice function is necessarily irrational, and that perfect representation of 
individual preferences in a public choice decision is impossible if even a few basic 
conditions of democratic politics are to be met.
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'profoundly affected attitudes on the status of the decisions of the 
existing European institutions'. Ncofunctionalists, such as Haas, 
in i t ia l ly  regarded  national governm ents ' recogn ition  o f  an 
in ternational ins ti tu tion 's  com petence as suffic ien t,  only la te r  
considering the problem of "authority-legitimacy transfer". Taylor 
then considers the view that Federalism provides 'a political solution, 
a way of managing different interests’; a view, he says, o f  which 
Mitrany and Rosenticl arc suspicious. The older Functionalist view 
'insisted that the development of socio-psychological community was 
the essential precondition of sovereignty’, while at the same time 
emphasising that a high level of capacity - the ability to receive, 
understand and act authoritatively on demands - is required o f  an 
institution to ensure stability and maintain legitimacy, especially in 
a disparate community.40
These reflections on the problems of political integration, and 
especially the question of legitimacy as opposed to mere efficacy, 
reflect the tension arising from the differing points of reference in 
either ’interests’ or 'values'. The matter of institutional capacity 
described above refers to the accomodation of interests, in the first 
instance, although clearly these interests may be either conditioned 
or determined by an overriding value attached to the 'idea o f  
Europe', or to ameliorating the stigma of recent national political 
history (e.g. fascism) by complementing it with a broader political
■7
identity, or to future prospects of a united Europe in the context of 
the global political economy. Indeed, the Functionalists felt elite 
expert opinion, operating through international institutions, would 
influence broader public opinion and build the necessary sense o f
40 Paul Taylor, The Limits of European Integration (London: Croom Helm, 
1983), pp. 11-14.
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community. Similarly, the emphasis on a socio-psychological
community ‘as the precondition of sovereignty’ clearly reflects a 
recognition  of the im portance of norms or values in the
achievement of political goals such as integration, though it does not
ignore the connection between these values and the successful 
pursuit of particular interests. The relevance of this discussion for 
the present thesis is the implication that values have primacy over 
interests in respect of their role in determining the framework in 
which interests are to be pursued (in this example, a shift to 'a
European focus for group interests') whether or not this framework 
itself is comprised primarily of shared values or a constitutional 
community o f  competing interests.4 1
Values and Interests in Foreign Policy
It has been argued earlier that reference to interests is problematic
just because they arc not self-justifying or even self-evident but are,
rather, dependent on value systems which are inherent in any 
factual or empirical referent that may be paraded to g am er 
confidence in a policy. In discussing interest as a guide to foreign 
policy, Vernon Van Dyke observes that ’particularly in the writing 
o f  Hans Morgenthau concerning the national interest much of the 
trouble is definitional rather than cpistcmological'. Van Dyke 
critiques Morganthau’s infamous formulation - "interest defined in 
terms o f  power" - claiming that 'he does not himself advance a
definition explicitly, whether or not in terms of power. In truth, he
41 Ibid.,  p. 15, 19.
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seems almost deliberately to accentuate the vagueness of the key
te rm s '.4 2
For Van Dyke, it is clarifying to distinguish  betw een
'dependent' and 'independent' interests and between 'goal' and
'instrum ental ' values, but the distinction between values and
interests is not vigorous in his hierarchical scheme and he admits to
the similarity o f  meaning of  these terms in common usage.
N evertheless, the problem with conventional assumptions about 
interests is brought out well, especially in the sense that the 
relationship between values and interests is denied when values are
held to be simply confusing, and thus something not just to be
ignored but actively avoided in the policy-formation process. It may
be that this process itself, being largely the business o f  a
profess ional e l ite ,  has been somehow d isengaged from the 
mainstream of political activity. Van Dyke notes that
the well known distinction has been made between
"politics" and "administration," the suggestion being
that politics is the realm of choice among values and
that administration is (or should be made to be) the
realm where technical expertise is relied upon to
prom ote  the values  that have been p o l i t ic a l ly
se lec ted .43
Further to this problem of defining the national interest,
even when acceptably defined, is a problem peculiar to a foreign
42 Vernon Van Dyke, 'Values and Interests' American Political Science Review 
(Vol. 56, September 1962), p. 573. The reference is to Morgenthau, Politics Among 
Nations. 3rd. Ed. (1960), pp. 4-5.
43 Ibid., p. 572.
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policy which purports to reflect this interest: the policy (and
interests) must be projected into an international forum where the 
contingent origins of the policy in the society which generates it 
will become all too obvious when compared to other competing
interests and policies of equally contingent origins. There is
nothing external to the policy-generating  society which will 
guarantee the acceptance or even the comprehension of that policy 
by others in the international sphere. As a matter of logic, any
foundation for such policy must consequently refer to some
internationally accepted frame of reference if it is to be properly 
considered foreign policy, as opposed to something labelled 'foreign 
policy' which is in fact intended only for domestic consumption, and 
indeed only valid for domestic consumption since it has no 
in te rna tiona l currency .
In many respects this sort of problem has been overcome by a 
wide range of international institutional values, or norm ative
systems (international law, intergovernmental organisations, policy 
cooperation or international regimes, etc.), including the most
general form of these: common practice. That is to say, to the extent
that the foundations of political choice and action are to be found in 
the values of the society to which they apply, this must be as true of 
international society (whatever conception of this one may hold) as 
it is of national societies. The ability to comprehend and to function 
in the international realm is coincidental with the development of 
normative systems emulating the social structures that are more
familiar in particular societies.44
44 Note, however, the difficulties associated with 'the domestic analogy'. See 
Hidemi Suganami, The Domestic Analogy and World Order Proposals (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989).
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Returning to the European experience once again, as an 
obvious example o f  political cooperation in action (not forgetting 
Caricom, and other similar cases), the development of European 
Political Cooperation (EPC) provides a clear indication o f  the 
normative processes influencing foreign policy formation: 'EPC has 
created some habits and methods of problem-solving which have 
been taken up by o ther governm ent c irc le s ' .4 ^ EPC is an 
international normative structure 'under construction', so to speak, 
but it simply reflects the normative character o f  international 
political life that is everywhere, if nowhere so obvious as when 
manifested in the overt language of political cooperation.
In the context of international relations theory, problems 
arising from traditional political and epistcmological conceptions 
arise once again in respect to the example o f  the European 
e x p e r ie n c e :
Many of the early theories imposed a highly positive 
value judgement on any kind of integration (as a 
reaction, naturally to World War II). With a general 
dec line  o f  the p ro - in teg ra tion  m ood in teg ra tion  
theories were often perceived as 'ideology' which was 
harmful to practical ventures like EPC.4 ^
This aversion to 'harmful ideology' reveals the inability  o f  
trad i t io n a l  in te rna tiona l re la tions  theories  and concep ts  to 
distinguish between a cynically purposive ideological position and
4  ^ Alfred Pijpcrs, Elfricde Rcgclsbcrgcr and Wolfgang Wessels (eds), European 
Political Cooperation in the 1980s: A Common Foreign Policy for Western Europe? 
(Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1988), p. 269.
46 Ibid., p. 232.
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the ordinary - indeed, definitional - political activity of identifying 
and pursuing collective goals. When politics arc viewed as nothing 
more than the competitive pursuit of particularistic interests, any 
subtlety in conceptions of the political is lost. When the political
realm is recognised as the realm of changing or developing values, 
the importance of theoretical endeavours becomes evident: theories 
provide a normative structure of knowledge which is similar in form 
to the normative structure of the political events under examination.
If theory is reduced to mere descriptive typology or doctrinal 
statements, it is no wonder the value of theory is questioned.
In the critique of theory there is often a confusion as to
its claims. Theory is not a blueprint for action: it is
decidedly not a doctrine and above all it is not an 
ideology: While avoiding the rich theory as to the
nature of theory itself, we may simply state that its 
main attempt is to provide a coherent account and 
explanation of a phenomenon (which it often defines 
itself). Tangentia lly , it might have a p red ic tive  
c a p a c i ty .4 7
C onc lu s io n s
Christopher Hill, writing on future research tasks relating to EPC, 
points to a 'more directly normative' question which brings the 
p resen t d iscussion  back to the general theme o f norm ative
47 Ibid.,  p. 234.
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structures in international society, which must then be held to be
among the determinants of foreign policy as much as they are the
product o f  national foreign policy (w hether such policy  is 
intentionally or unintentionally supportive of international norms):
It is the appropriate balance between self-regarding
and systemic objectives. This is almost what Arnold
Wolfers designated as the divide between possessional 
and milieu goals, and is a central dilemma for any 
foreign policy, national or collective. Essentially it 
refers to the fact that any actor in in ternational
relations has to decide, in general and on a case-by- 
casc basis, what balance it is going to strike between 
pusuing national concerns and looking after the fabric
of international society as a whole - which many would 
characterise as being in its own long-term interest.4 **
Of course, the differences among particular societies  in
respect to establishing and preserving absolute value references 
(the substance of nationalism, for example) dictates that their
relationship with an international society will be distinctive - there 
is no prospect of a perfectly shared understanding of world affairs
given that each actor views the world from within a different 
referential context. However, this docs not mean that normative
theory cannot be employed in understanding the manner in which 
foreign policies are generated in individual societies, or indeed how
they are likely to be pcrcicvcd by other international actors.
48 Ibid., p. 222.
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regardless of common reference points in an international society.
As Kratochwil says of the tendency to focus on national decision­
making processes:
By reviving a more philosophically oriented discussion 
which attempts to assess the role of norms in decision­
making, if all goes well we not only counteract such an
unw arran ted  narrow ing  o f  focus in regard  to 
international relations, but also gain a better picture of 
why actors in the international as well as in the 
domestic arena have to resort to norms.***
Furthermore, what has been established in the way of  an 
in ternational society can itse lf  generate particu lar values and 
apprehensions, and being a part of this 'society' too, individual 
actors may find sufficient common ground for the conduct o f  their 
mutual affairs. What is especially significant is that there now exists 
a body o f  vital central issues (security ,  developm ent,  the
env ironm ent, etc.) which simply cannot be addressed  from
contingent perspectives, and which admit of no culture-bound 
solution (notwithstanding that these issues may be produced or 
conditioned by a dominant or hegemonic global culture: a normative
process). These issues, consequently, exemplify objects o f  study
which are uniquely and distinctively the concern of 'international 
r e la t io n s ' .
A norm ative understanding of political life, which is 
conscious of the contingent solutions to the problem of 'the absolute'
*9 Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules. Norms, and Decisions, op. cit.t p.5.
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which individual societies rely on, may provide a means o f  
addressing the difficulties of transferring even a part o f  this
reliance to a system of international values.
What prospects there arc for such an international value 
structure arise principally from the uniqueness (and perhaps also
the intransigence) of the issues involved, all o f  which are the 
products of modern international relations and consequently have 
some meaning and reference beyond individual societies. Naturally, 
this meaning impinges on the practical possibilities o f  individual
actors, as is best appreciated from a theoretical approach which
views 'normative  cxpcctaiions as a filler... on what decision-makers 
cons ider  worth try ing '.5 ^ Largely because norms 'enable and 
constra in  the playing of ro le s ' ,5 1 the re la tive ly  sub jec t ive  
estimation of what is feasible contributes to the shared meaning
ascribed to the international milieu, and a shared understanding o f  
the values operating there.
That societies remain individual and distinct nonetheless is a 
source of difficulty and the challenge for any foreign policy that 
seeks to address global issues. John Dunn, writing about the broader
challenge of formulating state policy in the absence of a coherent 
conception of the Political Good and under conditions of an abiding 
nuclear threat, concludes thus:
On balance it still seems likely - despite the appalling
record of organized violence in the twentieth century -
that states today do somewhat more good than harm.
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith (eds), Explaining and Understanding 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 191-193.
51 lbid.% p. 193.
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But what is unnerving about the world we live in now
is the sense of a challenge... It is hard to see how we can 
hope to address this challenge except, in the end, 
through the responses of state powers. But whether
states themselves could in principle display the causal 
capacity to face this challenge successfully for us is at 
best as yet quite unclear.^ 2
It is argued here that global issues, by definition, arise and 
must be resolved in the context of a global or international political 
realm with its own history and its own contingent solutions to the 
problem of political meaning. Thus it is essential to arrive at an 
adequate understanding of the normative pattern of this broader
society, and its relation to the similar if more restricted normative 
environments of distinct political groups which both act in and
constitute international or global society.
52  J oh n  Du nn ,  I n t e r p r e t i n g  Po l i t i c a l  R e s n o n s i b i l i t v :  B s s a v s  1981-1989. op. 
cit., p. 141.
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C o n c l u s i o n
Thus do philosophy and reality, theory and action, 
work in the same circle indefinitely.
William James1
It has been shown that normative theory plays a central role in the 
study o f  international relations, in accordance with the initial 
premise. The questions posed at the outset concerning the role of 
normative theory - how, why, what - have been addressed by
reference to methodological distinctions, to traditions reflected in 
the literature, and to the depth and breadth o f  the normative
dimensions o f  international relations.
How normative theory plays a role was shown by examination 
of^ methodological problems raised in the first chapter, problems 
which resurfaced throughout, although their im portance is not
simply in indicating how normative theory accounts for choice of 
methods (and not just methods which locate values), since the
questions  about method right away im plicate  ep is tem olog ica l 
justifications of methodology. The role of normative theory was ) 
shown to be the establishment of the relationship between values f 
and facts arising from the interpretive function o f  theory. \
Why normative theory plays a role is consequent upon 
theoretical traditions which govern the d isc ip linary  study o f
1 William James, A Pluralistic Universe (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press, 1977), p. 149.
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international relations, and a reading of the literature shows that
these traditions have both implicitly included and exp lic it ly
marginalised normative theory. Here the role of normative theory
was shown to be the rcintroduction of values into a body o f  theory 
otherwise preoccupied with interests.
What the role of normative theory amounts to has been shown 
in chapters addressing the philosophical foundations o f  a normative 
approach dicovered in the realm o f ideas and ideology (indicating 
limitations), in the communicative dynamic o f  norms in ethics, 
epistemology and political practice, in the influence o f  values in the 
formation of world views supporting political action, and in the 
applied cases of deterrence and foreign policy which indicate the 
explanatory capacity of normative theory in key areas of study. The
twin strands of epistcmological and political significance have been 
shown to give normative theory a broad ambit in the study o f  
in terna tional relations.
The Line of Argument
The argument presented here has developed along tw o 
intertwining strands or themes: the first is epistemological; the
second political, in respect to theory. Which o f  these strands
■t
dominates depends to some extent upon the nature o f  the relation 
between theory and practice, but also on the perspective o f  the 
in te r lo c u to r .
On one hand the empirical contingencies of life on earth
create the demand for knowledge and understanding of empirical
facts which impinge upon our lives without regard to our values or
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designs, while at the same time many of the salient features o f  our
world are social, economic and cultural and subject to political 
processes in which historical consciousness of value choices and 
collective aspirations is a vital component - these latter are social or 
institutional facts.
On the other hand, political practices and policy choices
depend on some relatively stable conception of the world in which 
they are made, on grounds of effectiveness, while at the same time 
unfolding events or trends in or around a political system may
escape detection and response if they are not accounted for in the
operative political understanding.
Thus, the two strands o f  cpistemology (or ontology, in the
context o f  culture) and politics are tied up with one another such 
that know ledge is always conditioned  by politica l p rocesses  
(including the politics of knowledge itself) and politics is always
conditioned by the state of knowledge as it bears on political choice 
and action.2
The point of arguing for the cpistcmological priority o f  values 
is not simply to deny factual aspects of international life, but to say 
that w hatever facts are apprehended are apprehended as a 
consequence of normative influences. The intimate relationship o f
facts and values has been acknowledged here from the start. The
issue is the nature of this relationship, which has been examined 
here to show that in every respect values are prior; prior in 
knowledge and prior in politics. Therefore, we should not be 
inclined to make out the facts of international relations in order to
2 The phrase 'as it bears' distinguishes between the state of knowledge as 
among academic theoreticians, who may overestimate their influence, and the state of 
knowledge that informs political processes of everyday life.
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choose appropriate values, but rather to consider what can be made
of these facts in light of our value choices. Unger puts it well:
'Until the present time, few ideas were so widely shared 
among thinkers of the most diverse persuasions as the 
belief that the decisive question for political thought is, 
What can we know? This belief was accompanied by
the doctrine that the manner in which we solve the 
problems of the theory of knowledge in turn depends
on the way we answer questions in political thought. 
The theory of knowledge, according to this conception, 
is part of an inquiry into the psychological question, 
Why do we, as individuals, act as we do? Political theory 
is defined as the study of how men [and women] 
organize their societies and of how society should be
o rg a n iz e d . '■*
In the end, the discussion must come full circle and consider 
once again the character of the is-ought distinction and the 
separation o f  ethics and politics which has generated a marginalised 
and limited form of normative theorising in international relations. 
The determination of 'whai ought to be' in international relations is
not the only or even the chief role of normative theory J n  the study. 
o f  international relations. Prior to and more important than any 
prescriptive statements that a normative theory of international 
relations can produce is the possibility it affords of revealing value­
laden epistemologics and engaging in descriptive analysis o f  the
3 Roberto Mangabcira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975), p. 3.
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moral order of the age.
The p reced ing  exam ination  o f  norm ative  in te rn a t io n a l  
relations theory has focussed on these latter aspects o f  its role, 
partly by making the necessary distinctions to indicate its potential 
for descriptive application in international relations, and partly by 
showing how realist international relations theory has hidden the 
normative dimension of descriptions and explanations. Political 
theory is only possible when the conception of politics is possible, 
and theory is consequently tied to human experience o f  political
practice - in its several guises. This apparently se lf-evident
condition is perhaps neglected in any study which takes a given 
theory or interpretation of reality for granted.
A theory of politics must be a theory of collective life, based
on shared experience, regardless of what transcendent grounds 
there may be for human choice - these latter do not relieve us o f  the 
responsibility  (jointly or severally) for choosing the form our 
collective life. Realism, like religion, allows the world to come to 
terms with its failings. Yet it is insubstantial; political substance 
resides in values, and these are not subject to a final settlement.
In in ternational relations, the natural history o f  social 
interactions ('the history through which they were established and 
n a tu ra l iz e d '4 ) which generate normative structures is characterised,
and challenged, by differences. Differences abound, typically as a
*
result o f  identities grounded in nationhood and citizenship, but also 
in the miriad of cross-culling experiences and loyalties that grow 
out of culture, class, race, religion and gender. Unlimited by the
4 William E. Connolly, 'Identity and Difference in Global Politics' in James Der 
Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (cds), Intcrnational/Intertcxtual Relations: Postmodern 
Readings of World Politics (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 341.
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param eters of the naiion-statc, these islands of difference and 
identity rise out of a sea of human values. The choice of values gives 
gives rise to political issues or struggles, whose resolution is 
necessarily  normative; normative not simply in the sense that
resolutions determine which values ought to prevail, but because 
reso lu tions  represent acknow ledgem ent and acceptance as the
product of a political engagement.
If it is granted that theory and practice are in a dialectical
relationship, it is unlikely that practice will ever conform closely to
the latest theoretical developments or that theories will necessarily 
address the pressing demands of everyday life. Nevertheless, the two 
in fo rm  one an o th e r ,  and know ledge  and p o l i t ic s  share  
characteristics which make them in some sense compatible. It is 
argued here that these characteristics arc normative, and implicate 
values. Values exist both in static empirical facts, and in processes. 
Thus the argument of the combined strands, epistemological and 
political, is that the study of international relations stands in 
relation to the values permeating both its epistemologies and its 
subject matter. Consequently the role of normative theory, capable 
o f  addressing these values, is central to the project of international 
relations in both theory and practice.
It is particularly important to the present discussion that this
relationship between theory and practice - or experience o f  practice
*
- reflects a limitation of normative explanations. It has already been 
said that normative theory cannot account for transcendent belief 
systems except by reducing them to social norms, and that normative 
theory must remain agnostic about the transcendental categories of 
some philosophies. At the same time, it is clear that experience itself
is not lim ited  to an objective  reality , and the re fo re  tha t
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transcendental features of human experience may influence the
apprehension of an acknowledged reality or its attributes. Recall 
Kolakowski's previously cited observation that 'we may not a priori  
exclude the reality of mystical experience that provides some people
with this privileged access; but their experience cannot be re-forged 
into a theory’.5 Thus it remains the case that normative theory can
only account for values that arc 'there', in the political world, and
not for those to which access is privcleged. Normative theory is 
concerned  with the descrip tion and prescrip tion  o f  po li t ic a l  
practice, rather than with an ascription of Truth, notwithstanding 
that ethics and epistemology can be viewed as political practices. 
The well-known normative categories of truth, goodness, and beauty 
must be understood as having an application in the world of human
experience, and therefore always presenting opportun ities  fo r  
establishing ultimate - if contingent - ends.
Normative theory must not fall back upon the ’...teleology and
essentialism  that the modern philosophical tradition was born  
c o m b a t i n g . ’6 On the contrary, it should partake o f  the anti-
foundationalist, dcconstructionist and constructivist developments o f  
postmodern thought where the debate is between a 'code of paradox 
and a code o f  coherence’ - Derrida and Foucault vs  Habermas and
T ay lo r .7
5 Laszek Kolakowski. Metaphysical Horror (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p.
98.
6 Roberto Mangabcira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The Free 
Press, 1975), p. 341.
7 William E. Connolly, 'Identity and Difference in Global Politics', op. cit.% p. 
340. See also K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy (eds). After Philosophy 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987).
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Background Theory
In order to conclude how and why normative theory is part of the 
study of international relations it is necessary to consider what this 
larger project entails. Ordinary accounts of any disciplinary study, 
or science, include the attributes o f  description, explanation and 
understanding, which are valued and justified in terms of the desire 
for prediction. This is not to say that predictive capacity is the only 
or even the most important criterion of good theory, but wherever
the applied purposes of choice and action are at issue some element 
o f  prediction is inevitable. It is hardly necessary at this point to
re i te ra te  the d isc ip l in a ry  c h a ra c te r is t ic s  o f  the s tudy  o f  
international relations, beyond noting that predictive capacity is at 
least as much valued in respect to the weighty issues of international 
affairs as in any of the more restricted ambits of social science or in 
respect to the moral order of any constituent part of international
soc ie ty .
While it may be true that claims to predictive capacity are 
weaker in the social sciences than in the natural sciences and that 
pred ic tion  is largely tangentia l to social theory , there  is 
nevertheless a clear and continuous demand for knowledge about 
socie ties , including the global community (hence in ternational 
relations), with the end-in-vicw or ultimate purpose o f  choosing
• f
options and planning for the future. It would not be an
overstatem ent to claim for normative theory the capacity  to
uncover, examine and criticise the foundations of the theory and
practice of international relations, and thereby create opportunities 
for choosing and planning the moral order of a new age.
If this characterises the task at hand, what contribution does
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normative theory make? The extent of normative structures and 
influences suggests endless actual and possible roles for normative 
theory, but of greatest interest is the notion of a normative 
background theory, as a basis for particular investigations o r  
theore tica l construc ts .  G iven its pa r t icu la r  u se fu lness  in 
ep istem olog ical applications, norm ative theory can p rov ide  a 
stabilis ing b a c k g r o u n d  theory  for ep istem ological com petit ion  
within the study of international relations, since it does not readily 
allow an oversim plified  or particu la ris tic  version o f  'tru th '.  
N orm ative  theory , as a form o f  engagem ent in p o l i t ic a l  
u n d e rs tan d in g ,  also p rov ides  a background  for p u rp o s iv e  
engagement in political life; a means of coping with the rise and fall 
o f  particular practices, and a framework for comprehending the 
nature of the political processes by which these practices come to be 
known, accepted, and ultimately discarded.
The possible applications of theory ’in the background' are as 
numerous as the practical applications which rely on it, and
normative theory is relevant to all aspects of social interaction. This
is significant in a world which is changes rapidly, and in which 
change has an impact on the everyday life of diverse populations. 
The normative dimension of international relations shares the 
cultural aspect o f  more familiar normative activities (influenced by
fashion, for example) in as much as many features of everyday life
*
involve conscious reference to international or global cu ltural
trends which have importance in the immediate social context. The 
m eaning  o f  the global norm ative  s truc tu re  is p layed  out
contingently, in a local context - it is a case of the local-global nexus
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in the realm of ideas.8
Furthermore, we all live - physically and morally - on one 
planet and in one world, whatever ’other worlds' are relevant to us
o r inform our lives.
Because of our common humanity and because of the
needs which every society has to provide for, there is
always available, if not always in evidence, a common 
basis for intercultural com m unication and m utual
appraisal, moral appraisal not excluded.9
A pertinent example is radical social change in the USSR and 
Eastern Europe in and around 1989 (and its continuing effects),
which illustrates socio-political norms dictating social realities in a 
concrete way, with 'reality' changing as a direct result of changing 
ethical, epistemological, theoretical and ideological principles (the 
catalyst being g l a s n o s t )  - literally, a change of mind leading to a 
change of politics. These changes have come about in a global 
context, even though they arc played out in the local (national) life 
o f  the region. A normative theoretical background can usefully 
inform investigation of such events by calling attention to the
normative features of change, rather than simply the machinations
o f  power and wealth.
No doubt general recognition of this background role is only a 
distant possibility, given the tenacity of traditions in international
relations theory. It may even be a disservice to norm ative
8 See The Local-Global Nexus', International Social Science Journal. (Vol. 40, 
No. 117, 1988).
9 Robin Attfield, A Theory of Value and Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 
1987), p. 220.
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theorising to link it to the particular activity of international 
relations scholarship. Chris Brown argues (after Kant) that well 
intentioned "international theory" can only offer sorry comfort to 
the oppressed by attempting to produce normative theory, because 
'acceptance o f  the idea that such theory can be constructed within 
the limits imposed by a separate discourse of international relations
is a crucial handicap to their enterprise’. 10 On this view, the 
broader tradition of political theory is a more appropriate standpoint 
for theorising about international relations. For example, David Held
(a political theorist), in characterising the present international 
o rder  as a hybrid system of persistent sovereign states and 
developing plural authority structures, says that the dangers this 
hybrid signals 'may in principle be surmounted if a multiple system
o f  authority  is bound by fundamental ordering principles and
r u l e s . ' 11 Such a 'multiple system’ falls outside the traditional 
concern with nation-states, but is perhaps well addressed by more 
innovative perspectives on international relations that challenge
tradition. The present argument maintains that there are sufficient 
specific  characteris t ics  o f  international relations to w arrant a
specialised body o f  theory about the subject, but agrees that such 
theory can draw on a broad base of philosophy and social science 
and should not be restricted by cssentialisi or absolutist conceptions
of its subject matter.
I t does not follow from the foregoing argum ents tha t
10 Chris Brown, 'Sorry Comfort? The Case Against "International Theory", 
unpublished conference paper presented to the Inaugural Pan-European Conference 
International Studies of the European Consortium for Political Research, Standing 
Group on International Relations (panel on 'Power and Morality in International 
Relations'), Heidelberg, 16-20 September 1992, p. 4.
11 David Held, 'Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System* in David 
Held (ed). Political Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 226.
304
normative theory is the only kind of theorising worth doing, and
clearly  it has limitations. Yet the normative perspective is 
sufficiently vital to the study of international relations that the case 
for it should be made strongly. If the case is made strongly enough, 
and normative consciousness is incorporated or reincorporated into 
the whole range of approaches to the subject, normative theory can
quickly recede into the background - where it belongs.1 2
Finally, it must be said that the incentive for a study such as 
this is concern with the distance between political practices and the 
human values that they arc intended to further. This is not the place 
to describe the suffering brought by the four horsemen of  the
apocalypse, and in equal measure by political folly, but it should be 
clear enough that the general purpose o f  political systems is to 
improve the human condition. This critical assessment of the role of 
normative theory in the study of international relations is therefore
also a call for change in theoretical practices, since both theoretical 
and practical goals are furthered by reintegrating human values 
into the study of international relations.
Note again Bcilz’s remark that normative ideas are most powerful when 
operating 'in the background'. Charles R. Bcitz, 'Recent International Thought', 
International Journal (Vol. 43, No. 2, Spring 1988), p. 203.
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